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# THE MIND OF ST. PAUL

## A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY

BY

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## PREFACE

THIS volume is not a theology or philosophy, but a psychological study of the mental processes of St. Paul, who was converted from a Jew to a Christian, and in the process converted a Jewish sect into a world-religion.

The subject matter divides itself naturally into three parts. The first consists of a character analysis of Saul the Hebrew; the second analyzes and describes, in terms of mental processes, his notable conversion, and shows the inadequacy of the scientific explanations of that event; the third describes the processes by which St. Paul built his new faith, and especially the place of reason in that process. His experience demonstrates the insufficiency of scientific description and the naturalness of his religion in the light of the newest philosophy and latest interpretations of nature.

My obligations are numerous and are intricately bound up with my experience as a clergyman, teacher and student, so that it is impossible for me to distinguish the aid of any one person without feeling myself similarly indebted to many others likewise. To Dr. F. J. Foakes-Jackson, who has written the introduction and who has made invaluable suggestions regarding the text; to Dr. Fred D. Kershner, of Butler University, who read the manuscript; to my wife, who has been constant in her criticisms and suggestions; to the students at Butler University and to the Clerical Brotherhood of Philadelphia, who listened graciously to much of the subject matter in lectures, I am particularly obliged. References throughout the volume acknowledge other sources of information and this opportunity is taken to express the pleasure I have received from those works.

The aim of the book is frankly practical. It avoids technical terms without sacrificing technical knowledge in the vast field necessarily touched upon. I hope the book may be helpful to that earnest group of men and women who to-day in their private and public lives meet so many of the identical problems attacked and solved by the Great Apostle to the Gentiles and leader of those who seek a religion of experience.

ARTHUR HOLMES

## INTRODUCTION

ST. PAUL is perhaps more alive to-day than he was within a few years of his death, in the churches which he had founded and in the minds of men and women with whom he worked. He is like some mountain, the immensity of which can be realized only when seen from a distance. Of "Lives of St. Paul" there is no end; yet every scholar who attempts to write one finds that some aspect of the Apostle has been overlooked by those who have preceded him in the task. Almost all of us discover in St. Paul something in which we individually are interested, because he succeeds in touching so many chords of human life and thought. Even outside the sphere of theology Paul appeals to the lawyer, the statesman, the philosopher, and scores of others. He has influenced the most powerful intellects of the past, and the best thinkers of our day find it impossible to ignore him. Some have been strongly attracted to him, others repelled; but Paul still demands serious consideration from all.

It is therefore with more pleasure than surprise that we welcome a contribution in regard to this extraordinary man written by a modern psychologist; since no better subject can be chosen to set forward the present ideas of what is claimed to be a new science, in a concrete form.

To one who, like myself, can pretend to no more than an amateur's acquaintance with psychology, the principal attraction of this book lies in the fact that whereas the majority of psychologists use highly technical terms, and treat their science in the abstract, this study presents an application of its principles to a great man familiar to most of us. We are able from his own brief, but astonish-



ingly pregnant writings, to trace the workings of the mind of one of the greatest religious geniuses of all time, of which Dr. Holmes has given an explanation in the light of the psychology of to-day.

But to understand St. Paul a writer needs to be in sympathy with him in his religious aspirations and emotions; for the result of a coldly critical examination of the Apostle must inevitably be disastrous. No "mechanist" could arrive at a result of any value in dealing with a man of such exceptional qualities. What is needed is one who himself has had spiritual experience, and, like St. Paul, has also been a teacher and a guide to others. Here Dr. Holmes proves that he is admirably fitted to be an interpreter of one who was preëminently a missionary and a pastor.

It is always dangerous to predict the fate of any book which is offered to the public, especially if it is, as this volume purports to be, designed rather to help those who need guidance than to awe the scholarly with a parade of erudition, although Dr. Holmes' pages are filled with the results of wide and deep study. But I confess that I should be in no wise surprised if this book proved itself to be an epoch-making attempt toward a true estimate of the Apostle to the Gentiles.

F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON

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# **THE MIND OF ST. PAUL**



# THE MIND OF ST. PAUL

## CHAPTER I

### THE MAN

ST. PAUL stands out peaklike among the makers of history. With uncommon power he attracts us to his every thought and act, and especially to those attributes which he shared in common with other men of lesser order. His personality presents two distinct aspects. One side of him was turned perpetually heavenward, whence, in ways past analyzing, he received messages of strength, comfort and revelation. The other side, turned toward this world, offers a study at once fascinating and difficult. The two combined give us the man, a union of two worlds. The heavenly influences, passing through his personality like light through colored glass, took on the color of the human medium through which they came, and so appear to us in forms describable by psychology.

For the profit of our own piety and for the aid of practical religion we will examine this man's personality and analyze the powerful, though humble, processes of his mind. For it is vastly interesting and immeasurably valuable to discover what this founder of the church and favored apostle of God himself experienced, and also what he thought about the ideas, feelings and decisions of men in general, especially in relation to that all-absorbing matter of religion, to which as Jew and Gentile apostle he devoted his entire life without stint, literally to the last drop of his blood. This man of whom it was said, "He has the habits of a psychologist; he is one by instinct and nature; he

reads his own soul and the souls of other men,"<sup>1</sup> is the object of our reverence and the subject of our study.

A study of St. Paul's personality must include a study of his psychology. For though our modern science is impersonal, among those sciences classified as humanistic the one standing closest to human nature is psychology. As a result, any mental philosophy formulated into a coherent system will bear on its face some marks of the author's own character. Such signs of individual workmanship, in a scientific age, may be almost obliterated, but they never entirely disappear. In the apostolic age the personal impress of each thinker upon his system was boldly evident.

With the understanding that what is meant by modern science is a body of knowledge organized after the most simple pattern and bent upon describing a mechanical world in all its detailed motions, the student is better able to place psychology in its proper setting, to appreciate its definitions, its varieties and the motives influencing its origin, its stages of development and its present condition.

For, despite the fact that the word "psychology"<sup>2</sup> is on the lips of almost everyone, and has a wider and more popular application than perhaps any other branch of learning, its meaning, its scope and its particular method are still matters of experiment and discussion amongst the experts themselves. No apology to nontechnical readers is therefore required for any attempt to make this unwieldy word, drunken with many meanings, to walk in the strait and narrow way of our purpose to show what position this member holds in the family of modern sciences.

Being as it is a pure, inductive science, it is not metaphysics, nor philosophy, nor religion, nor hypnotism, nor mental healing, nor psychic research, nor any one of a dozen other varieties of learning, forming congeries sane and good at the center, but shading off into fringes whose

<sup>1</sup> T. R. Glover, *Paul of Tarsus*, 1925, p. 77.

<sup>2</sup> James Ward's article "Psychology," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, still remains valuable for the general reader.

twilight zones afford such delicious sporting ground for those pseudo-scientific vagaries frequently exploited commercially. In fact the word "psychology" is almost never used in the same sense by popular writers and the technical expert. The latter would never speak seriously about "a psychological moment," or call some whim, or fashion, or tendency "psychological." Neither does his science have anything to do with "subjective" and "objective minds," "new thought," "faculties," "spiritualism," "souls," "spirits" and other entities, except insofar as the psychologist may make incursions into metaphysical and theological regions, recognized only because, like clouds floating above a landscape, they account for some of the dark areas in the field of his descriptive science.

In its long and venerable history mental philosophy, as it was so long called, is most remarkable, perhaps, for the length of time it escaped subsumption under the method of modern inductive sciences. Its submission to that régime marks distinctly the line between the "old" and "new" psychologies, a distinction which at best is short-lived, and which finds a legitimate place only in a historical study of any subject. The history of psychology can be conveniently divided into four parts: (1) from Aristotle, fourth century, B.C., to the Scholastics, about the twelfth century, A.D., in which period it became a body of increasingly well-organized knowledge, derived from observation, introspection, and logical reasonings based upon premises partly adopted from theology; (2) from the Scholastics to Immanuel Kant, eighteenth century, the era being marked by more minute and systematic organization of material leading up to the unification of all conscious processes in the intellect, or reason, omitting the will and making emotions confused ideas; (3) from Kant to modern psycho-physics founded by Weber, Fechner and Wundt, being introduced by Kant's endorsement of Tetens' tripartite division of the Soul into three faculties, intellectual, emotional and volitional; and then (4) with the omission of the Soul from



consideration, and with the application of the measuring rod to the processes of human consciousness, and the founding of the first psychological laboratory in the world by Wilhelm Wundt, at Leipsic, Germany, in 1879.

The old faculty or Soul psychology displaced by Wundt—if the conventional definition of science as an organized body of knowledge is accepted—presented one of the most perfect sciences man has ever formulated. It began with a definition of the Soul, and then by logic proceeded to define the Soul's faculties in detail. But that procedure denied it a place among the accredited inductive sciences. Only when "a remarkable school of workers in Germany" undertook "the novel task of interrogating the relations of the body and mind from the standpoint of physics" by applying the "vernier and the balance, as far as might be, to the intangible processes of the mind,"\* was the new science of psychology made. Measurement made it. How that was done is too involved in mathematics for discussion here, except to say that the psychologist uses both observation and introspection in the measurement of outward expressions of inward experiences.

In Germany the new science, under the leadership of Wilhelm Wundt,<sup>4</sup> went chiefly by the name of psychophysics, and in the British Isles, under the direction of Alexander Bain,<sup>5</sup> it was called physiological-psychology. The difference lay chiefly in the fact that the Germans emphasized measurement in their investigations, and a mathematically determined relationship between mind and body, while the British adopted psychophysical-parallelism, a looser and more common-sense theory of that relationship. The common factor in both was the introduction of

\* H. S. Williams, *History of Science*.

<sup>4</sup> Wilhelm Wundt, *Grundsätze der Physiologischen Psychologie*, 1908, 6th ed., Vol. I, Intro., p. 1, defines psychology. His *Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology*, 1892, trans. by Creighton and Titchner, 1894, Part I, p. 2, lec. 1, gives the province of psychology.

<sup>5</sup> *The Senses and the Intellect*, 1894.

observation by which the inductive method of general science was introduced into mental philosophy. The Soul was dropped from consideration.

But once mental science adopted induction and thus became a science similar to physics and chemistry, the elimination of introspection was inevitable. For modern science insists that all its facts shall always be open to verification by many witnesses. But a man's report of what goes on in his own mind cannot be verified by witnesses. Therefore, such testimony cannot be admitted to science as facts. Psychology took the inevitable plunge and discarded introspection entirely. Behaviorism is the result.\* It takes cognizance only of the movements of the body. That step constitutes the final movement in a logical development which began with introspection, passed through physiological-psychology, and now ends with measurement of body motions.

To-day many varieties of psychology still persist. The general field is divided between the Behaviorists and the Mentalists, the latter still holding that mental science should study mind. These subdivide themselves into several schools. The Intellectualists magnify perception, memory, imagination and reason; the Voluntarists make will, or conation,<sup>7</sup> or energy, primary, and think of experience as dynamic; the Freudians, while accepting the primacy of will with Schopenhauer, have done much to bring emotions into prominence.<sup>8</sup>

The scope of psychology has received much study and its field has been defined chiefly by two factors: one, the inductive method of science; and the other, the mechanical ideal of the world. The latter grows out of the former. For the inductive method depends upon the special senses

\* J. B. Watson, *Psychology*, 1919; E. A. Singer, *Mind as Behavior*, 1924.

<sup>7</sup> Wm. McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, 1922.

<sup>8</sup> *Psychologies of 1925*, lectures by several authors, gives an account of the present-day varieties of the study.

for its facts. Such facts must be physical, or material. Therefore, such a science assumes the existence of a world made up of particles of matter moving according to uniform laws. The influence of such an assumption is plainly visible throughout physics, chemistry, biology and behavioristic psychology.

Modern science also asserts that it can predict coming events with exactitude. Such an assertion rests upon the assumed uniformity of motions in the world, expressed in the principle of universal causality—everything has a cause, and the principle of uniformity—the same cause always produces the same effect.

In addition, modern scientists claim that their inductive method is the only one that will give any knowledge; and more, that it gives all the knowledge man can gain.\* These three demands—the senses alone give us knowledge, all events conform to law, and induction possesses the sole proprietorship and complete monopoly of knowledge-making—effectually exclude certain types of psychology from the study of St. Paul's religion, or any other religion.

For Behaviorism either ignores or else denies the existence of personality with its free-will and its inner life invisible to observation by the senses. But religion demands personalities,<sup>10</sup> free-will and the possibility of God's breaking the law of uniformity and performing miracles. Religion, unlike any special science, must consider the whole universe as its field, and cannot leave out of account any part or parcel of ground in that vast territory.

In this volume, therefore, we will make use of applied psychology, the unit of which is not an electron, or atom, but a person; and the method of which includes introspection as well as observation. Other working principles may from time to time appear, and will justify themselves by being applied to the task in hand.

\* Karl Pearson, *Grammar of Science*, 1911, Intro.

<sup>10</sup> A. Knudson, *Philosophy of Personalism*, 1927, carries forward the philosophy of B. P. Bowne, 1908.

This brief survey of psychology may well bring the query: Did St. Paul possess, in any modern sense of the word, a system of psychology? The answer must be rather guarded. Like all men of his time, he tacitly, if not explicitly, recognized that people in general thought, felt and acted alike. St. Paul necessarily assumed and made use of these similarities of mental structure and function which knew no artificial national boundaries, barriers of race, nor breadth of seas. More than that, insofar as he studied and knew the systematized knowledge of his day that dealt with the mind of man, he possessed a psychology. On the whole, we may define his mental philosophy as common sense applied to human nature.<sup>11</sup>

As far as we can discover what it was, by his casual references to it, it was of that variety now called physiological-psychology. It unquestioningly recognized the unity of the Soul, or mind, and body. Moreover, it also accepted the time-honored doctrine which made the "heart" the seat of the Soul. That word applied to, first, the physical organ itself, much as we now use the brain. Then it also was used to indicate the mind in its threefold aspect of intellect, emotions and will. It was the focal point of the personality. The idea is found throughout the Old Testament, and both Plato and Aristotle connected the heart with some processes of consciousness. The theory is summed up in the words, "Out of the heart are the issues of life" (Prov. iv. 23); in the thought of Jesus (Mt. xv. 10-20); and in the words of St. Paul, "With the heart man believeth unto righteousness; and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation" (Rom. x. 10). As the physical organ was single, central, throbbing with life and blood, it easily became the center of a man's whole personality.

How the mind developed St. Paul does not say. He hints at a growth in saying, "When I was a child, I spake . . . felt . . . thought as a child; but now that I have become

<sup>11</sup> Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible, and Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, articles "Heart," "Soul," "Psychology."

a man I have put away childish things" (I Cor. xiii. 11). He very probably accepted the doctrine that the Soul came from God, but how the mind, or consciousness, was related to the Soul, or Spirit (Heb. *nephesh*, *ruach*; Greek, *pneuma*, *psuche*), he did not indicate. On the whole, his common-sense psychology approaches much nearer to the popular thought of to-day than it does to the analytic, abstract science taught in the universities. Our study will make use both of the Apostle's statements and also of his patent assumptions, with gaps filled in at times by legitimate inferences.

This definition of method, broad as it is, still reveals certain limitations when it is applied to an analysis of St. Paul's personality. For he himself—it is frequently asserted—taught a tripartite division of the human being into "spirit and soul and body" (I Thess. v. 38). Be that as it may—and the matter is in dispute<sup>12</sup>—psychology as a descriptive science may for its purposes admit that a human personality consists of (1) Spirit or Soul; (2) mind as consciousness; (3) and a body, all united in one organic, functioning whole defined as a unity of unities. But, since the Spirit or Soul is transcendent, or never comes under the immediate observation of either the special senses or introspection, it is a subject for discussion by theology or metaphysics, and not for descriptive science. Modern psychology may freely admit the existence of such a simple-spiritual substance, or of pure activity, but it confines its attention to the behavior of the body as a whole and to the processes of the mind as they appear in all human beings. We will begin the analysis of St. Paul's personality with a very brief study of some of the salient features of his body.

Physiological-psychology is heartily seconded by popular curiosity in being interested in the physical appearance of Saul. But both can be only moderately satisfied by "A

<sup>12</sup> E. Kautsch, "Religion of Israel," in *Hastings, Dictionary of the Bible*, Ex. Vol., pp. 664ff.

plain and unflattering account of him," one that "goes back ultimately to a document of the first century,"<sup>1\*</sup> and which seems therefore "to embody a very early tradition." That all too brief account says that Saul was "bald-headed, bow-legged, strongly built, a man of small size, with meeting eyebrows and a rather long nose," yet withal "so full of grace" that "at times he looked like a man, and at other times he had the face of an angel." Such is the barest sketch of his personal appearance. It is interesting in the light of some references in the Scriptures to his unimpressive physical equipment, his weak body, his ailments, all of which must be considered in the light of his gigantic labors and his endless endurance of pains and exhausting fatigue.

The sources of information concerning St. Paul's life and acts are found in his Epistles, in the Book of Acts, and in tradition. The historical worth of these three sources varies much. How much value must be assigned to each is a subject too far afield for a psychological analysis of character to undertake. What the Apostle says of himself in his accepted letters is naturally of the most worth; what he is reported in Acts to have said of himself and what is reported of him come next; what tradition says comes last.

The discrepancies that exist among these sources are many and varied. It seems best for us to follow what is most generally accepted by the best scholarship of the day. Since the most generally accepted conclusions appear in works of reference, we have referred to such works very freely. Since the Revised Version of the Bible contains the most familiar statements, and because the aim of this work is to furnish religious workers with a practical aid, we have quoted the English Bible, mentioning the Greek and Hebrew words only when necessary.

Such a procedure does not seek to ignore the problems

<sup>1\*</sup> Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, "St. Paul"; James, *Apocryphal New Testament*, Oxford, "Acts of Paul and Thekla."

of literary, historical and textual criticism involved in any study of St. Paul.<sup>14</sup> But in a psychological study, many items highly important to theology and biblical interpretation may be and sometimes must be omitted from consideration. A man's character stands out above the thousands of incidents he experiences and the millions of words he utters. Only critical incidents and significant words count in forming an estimate of him.

For example, the Book of Acts presents three accounts of St. Paul's conversion: one by the author of the book, and the other two reports of the Apostle's own story. They differ widely in details. Acts ix. 7 seems to contradict Acts xxii. 9 about Saul's companions hearing the voice. To the old impressionistic psychology, with its theory of "real," external stimuli, this was important. To the new psychology and philosophy, which do not necessarily believe that a perception is caused by an external, independently existing object, the question of "subjectivity" and "objectivity" falls into oblivion. This example at once illustrates the nature of a psychological study and its function of throwing new light upon biblical problems.

The personality of such a man, even in the comparatively superficial sense of the word as referring to physical and external qualities in a man by which he makes himself impressive in any company, has its place and demands attention in connection with this singular being. His personal appearance must have exhibited something distinctive if not impressive.

The thumbnail sketch of Saul given above offers a fair idea of his physical appearance. Only a few details can be added to that picture, etched in by imagination as much as by tradition. He was a Jew and therefore bore in his posture and manner, as well as in his complexion and features, evidences of his origin. His posture in youth may

<sup>14</sup> For the importance of such studies see B. W. Bacon, *Mystical Experiences of St. Paul*, Part I; *At One with the Invisible*, ed. by E. H. Sneath, 1921.

have been erect and his bearing proud, but in age he must have been somewhat stooped under the overwhelming trials and cares weighing upon him. In action he was quick, energetic and decided, controlling his body with muscles hardened early by manual work at tent-making. His hands evidenced the nature of his occupation in their sinewy strength and power (Acts xx. 34, xviii. 3). His energy exhibited itself in his speech, rude to the fastidious Greek ear, eager, fervent, hurrying on to the all-important end of conveying inspiration or instruction. His physical constitution was, in spite of his own confessions of weakness and illness, tough and enduring; for no weakling could have stood the labors and privations he underwent. His deprecatory statements were dictated by a spirit too powerful, lodged in a body, by comparison with it, weak solely in the face of superhuman tasks. In age that body seems to have retained much of its sturdy energy, and his soul not to have abated any of its spirit. Possibly his last years of enforced rest in prison preserved his strength and gave him leisure from travel to work to the end (Phil. i. 12-18; II Cor. x. 10; II Cor. iv. 7, v. 1, xii. 7; Phil. iii. 21; Gal. iv. 13, 14; I Cor. xv. 31).

Much has been made of his bodily ailments. At times he suffered acute attacks of illness (Acts xiii. 14; Gal. iv. 13-16). The nature of these attacks we cannot guess. They never seem to have prostrated him utterly. Contrasted with them is the chronic "thorn in the flesh." The attention devoted to surmises of its nature probably lend it a disproportionate importance. Whatever the Apostle may have felt about it—and his feelings seem to be acute on the subject—it did not incapacitate him from achieving a success of which he was not altogether insensible (Gal. iv. 13-15). It seemed to be an affliction—whether of body or mind is not absolutely clear—more irritating than serious perhaps, though humiliating to him personally, and both inimical to his ambition and mysterious in its origin, a messenger of Satan, to be cured by prayer rather than by



medicine. It may have been (1) epilepsy, (2) hysteria, (3) ophthalmia, (4) malarial fever,<sup>18</sup> (5) headache, or migraine.

Citations and surrounding circumstances exclude (1) spiritual temptations to pride, etc., (2) carnal incitements, a theory based on incorrect renditions of *stimulus carnis*, (3) human opponents of his work. On the whole, the malady, whatever it was, does not seem to have affected his character for good or bad, nor to have wrought significant damage upon his bodily endurance or upon his mental powers. It does appear to have been a burden for St. Paul to bear; a clearly recognized and serious affliction, not foolishly denied, but treated with sanity and common sense and, in the final resort, by prayer to God, who did not relieve the affliction, but supplied the fortitude to endure it, and the faith that turned it into a means of greater grace.

His nervous system was high-strung and sensitive. He quivered with nervous energy. Nothing of the stolid and phlegmatic disposition of the Stoic ever reflected itself in his behavior. The impetuosity of his style in speaking and writing testify to the nervous tension under which he lived and worked. His gestures were apparently quick and decisive, themselves expressing a commanding power or nerve energy (Acts xlii. 9, xiv. 12-14, xx. 34, xxiii. 1-6, xxvi. 1; Gal. iii. 1; Phil. iii. 18). Nevertheless, in all the fine sensitiveness he exhibited there can be nothing discovered which can be indubitably pronounced abnormal. His quick, energetic actions were coördinated and purposive; his peculiarities of style easily explained by his intense desires and his haste; his emotional irruptions quite in harmony with his intense affection for his disciples, his religious fervency and devotion to his work.

Thus far we may go with some assurance of reconstruct-

<sup>18</sup> Wm. Ramsay, *St. Paul, the Traveller*, 1898, p. 94; T. R. Glover, *Paul of Tarsus*, 1925.

ing the great Apostle's physical person as it appeared to men. Naturally the reconstruction cannot be complete or accurate. That dread of idolatry, so justified by the persistence of human longing for the material manifestation of the spiritual, has divinely protected Christians from worshipping the images of the Apostles by hiding forever from human sight any sure knowledge of their physical appearances. But their spiritual or inner personalities are not so concealed; and we may turn from a study of Saul's body to his mind and behavior with more confidence of securing trustworthy results.

Besides his body he possessed also, as part of himself, a mind. For purposes of character analysis, we may diagram that mind in the following form. He was:

I. Intellect

- A. Perceiving sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, etc.
- B. Remembering, or (a) retaining, (b) recalling, and (c) recognizing past experiences.
- C. Imagining, in (a) fancy, or (b) constructive imagination.
- D. Reasoning, by (1) discerning (a) two ideas in logic are identical, (b) two quantities in mathematics are equivalent; (2) understanding, discerning a partial identity in a complex whole, i.e. soot and diamonds are carbon; (3) judging, discerning efficient means to ends.

II. Emotion

- A. Feeling pains and pleasures.
- B. Primary emotions arising from instincts.
- C. Secondary, or compound emotions in sentiments.
- D. Derived emotions, coming from sentiments, like joy over the good fortune of a friend.

- III. Volition, Conation, Will, striving in:
- A. Automatic reactions, like heartbeat.
  - B. Reflexes.
  - C. Instinctive, or inborn impulses.
  - D. Ideational, purposive, or voluntary acts.
  - E. Acquired habits.

This bird's-eye view of the various mental processes must be considered a unitary whole, diagrammed here in parts to make distinctions in phases of a single proceeding. A person cannot, for example, think and not feel or will at the same time. He is indissolubly one, made so by the fundamental characteristic of striving for some goal at each moment of his life. Moreover, the above processes are not peculiar to any one person, but are the mental processes common to all men.

For purposes of study, the whole personality is often divided into inherited and developed parts. St. Paul's inheritance, organic and social, is mentioned in several places. He was a Hebrew of the Hebrews, of the tribe of Benjamin—King Saul's tribe—but his father was a Roman citizen (Phil. iii. 5; Rom. xi. 1; Acts xvi. 37, xxii. 25, 28). Beyond these few facts and the mention of a sister, her son and a few other relatives, practically nothing is known about his family, though surmises may aid us to fill out this meager information.

His social inheritance, comprising his home surroundings and the city and country in which he lived, must be imagined rather than described. How much he absorbed from his home city of Tarsus in Cilicia as a boy, and how much from Jerusalem as a student and man, it is hard to say. The first-named city, with its location, internal affairs, university, streets, wharfs, etc., can be fairly well reconstructed; the second is, of course, well known. But how much they affected the character of the man remains, and must remain, to a large extent, a mere estimate. The age at which he left Tarsus for Jerusalem—a fact of vital moment in determining the effects wrought upon the boy

by such comparatively subtle influences as education, philosophic atmosphere, Hellenic culture, home-training, and physical environment—is unknown.

The education of the boy came through his home, his school and his social contacts. His home was probably well-to-do. He enjoyed there the companionship of a sister (Acts xxiii. 16) and probably other relatives about his own age (Rom. xvi. 7, 11). His book learning began and proceeded like that of any other Jewish boy similarly situated. Greek was his mother tongue, and he knew also Hebrew (Acts xxii. 2, xxvi. 14), Aramaic, and possibly also Latin. The Greco-Roman world was his world, though his background in thought is principally Semitic, and his religion at first Jewish. He was nourished on the Septuagint of the Old Testament, upon certain Apocalyptic books, and studied under Gamaliel at Jerusalem. The Greco-Roman culture does not seem to have affected very much the character of this essentially devout and fanatic young Jew.<sup>1\*</sup>

The word "character" has a long and honorable lineage. It comes from a root which meant "to engrave." Its first nominative meaning, therefore, signified a mark placed on an object to give it individuality, usually the mark of ownership. Then its meaning grew to include any graphic symbol; then a style of writing; then, figuratively, to indicate any appearance or outward trait viewed as a sign of the real nature of a thing or person. This thought was enlarged until it referred to the aggregate or sum of qualities and features by which a person or thing is distinguished from all others, or is individualized. Roman Catholic theology still retains the ancient signification when it defines character as that "spiritual sign impressed upon the

<sup>1\*</sup> Wm. Ramsay, *St. Paul*, 1896, pp. 354ff., for some similarities with Seneca; also F. J. Foakes-Jackson, *The Life of St. Paul, the Man and the Apostle*, 1926, Chap. IV; T. R. Glover, *Paul of Tarsus*, Chaps. I, II; *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Paul," by A. Menzies and Wm. Edie; Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, "Paul, the Apostle," by G. G. Findlay.

soul by the sacraments of baptism, confirmation and holy orders, by which the recipient is in some special way marked for the worship of God." The longing for visible marks was answered by the church with stigmatization, by which the scars of the crucifixion appeared on some of the saints.<sup>17</sup> Possibly St. Paul may refer to such signs when he asserts that he bears "branded on his body the marks of Jesus" (Gal. vi. 17), though more probably he is thinking of the marks of service and suffering left upon him, possibly as much a beautification of his soul as a scarification of his body.

In modern times Immanuel Kant gave the term a new turn by differentiating between the empirical and the intelligible characters, and then between the physical and moral characters, and by placing the latter under the control of the will. "The foundation of character is the absolute unity in the inner principle of conduct,"<sup>18</sup> or categorical imperative, or Golden Rule, he said. Thus man's acquired constitution became a distinctly moral construction, not imposed upon him from without either by an agent or by nature. It is the product made by the person working from within by his own will. The conception has spread from Kant and has gone out in ever-widening circles, so that now character-making is the concern of education, secular and religious, and the chief study of society and the individual.

Neither does character reside in any unique quality. It appears in the ratios which human actions and qualities hold to each other in any individual's constitution and function. In such a blend is found that peculiar tang of personality known as individuality, or stamp, or character. The elements of character are given at birth, their organization and development are matters of self-determination.

This ability of men to manufacture their own characters, and the implied freedom they possess in doing so, gives

<sup>17</sup> G. B. Cutten, *Psychological Phenomena of Christianity*, 1908, Chap. VIII.

<sup>18</sup> *Anthropologie*.

ground for the common recognition, often painful enough, that people make both weak and strong characters for themselves. A weak person is one who is driven hither and thither by every passion, changed by every object that arouses his separate instincts, by every desire or aversion that may be contained in his haphazard sentiments. The strong character is the man who has organized himself around some end, aim, goal, purpose or ideal in life, has brought all his powers, native and acquired, into harmony with that ideal, and strives for it with all his concentrated energy. The nature of the goal determines the quality of the man. If he has a set goal, he is strong; if his goal is bad, he is bad, yet strong; if it is good, he is strong and good. Strength of character lies in the organization of the whole man, the integration of his personality into a harmoniously working whole.

Such a man is dominated by a master sentiment. It may be the desire for fame or glory, love of money, hope of heaven, devotion to virtue. The good, strong man is he whose master sentiment is self-respect, which sets for him the highest moral ideal he can conceive, and who strives consistently and persistently toward it, using every means available to approximate his ideal ever more closely.<sup>1\*</sup> The ideal person is symbolized by a cone whose apex is the ideal of the Perfect Man, whose body includes interest in every idea, person and thing in the universe, and whose base represents the congruent actions flowing from the ideal and interests, all harmoniously organized and functioning together for the supreme ideal. How closely Saul of Tarsus approximated this ideal, how his conversion affected it, and how St. Paul was built up in it will be the subject of the following chapters.

Since the essence of human personality lies in man's striving toward goals, we will define will, in its widest sense,

<sup>1\*</sup> A. F. Shand, *Foundations of Character*, 1914; Wm. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 1924; *Principles of Character-Making*, 1913, by the author.

as (1) the conative power, or spiritual energy, (2) derived from the source of all energy, (3) showing itself in man's automatisms, reflexes, instinctive actions, voluntary, rational or purposive actions, and in his acquired habits, (4) all marked by the common characteristic of striving for some goal. Without question St. Paul possessed an abundance, seemingly an inexhaustible store of this energy, replenished it may be at needful moments from mystical sources by direct communication from God.

But a strong will must not be confused with mere expenditure of bodily energy in sporadic motions. Many a weak-willed man is incessantly active, never-resting, always on the go, without a lazy bone in his body. But he runs hither and thither, from pillar to post; he is vacillating, unreliable, swept by gusts of passion and moved by every wind of doctrine. St. Paul's pre-conversion character exhibited a will that was more the expression of his natural passion, his native temperament, and the occasion of the moment than the power of an energy disciplined in service of a great purpose. From this weak will his conversion changed him mightily (Acts viii. 1, ix. 1-3).

His conversion changed his striving for projects and for temporary goals into devotion to one, single, supreme and eternal ideal, or end—the continual growth into Christ-likeness (Eph. iv. 12; Phil. iii. 12, 13; Col. iii. 10). All other things were means to that end (Col. iii. 17; I Cor. ix. 19-23; Phil. iii. 16). From that end and its pursuit no circumstance, be it tribulation, or anguish, or persecution, or peril, or famine, or nakedness, or sword; nor those persuasions harder to resist—prophecies of companions, petitions of friends, the drawing power of love; nor any being, demoniac or divine, could separate the Apostle who had tasted the Love of Christ (Rom. viii. 35-37; Acts xx. 24, xxi. 13). Even death itself is welcomed as means to that end (Rom. xiv. 8; Phil. i. 21).

From a vital, conscious devotion to this goal and the use of means thereto, St. Paul was never decoyed by the insidi-

ous process of permitting his daily service to God or man to pass over into mechanical habits, a tendency resulting from many character-making processes. In view of the excessive place given in all systems of moral training to habit-making, it is indeed surprising to find how little St. Paul makes of this "second nature" either in himself or in his teachings to his disciples.

The intellectual processes of consciousness are usually summed up by psychologists under perception, memory, imagination and reason. Under these heads we will study Saul's intellect, a power marvelously well balanced with his emotions and will. His general intelligence, could it have been measured by our present-day mental tests, would have rated very high. His education and his writings place that beyond question. His ability to stand with dignity before rulers, to oppose successfully the dignitaries of his own people, to appear with assurance before the learned philosophers of Athens, to plead his case before the tribunal at Rome, and to address them all in speeches that revealed a sure contact with a general knowledge of the world, adds to the other testimony its own weighty and decisive evidence of the high mentality of the man.

A more detailed analysis of his intellectual processes corroborates this first impression of his high general intelligence. His perceptions—at any rate, after he had aged some and suffered much—were not all equally keen. His eyesight was probably poor. During his trial at Jerusalem he apparently failed at first to distinguish the figure and features of the high-priest from others (Acts. xxiii. 1-5). Possibly his indifference to beauty also testifies to such a defect.

His memory was marvelously comprehensive. It held tenaciously the names of many people (Rom. xvi.), and kept stored ready for use the accumulated details of vast and widely separated interests concerning the various churches he planted. It recalled readily, in the haste of his fervid composition, many quotations from the Old Testa-



ment. It was well organized, holding its material in a form ready to be poured out in sermon or epistle with little if any revision. In short, St. Paul was gifted naturally with what psychologists call a good physiological memory, and he diligently organized this gift into a memory that retained, recalled and recognized its store with quick and ready balance, and with fine aptness for both practical and theoretical ends. It is not often that a man possesses both the memory power and the reasoning power that he exercised so freely. With too much reason, he would have been a mere theologian; with too much memory, a preacher of doctrines he had learned. But his memory, like a good treasurer, served his reason, the captain of his thinking, with an ever-ready store of facts for organization and debate.

Such a memory laid the foundation and furnished the material for Paul's powerful constructive imagination. Before that faculty we must stand in continual awe, so rounded was it, so ready to seize upon widely separated details and mold them into theological, poetical or practical forms appearing in doctrinal systems evermore the wonder and delight of scholars, into poems of rare and intense feeling, into great organizations of people diverse in race, nation, language, temperament and thought, into lawyers' briefs of direct and clear cogency, or into homely advice on personal matters. His creations are to-day and will ever remain a body of literature as varied and vital as the genius of Shakespeare might envy.

Closely allied with imagination stands reason, a threefold process of noting intuitively and instantly identity of ideas in logic and quantities in mathematics; of understanding that partial identity exists in complex situations; of judging what ends are supreme and what means will most efficiently achieve ends sought. With all three of these capacities St. Paul was bountifully supplied. His intuitive reason makes him one of the greatest thinkers of all time; his understanding penetrates the most complex situations,

social, economic, philosophic; his judgment makes him the organizer, executive and arbiter of a world-wide, age-long movement. His ready judgment is startling. It saves him at Damascus from an early death, prevents the suicide of the Philippian jailor under dramatic circumstances and enhances his own standing at Philippi; it makes him a tactful speaker and endows him with common sense to advise on all manner of life problems, personal and congregational; it frees him from illegal scourging and enables him to leap like lightning from the encircling net of death at Cæsarea and use the situation as a means for accomplishing his long-nourished purpose to go to Rome; it makes him leader on shipboard and, we may guess, does not desert him in his final hour when he dies like a Roman under the sword instead of like a Christian upon the cross.

## CHAPTER II

### ST. PAUL'S EMOTIONS

GREAT as the intellect of St. Paul was, and powerful as his will appeared to be, each was equaled and balanced by his always deep and vigorous emotions.<sup>1</sup> They ran the whole gamut in him from the most poignant pain to the highest pleasure, from the deepest sorrow to the supreme bliss of ecstasy, experienced directly in and for himself or in sympathy with others (II Cor. xi. 16-32). In his own character they not only played an important rôle, but through him they entered into and fired with a holy flame that religion which he established among the Gentiles. Far from denying the presence of pain and sorrow in the life of mankind, he, like his Master, recognized them as realities neither to be removed by fatuously ignoring their existence nor mitigated by vainly attaching to them soothing misnomers.

An analysis of the man reveals him not only powerfully gifted with intellect, emotions and will, but on his first appearance in history (Acts vii. 58, viii. 1, ix. 1) it also shows him to be a personality apparently yet unorganized, devoted to a temporary and unsatisfying campaign against the Nazarenes, and swayed by passions seemingly uncontrolled, if not uncontrollable (Acts ix. 1, xxvi. 11), breathing themselves out in mad threatenings and slaughter

<sup>1</sup> A. Bain, *Emotions and the Will*, 1859. James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, Chap. XXV, gives the famous James-Lange theory of emotions; C. Lange, *Ueber Bemuetsbewegungen*, trans. by H. Kurella; G. F. Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, 2d ed., 1901; Wm. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 1908; and J. Ward, art. "Psychology," *Encyc. Brit.*, 11th ed., criticize the James-Lange theory.

against the Way. Evidently this man of great natural gifts had not yet succeeded in organizing his innate powers into that world-dominating personality he later became. The ingredients were there, but the combination, a rare one, indeed, had not been effected. "Logic, love of truth, argument, courage and intuition, with extreme swiftness of mind and a quick temper—a man of passion and of reason . . . born like the ancient Athenians, 'neither to keep quiet, nor to leave other people quiet,' " is the way Glover<sup>2</sup> characterizes this man who was destined to sway the world. In that project, as well as in the man's own character, his emotions played their magnificent part. To their conflicts he owed his conversion and in their final hierarchial organization the man and the Apostle found his peace. How this was accomplished will be shown in the next several chapters.

Saul had not found peace. For him this was a peculiar tragedy. For his Orientalism, his racial inheritance and his religious training all conspired to make him value peace of mind above rubies and fine gold. On every hand he heard it wished upon him. His friends greeted him and left him with the benediction of peace upon their lips (Gen. xliii. 23; Lu. ii. 14, x. 5, xxiv. 36; Jno. xx. 19; cf. his epistolary greetings). The name of his city, Jerusalem, probably means "the abode of peace."<sup>3</sup> His religion taught him that peace was the proper state of a soul right with God.

Peace is a derived emotion; it must come from something else. It cannot stand alone in consciousness. Saul was right in thinking that if he was to escape the uneasiness of transient peace it must come not from the world (Jno. xiv. 27, xvi. 33) nor from external circumstances (Lu. xii. 19; Is. xxxii. 11; Am. vi. 1); nor is there peace for the wicked (Is. xlviii. 18, 22, lvii. 21; Jer. iv. 10, vi. 14; Ez. xiii. 10; Ps. xxxviii. 3; Rom. viii. 7; Col. i. 21). On the contrary, he who possesses righteousness should also possess

<sup>2</sup> *Paul of Tarsus*, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, "Jerusalem," by C. R. Conder; *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Peace," by R. L. Ottley.

peace (Gen. xv. 15; Is. xxxii. 17; Ps. xxxiv. 14, lxxxv. 10, "righteousness and peace have kissed each other"; cxix. 165, "great peace have they that love thy law"). In Saul's mind righteousness and peace should attend one another as the dawn does the morning (Rom. xiv. 17).

Yet he himself, possessor of that righteousness found in the Law, had missed peace. Where lay the fault? Did he, as Job's comforters hinted to that patriarch, cherish somewhere a secret sin? No; so well had he observed every jot and tittle of the Law that his peace should have been like a smooth-flowing, full-banked river (Is. xlvi. 12). Something was radically wrong somewhere. In that corrosive perplexity of mind, caused by his perfect consciousness of rectitude and his equally conscious anxiety, lay the germ of his later renunciation of the Law, and his denunciation of its futility for producing the righteousness which brings peace to the harassed soul.

The secret of peace, as he was later to find, lay in the deeper meaning of his beloved word *shalom*, the root significance of which is "wholeness." Holiness, as outward conformity to the Law, he had obtained (Phil. iii. 6), but wholeness he had missed (Col. ii. 9, 10; Jas. i. 2-4; Rom. vii. 5). His righteousness was the righteousness of legality, of conformity to law. Inner peace comes not from outer conformity. To his little world he had fairly adjusted himself. How could he have come so close to peace and missed it so far?

As far as can be judged from his words and actions, Saul was singularly free from the popular delusion of looking for peace in material possessions. His wealth, his social position and his friends were all sacrificed with comparative ease when he adopted his new religion (Phil. iii. 4-7). His mind was set not upon the material world, but upon spiritual riches. Those circumstances of environment which so vitally affect the average man had little control over his thoughts, feelings or actions. From the beginning of his life he was accustomed to view everything in the light of his

religion and to weigh and measure men and affairs by their eternal values.

If external circumstances yield no sufficient and satisfactory ground for Saul's unhappiness, abundant evidence is forthcoming to show that he suffered most unhappy internal stresses and strains. Concerning the nature of this trial the Apostle himself gives much information. Both the Book of Acts and his Epistles contribute direct and indirect testimonies to the hidden struggle that tortured him. The seventh chapter of Romans surpasses the other accounts in the vividness and detail with which this sore condition is depicted.

That description of his state is ideal biography. It is neither entirely individual nor wholly universal,<sup>4</sup> but rather his own experience universalized. It describes neither the state of a man completely saved or unsaved, but the state of an unregenerate, struggling man seen through the eyes of a man regenerated. While it contains much of St. Paul's doctrine about the Law, sin and redemption, it is not primarily a piece of theology, but rather a rugged truth, hewn out of his own personal experience, a foundation stone on which he built much of his later doctrine.

As a real experience in life, it presents, with reference to sin and the Law, three fairly well-marked stages: the first is a vaguely defined period of ignorant innocence; the second begins with the advent of his knowledge of the Law and sin; the third, with the entrance of Christ into the heart and life of the penitent believer. The first period ends with "sin revived and I died"; the second with the despairing cry, "Wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" and the third opens with, "I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord!" The hiatus between the second and third stages is filled with all the mystery and all the glory of conversion and its consequent salvation.

<sup>4</sup> *Hastings, Dict. of the Bible*, "Paul, the Apostle," by G. G. Findlay.

On account of this intervening conversion, some explanations have referred the whole warfare to a struggle between the "old man" and the "new man." But, though the schism in Saul's personality was healed forever by his conversion, nevertheless its existence and duration cannot be assigned solely to a conflict between the regenerate and unregenerate selves. For the "old man" died before the "new" was born; so they could not meet each other in a conflict which raged in the young man's soul before his conversion. The opposition lies wholly within the "old man," with two "I's" distinctly arrayed against each other—"that which I do, I allow not; for what I would that I do not; but what I hate that I do" (Rom. vii. 15). This bitter arraignment hails two selves before the bar of judgment—one good, the other bad—and describes the turmoil wrought by their contrariness before the new self arrived upon the scene. In the medley of factors, three stand out prominently: the flesh; its product, sin; and its antagonist, the Law. Let us consider first the significance of that much-used and very figurative term "flesh" in its psychological applications.

In physiological-psychology, can "flesh" be made to stand for the literal fleshly tissues of the body, with the secondary implication that they are the seat of sin, as Gnosticism and some religions have interpreted it to mean? Such a conception is at entire variance with the teaching of both the Old and New Testaments, which begins with man's unity in a body and soul and goes on to that climax of creation, their union in the "Word that became flesh." The human body, far from being that thing of detestation which perverted forms of asceticism later made it, according to St. Paul's teaching, is actually the temple of the Holy Spirit (I Cor. vi. 15, 19), the means through which we worship God (Rom. xii. 1; I Cor. vi. 20), the glorified partner and sharer in immortality with the human spirit (I Cor. xv. 42-44). Such magnified uses of our bodies cannot be reconciled with the thought that they are essentially sinful.

From the prominence of one particular thought in St. Paul's poignant description of his pre-Christian state, it might be assumed that his whole idea of the flesh and of his own soul-sickness could be dismissed with the one word "sin." That explanation would indeed lay its finger upon the middle term of the trinity—flesh, sin and law. But the many meanings in the Bible of the word "sin" must make us cautious here. Generally its meaning includes both an inner side consisting of a motive and an intent, and an outer side in the form of acts with their complement of consequences. Moreover, there are varieties of sinning recognized in both Testaments, ranging from falling short of God's ideal for a man (Rom. iii. 23) through that long train of descending transgressions to a senseless hardening of the heart (Rom. iii. 18-32).

If Saul sinned, it was neither gross vice nor open, positive and wilful transgression of the Law.<sup>5</sup> Other men, it is true, do suffer breaches of personality on account of actual transgressions. But this man affirms of himself "As touching the righteousness which is in the law found blameless" (Phil. iii. 6), or could fling into the faces of his enemies, eager to move heaven and earth to find a flaw in his character, "I have lived before God in all good conscience until this day" (Acts xxiii. 1), a challenge capped with the climax, "Herein I also exercise myself to have a conscience void of offence toward God and man always" (Acts. xxiv. 16). To the very last he insisted, "Neither against the law of the Jews . . . have I sinned at all" (Acts xxv. 8). Nor can the legal prosecution of the Nazarenes which he carried on be charged against his conscience as a sin, for he says, "I verily thought with myself I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth" (Acts xxvi. 9), and what he did he did "ignorantly, through unbelief" (I Tim. i. 13). These were not idle boasts made among friends or to strangers, but solemn statements made before

<sup>5</sup> Glover, *Paul of Tarsus*, discusses Saul's sinfulness, pp. 75ff.; quotes Gardner, p. 80, noting that no actual transgression occurred.



those who knew his manner of life from his youth up (Acts xxvi. 4). Sin may, indeed, have been at the root of Saul's despair, but it was not actual transgressions of the Law written in statutes, or engraved upon the tablet of his heart. Had such transgressions occurred, they would have brought either legal guilt or a bruised and aching conscience.

We conclude, then, that this "flesh" is not the body (*soma*), nor is it identical with the "old man," nor sin in the sense of actual transgression, nor a settled state of rebellion against God, nor is it all of human nature, nor all of inherited human nature. It seems to be man's general disposition to sin consisting of a proneness to yield to temptation, a positive desire and impulse to break the law recognized by man's reason as good—the energy in a man, latent and potential, ready to spring into vicious activity whenever temptation appears, when at the same moment the spirit, mind or will aims to do good. It is thus part of man's total personality, born in him and also developed by exercise in transgressing, to be annihilated only by salvation through Jesus Christ.

How is this "flesh" related to sin? What part did it play in St. Paul's life? What part does it generally play in any man's life? What, in short, are "the works of the flesh"? In general, the flesh is opposed to everything that is good (Rom. vii. 18). It lusts against the spirit (Gal. v. 17); serves the law of sin (Rom. vii. 25), which is in our members (Rom. vii. 23), which are sinful passions (Rom. vii. 5). Sin cannot be attributed to the Law (Rom. vii. 7), nor to God (Jas. i. 13, 14; Rom. vii. 11; Heb. iii. 13), but only to our fleshly lusts and evil passions (Rom. vii. 5, 23) which urge us to transgression.

This being the theological doctrine of "flesh," or at least one interpretation of that most difficult doctrine, our next question concerns the psychology of this idea. In men generally, is there any psychic process which corresponds

in its nature, structure, origin and functions to this "flesh"? Or, to cling to our specific task, was there in Saul of Tarsus a disposition or mental condition which furnished him with an experience upon which he grounded his doctrine, and possibly also was instrumental in bringing about his conversion? For his conversion was no ordinary one, sufficiently explained by the necessity of saving him from sin. Being exceptional, it requires some peculiar ground for its occurrence.

If the Apostle cannot charge himself with any positive transgressions of the Law,\* or with real guilt, he does quite freely bewail the fact that within him burned vigorous passions to defy the Law. The flesh, or the disposition, was there, and only a powerful will held its potential forces for evil in check. They were not all accounted for in that general disposition called temperament. The Apostle specifically states that the conflict lay between the "I" who would do good, who delighted in the Law "after the inward man" and "a different law in my members warring against the law of my mind." This last phrase about "members" suggests a clue to another kind of forbidden impulse he had in mind, and which he related to the "flesh."

Remembering that the "flesh" stands for the lawless desires in Saul, we may now ask what dispositions would move such a man as Saul to feel within himself an almost overpowering impulse to break that Law which his better self called holy and good? The answer may be sought in those illustrations of the works of the flesh given by the Apostle himself. In Galatians v. 19 he says, "Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these," and he adds a list of gross and more refined vices and sins. In Colossians, third chapter, he gives a somewhat similar category of sins, all belonging to "the old man" (v. 9) and quite contrary

\* I Tim. i. 12-16, in which he calls himself chief of sinners, is partly hyperbole, and refers wholly to his estimate of his persecutions after he was converted. Under the Law he was righteous.

to the "new man." Keeping in mind the fact that the "works of the flesh" are both the overt acts and also conscious dispositions, or impulses, or temptations, we are now in a position to catch a glimpse, at least, of those inner forces which wrought such misery in the divinely aspiring soul of this young Hebrew, naturally gifted with a conscience made poignantly tender by religious discipline from his very babyhood to manhood.

When we turn to psychology for a designation of those dispositions which are born in men and move them sometimes mightily contrary to their better judgments and their own consciences, and which always strive with burning vehemence and overpowering vigor to have their stubborn way, we are pointed to the instincts. They are (1) inborn dispositions, (2) arousing in their possessor's heart strong emotions, (3) and impelling him to gratify their cravings by action. These inborn dispositions have furnished material for much dispute among psychologists, some of whom, like Watson,<sup>7</sup> deny their existence; some, like James,<sup>8</sup> declare they are many; and some, like McDougall,<sup>9</sup> name a limited number and define them accurately as states of consciousness (1) aroused by some perceived object or some idea, (2) accompanied by a specific emotion, and (3) by an impulse to act in a specified manner—and, as some would add, without previous training, and for the benefit of the species.

These dispositions have been classified in many ways. For us the most useful division is that of (1) self-regarding and (2) other-regarding instincts. How they arise in the individual or race has been the subject of much speculation. Some evolutionists, following Lamarck, insist they are transmitted habits of ancestors; others,<sup>10</sup> with Darwin,

<sup>7</sup> *Psychologies of 1925*, 1926.

<sup>8</sup> *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, Vol. I, Chap. IV.

<sup>9</sup> *Social Psychology*, 1912.

<sup>10</sup> G. J. Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Animals*, 1884; H. Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, 1875.

say they arise in germinal variations; and still others, with Smee,<sup>11</sup> insist that they are God-given, thus leaving a choice between scientific and theological explanations. In the life of the individual, animal or human, they appear to rise without previous exercise, leaping at once into a complete, or nearly complete, series of complex actions all aimed at some common, average result perceived by intelligent onlookers, though probably not known to the agent. Hence, they are called "blind" impulses, though their blindness varies. Human beings very quickly learn what ends these instinctive acts achieve.

In Saul these impulses held the relation to his basic melancholy that the waves of the sea hold to its tides. They were not constantly alive, but came and went; they were not correlated with his organic constitution in general, but with particular organs, "members of his body," and they were excited by special, external objects, or by ideas. Some of them reënforced the dejection of his natural state, while some opposed and at times overcame it.

Now it would be a most glaring blunder to say that these inherited impulses are without exception bad. Far from it. Some of them, like the maternal instincts, though shared by both beasts and human beings, inspire in men the noblest forms of self-sacrifice and devotion. All virtues, in fact, can be traced eventually to these blessed inheritances. But, on the other hand, many are counted evils that must be invariably suppressed, or else allowed native expression only at appropriate times and places, or modified into other forms suitable to our civilization. Saul, being human, found in himself certain remnants that we now call inheritances from our cave-man ancestors. These powerful impulses to action and their emotions clamoring for satisfaction struggled and fought within the heart of the natural man, against those edicts of the God-

<sup>11</sup> *Instinct and Reason*, 1850; also McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 1912, p. 30, note. See also *Encyc. Brit.*, 11th ed., and *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Instinct," by C. Lloyd Morgan.

given Law that called for their implacable suppression, or their intelligent control.

Which instincts were evil and which good may be seen from a list of them. Some psychologists, like James,<sup>12</sup> name many; others, like McDougall,<sup>13</sup> give but a few, seven, with their primary emotions, namely, flight and fear, pugnacity and anger, repulsion and disgust, self-assertion or display and elation, self-abasement and subjection, curiosity and wonder, parental and tender emotion. To these are added several—the reproductive, gregarious, acquisitive and constructive instincts, with no particular emotions, and a few other more general inherited tendencies. The statement of the list alone is almost sufficient to indicate what particular “law in his members” would be found in settled opposition against some prohibitions dear to the Jews. A brief inspection divides them into prohibited, neutral and commanded natural actions.

Much light is thus thrown upon the Romans chapter by a correct estimate of the nature of instincts and the part they played in the dramatic struggle depicted so vividly therein. They are all impulses to action, natural and powerful, wanting nothing but natural objects to arouse them into violent clamor for satisfaction. Some of their actions were forbidden absolutely by Saul’s Law; some were aroused into activity by that Law, and some were increased into a mad intensity of desire by the prohibition voiced in the Law.

“When the commandment came, sin revived and I died” is one of his striking statements of how the Law aroused sin in him, and it is illustrated by covetousness, an overgrowth of the instinct of acquisition. Both the statement and the illustration of it show the deepest insight into

<sup>12</sup> *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, Vol. II, Chap. XXIV.

<sup>13</sup> *Social Psychology*, 1912, pp. 27ff.; *Outline of Psychology*, 1922. The names and origin of these states of mind are secondary to our purpose; their composition and function are primary. The dispute is largely verbal and academic.

human nature. For when instincts are unhindered in their expression either by circumstances or ideas, they flow almost unnoticed into appropriate action. But when they are stopped, then they flare up into fierce flames of desire and make themselves boldly known by their clamor. A giggle suppressed becomes agony, and a hungry stomach in the presence of forbidden food makes the mouth water with ravenous revolt against the restraint.

Emotions arise from instincts by both external prohibitions and internal inhibitions. Conflict of any kind arouses them. Physical circumstances without, ideals of duty and of manhood, and other instincts and sentiments, each and all may become the ardent opponents of some aspiring instinctive impulse to express itself in the presence of its appropriate stimulus. The uproar of these battling hordes in consciousness sometimes rises to near-madness. Passions and appetites denied legitimate expression seethe and writhe in consciousness, filling their possessor with tornadoes of feeling. Such experiences are common to men, are open to analysis, and manifest themselves constantly in the daily behavior of perfectly normal human beings. About them is no special mystery; nothing but the always overhanging mystery that hides the ultimate sources of such experiences from view and shrouds their finer functions in oblivion. Since they are common to man, they require no special dispensation to account for their activities in our young Hebrew.

That the Law made sin exceedingly sinful is another assertion supported and illuminated by the instincts. For sometimes the prohibition of an instinctive act not only arouses the forbidden instinct into violent rebellion, but also raises up a number of allies in open revolt against the higher self. One of these always-ready revolters, instantly alert against any affront to its egoism, is the self-assertive instinct. The mere statement of a prohibition is enough to arouse its pride. It calls immediately upon its close ally, pugnacity, with its emotion of anger. Both of

these are instant to resent any call to obedience whatever, and the more arbitrary the call appears to the intellect, the more vigorous is their opposition to it. Sometimes their rebellion rises so high that it sweeps away all moral restraint, and "sin revived and I died" is the melancholy obituary to many a good resolution so overcome.

If the opposition against morality developed by instincts is carried out into actual transgression, then, besides all the natural consequences following upon the sinful act, the moral man suffers the acute upbraidings of an outraged conscience. If in addition, like Saul, he is religious, to his pains of conscience and the misery of humiliated self-control are added all the grim forebodings of God's wrath to come, with its undefined but certain retribution hovering heavily over his soul. Still further, all these feelings may be incipiently aroused by the temptation alone, by the mere contemplation of the forbidden act, as they were in Saul's case. In these foundations of character, then, can be found ground for that fissure in his personality which extended upward throughout his whole being, and gave him the sense of sin and of futility in the face of these constantly tormenting destroyers of his inward peace. Against this inner war the Law pointed no way of suppression any more than it directed him to a way of peace and positive righteousness.

A detailed study of Saul's instincts and the manner in which each one of them was affected by the Law would be illuminating, but too extensive for our present purpose. A casual inspection of the list given above will reveal the fact that some did and some did not conflict with it. Of those dominant in Saul's character, pugnacity and self-assertion seem to be foremost. Fear is seldom mentioned. Humility seems to be almost unknown. His tender emotions, so constantly expressed in later life for his spiritual children, and his special solicitude for Timothy and Titus, to whom he was a father and more than a father, as they were to him sons and more than sons, do not appear in his

early career as known to us; though, of course, from this silence we must not argue that they were wanting. No new instincts were born in his rebirth at conversion.

The fighting instinct apparently remained strong in Paul throughout his life. Nothing eradicated that instinct entirely. For Paul "life was one continuous battle, never ended, never o'er." Modified as it was into forms far removed from physical contests or military battles, it still lives within him with vibrant force to the end, when "he has finished the good fight" (I Tim. vi. 12; II Tim. iv. 7). His whole Christian life was a contest, a warfare (I Cor. ix. 26, 27; Eph. vi. 12; Gal. v. 7; Phil. ii. 16, iii. 14); its tools, armor offensive and defensive (Eph. vi. 13-17); its goal, a crown placed upon the victor's head (II Tim. ii. 5, iv. 8). Anger, the emotion of pugnacity, might arise righteously in a saint's heart (Eph. iv. 26); and indignation, fed by the same hot temper, fought the good fight even against fellow apostles (Gal. ii. 11), and flashed out at Jerusalem (Acts xxiii. 3). Like his namesake, Saul was forever a warrior whose ambition it was to "die with his back to the field and his feet to the foe."

Two other instincts—self-submission and self-assertion—were profoundly important factors in Saul's breach of personality. For they not only oppose one another, but upon their equipoise depends the equableness of the man; and upon their abnormal opposition follows the manic-depressive type of insanity not uncommon to melancholiacs. They, with other instincts, form the self-regarding sentiments of men, and their just proportion in the compound gives him his self-respect. Even under the best conditions, in the most normal lives, they come into conflict and give their possessor moments of embarrassment and indecision. Their alternating domination marks the ups and downs in the unstable man.

Besides his feelings in attitudes coming from the special senses, Saul was also in possession of emotions arising from frequent and localized movements of the heart, stomach,



viscera, capillaries, etc., which he felt as passing emotions; and then also, besides these temporary feelings, from his body in general came that vague mass of unlocalized feeling called coenæsthesia, or general feeling of selfhood. This permanent mass seems to depend largely or wholly upon inherited anatomical and physiological peculiarities. In general, such mass feeling is either pleasant or unpleasant. Commonly it is known as temperament.<sup>14</sup>

Temperament has in the past received much attention from philosophers, medical men and psychologists. It is defined as a permanent disposition to certain forms or degrees of feeling, "a complex of many factors," according to McDougall, "in the main natively determined."<sup>15</sup> Accordingly, Hippocrates assigned four humors to the human body, on which Galen based the corresponding temperaments—sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric, melancholic—a classification which has been modified more or less by such psychologists as Wundt, Titchner, Höfding, Acht and others.

No difficulty seems to appear in the way of assigning Saul of Tarsus to the choleric-melancholy class, though like all persons he also possessed traits of the other two types. Of choler, or disposition to anger, we will speak later under instincts. The more complex disposition to melancholy claims our attention now because of its greater general importance in religion and the large part it played in Saul's conversion and in the Apostle's later life.

Melancholy is both a temporary mood and a permanent trait of character. The latter involves the whole man, his ideas, emotions and decisions. The passing mood rests upon accidental events; the permanent quality upon racial, national, family and personal inheritance, upon stages in life like adolescence, when "hope deferred maketh the heart sick" (Prov. xiii. 12), and upon special causes like nervous

<sup>14</sup> James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, Chap. XXV, pp. 449ff.

<sup>15</sup> *Social Psychology*, 1912, pp. 116f.; also *Abnormal Psychology*, 1926, Chap. XXII, pp. 352ff.

exhaustion from shock, overwork, illness, etc. It has been called the "sentiment of the irreparable," or more simply, hopelessness.

Deep-seated as temperament is, it exercised a lifelong and widely diffused effect upon Paul. It blackened his emotions; made discouragement easy and despair unavoidable. As in other cases of melancholic temperament, it made the love of his friends for him seem to be unreal, for no reciprocating passion served to make such love vivid. This failure to feel natural affection for those close to him tended to divide him into two people, one who intellectually appreciated love from others, and the other who stood by with heart untouched, an unmoved spectator. A sense of partial woodenness supervened and a doubling of personality impended.

Moreover, according to the law of mental association, the tone of the emotions determines to a large extent the ideas of the subject. The melancholic's perceptions are directed toward the hard, sad facts of life, its sufferings and sorrows, aches and pains, sins and failures. His memory stores and recalls such facts. His imagination busies itself with painting a glowering future; his judgment is warped toward despair; his philosophy becomes pessimism; his theology fatalistic; his eschatology dark with the doom of the human race.

The volitional effects are no less pronounced and gloomy. Socially, the melancholic tends toward uselessness. His fits of despair, especially when mingled with choler, turn to moroseness and end in the persecution of people suspected of evil designs. Saul of Tarsus was no accidental persecutor of the Way, and his breathings of threatenings and slaughter were symptoms of his inner state. His brooding melancholy was broken by fits of activity due to his choleric disposition; he could pass from the Damascus expedition to the Arabian desert-meditation easily and readily. From such a combination of melancholic temperament and choleric disposition, both unrecognized by

him, it seemed that nothing but religion could deliver him. Judaism had failed to save him. He was moving toward a life of misery for himself and suffering for others. What profound meaning for him lay in those words, "Now abideth faith, HOPE and love" (I Cor. xiii. 13). Christ saved him from the sentiment of despair.<sup>16</sup>

These four emotional urges in Saul—his melancholy temperament, his dominant instincts of anger, self-assertion and self-submission—are so well known that their individual effects upon him can be easily envisaged. Their combined influence is impossible to measure accurately; but they furnish us with a key to his character and behavior that enables us to look into his inner consciousness with both understanding and sympathy.<sup>17</sup>

Melancholy worked constantly to depress his emotions and to paralyze his activities. With this constant tendency the self-submissive instinct would at times and on occasions ally itself, and the abysmal depression and discouragement must then have been terrible to bear. On the other hand, pugnacity fired his will with anger, and moved him powerfully whenever it was excited. If to that was joined his self-assertive instinct, then Saul, thoroughly aroused, his apathy overcome with a violent stimulus, would break forth into the persecutor, breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the Way, consenting to Stephen's stoning, haling men and women with equal relentlessness before courts, and giving his vote for their imprisonment or death.

Then, just by contrast, if he was convinced that the Jehovah for whom, in his own mind, he was performing

<sup>16</sup> *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Melancholy and Temperament," by J. L. McIntyre; James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1903, for cases of partial, divided personalities; F. J. Foakes-Jackson, *Life of St. Paul*, 1926, p. 247, suggests that the Apostle's conception of "flesh" is primarily psychological and philosophical.

<sup>17</sup> James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, Chaps. VI and VII, gives melancholy as one of the principal conditions making a man ready for religious conversion.

all these services, rejected his services, denied the righteousness of his cause, and showed him that against high heaven itself, against the very Lord of all creation he was contending, the revulsion would be awful. This happened on the Damascus Way. When the blow came Saul's anger evaporated; his self-assertion died; his self-submission brought him to the earth; his melancholy turned his world to blackness. For days he sat distraught, neither eating nor drinking, plunged in mind as well as in fact into the lowest state it was possible for this proud young ruler to fall. This plunge has sometimes been called his conversion. But it was nothing more than a very natural consequence of his inborn propensities. Had his conversion gone no farther, he would have remained of all men the most miserable.

The young man's woeful condition arose from the reaction of his particular traits to the peculiar social environment in which he found himself. Being a Pharisee, or Puritan, his Law forbade him many indulgences constantly enjoyed by the pagans about him, and even by some of his own people, with an astonishing immunity from divine retribution. Some of these practices were natural, normal, harmless and even healthy. All of them gave pleasure. Saul's desires, not necessarily base or ruinous, were intensified both by example and prohibition. Possibly their irksomeness was vastly increased by his suspicion that their prohibition was arbitrary and useless. Such considerations in a man like Saul, keen of mind, sincere of soul, passionate with emotion, impetuous in action, quite adequately account for the agony he so poignantly depicts in his pre-Christian state.

To sharpen the outlines of this picture of the young Pharisee, devoted to the ideals of that straitest sect, it might be thrown upon the background of the life of the young pagans of his day. Suppose he had been a Roman or Greek youth. Then his ideal of manhood would have been much more in harmony with his haughty disposition.

His natural inclinations to pride, power and glory, and other possible desires for worldly indulgences, would have found no specter of the Law in the path of their satisfaction. His learning would have reveled in its unbounded philosophic speculation. It would have drawn to him kindred and congenial minds among the Greeks, even as his Roman citizenship and his wealth would have made him a popular and courted young man in other circles. Rich, powerful, learned, not grossly self-indulgent, but amenable to the moral standards and social sanctions of his group, he would have been counted the darling of the gods and the envy of men. But between that man and himself, a Jew, like the angel with the flaming sword at the entrance into Paradise, stood his religion, forbidding him to enter, but with melancholy negativism pointing out no path to peace in the enveloping wilderness.

## CHAPTER III

### ST. PAUL'S SENTIMENTS

THE chasm in Saul's personality cannot be completely described in terms of the warfare between his inherited dispositions and the Law. The cleavage extended upward entirely through his acquired character also, and affected fatally those powerful and well-organized components of his consciousness called sentiments. These organized colonies of feelings, each gathered about an idea, exercise an almost irresistible and decisive effect upon character.

They must be clearly distinguished from mere sentimentalism or emotion without thought, eventuating in no useful or rational conduct.<sup>1</sup> Sentiments, on the contrary, are (1) compounds of primary emotions belonging to and arising from instincts, (2) organized securely and comparatively permanently about ideas, persons, and things, (3) and working themselves out in actions, or behavior, released by the will, and guided by the ideas. They therefore involve the whole person—the intellect, emotions and will. They form three great classes: sentiments of love, hate and self-respect with their sub-species, directed toward others and self, and showing themselves in attractions and repulsions. They develop through the ordinary struggles of life, and also by deliberate education, maintain their lustiness by practice, and die by neglect. Some last through a lifetime, and some come and go like mites in a sunbeam.

According to their importance in life, they may be divided

<sup>1</sup> For a treatment of sentiments see McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 1907; *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*; 1926, especially pp. 159, 525-527.

into major and minor sentiments. The latter are interminably intermingled with our everyday consciousness, where they form our more or less settled likes and dislikes, hates and loves, and determine the degree of our self-regard. Along with these comparatively trifling stocks-in-trade of common conversation, woven into our philosophy, science, religion, morality, art, patriotism, etc., run the threads of our major sentiments, of which four, the sentiments of rationality, religion, morality and estheticism are the most important here. These combined governors of conduct order the minutiae of our daily lives, regulate our diets, choose our styles of dress, determine portentous issues, declare war and peace, win us our friends, make us our enemies, motivate our science and philosophy, mold our morals and determine our ethics, pass judgment on our works of art, and both make our religions and then win us to them; in brief, they are the architects and builders of a large part of ourselves and the worlds we inhabit. It is unfortunate that the sugary word "sentiment," with all its lackadaisical associations, should be the best designation obtainable for forces so stalwart and virile.<sup>2</sup>

A nice anatomical dissection of one's sentiments with each part neatly excised and properly labeled is the ideal of character analysis. But the procedure is forbidden in the case of Saul by the complexity of the material to be handled, and by the fact that any trait in human nature loses something essential whenever it is separated out from its organic context. It cannot be fairly treated apart from its place in a living, human being. We must, therefore, keep always in mind that Saul was a person conscious of a conflict within himself occasioned by different warring sentiments directed toward different objects and persons, and a conflict between the component instincts aroused at different times and on different occasions, but abiding in

<sup>2</sup> *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Love," by A. E. Crawley; A. F. Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, 1914; G. F. Stout, *Groundwork of Psychology*, 1903, Chap. XVI.

any sentiment held toward one object or person. The warfare was extra- and intra-sentimental.

In the first place, Saul was sorely divided by the admission to his daily consciousness of two such active, powerful and contrary sentiments as hate and love. Throughout they are antagonistic, being directed toward different persons; they embody mutually exclusive emotions and incite their possessors to entirely different actions. When one comes into the heart, the other moves out. Yet the traditions of the Jews tolerated both of them. "Ye have heard it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy" (Mt. v. 43; Ps. cxxxix. 21) was a rule that not only permitted but bade good Pharisees to entertain within their consciousness these opposed feelings toward different people. But such a way is not the way of peace. Hate itself is a corroding sentiment. It tempts to evil, and that brings remorse. Love and love alone is the only sentiment possible to maintain as a steady and unbroken state of mind in a healthy soul—an "eternal life" that may endure forever.

All that has been said about sentiments in general applies with force to Saul's religion. For with a clear knowledge of the difficulties so often encountered and so widely exploited<sup>\*</sup> in framing a suitable definition of religion, we will treat it as a sentiment toward God consisting of (1) an idea of his nature, (2) the emotions naturally growing up about such an idea, (3) the practices flowing congruently from that idea and those emotions; the idea itself arising (a) through revelation, and (b) through a study of the actual world; the (4) whole functioning (a) to unify a man's thought system of the universe and (b) practically, to unite him with God, and unify himself into an integrated personality serving in his social group.

By this definition of religion as a distinctive state of consciousness, it is intended to distinguish it from some of

<sup>\*</sup> J. H. Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, 1912, the appendix of which contains 48 definitions.



its close relatives and friends like metaphysics, philosophy, morality, magic, superstition, estheticism, patriotism and devotion to any and all secular causes. It may be symbolized by an hourglass, its upper portion figuratively representing the mystical or supernatural dealt with by theology; its lower portion receiving from the upper its purely human components of ideas, emotions and volitions; the neck standing for the God-idea which connects them both. In this highly developed form, Saul's religion included theology, worship and polity; and the sentiment in him contained its intellectual, emotional and volitional components.<sup>4</sup>

Though the primary function of religion is found in its unification of man himself,<sup>5</sup> of man with God, and of man with his fellows, it is quite evident that Saul was far from a well-integrated person. How his religion failed in this its prime duty it will be the work of the following pages to show. In brief, Judaism held rigidly to one God but had many moral rules, viewed other nations as separated from God, and held its people to be a peculiar people, thus leaving the unity of their Godhead trailing away into many strands like an untwisted rope. How this affected Saul we shall see in detail.

With this understanding, we will assume that much of Saul's activity was directed toward the ideal man he wished to be. This desire was an ever-present, ever-active factor in his thought and behavior. Sometimes it appeared as an end in itself for which everything else was means; but at other times he made the means to his own salvation the final end and purpose of his being. Had he been asked

<sup>4</sup> For a treatment of religion as a sentiment, see D. G. Brinton, *Religious Sentiment*, 1872; R. R. Marett, *Threshold of Religion*, 1909; McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 1912, Chap. XVIII.

<sup>5</sup> For psychology of religion see George A. Coe, *Psychology of Religion*, 1920 with its bibliography at the end; and for a compendious view, Wm. K. Wright, *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*, 1923, which refers the student to many other excellent works.

which sentiment was dominant above all the others he would have unhesitatingly replied that it was religion.

His religion, whether he consciously recognized it as such or not, was by no means a simple organization in his consciousness. It was, like all sentiments, a compound, in this case, organized about the idea of God. Towering infinitely above every other idea resident in his mind rose the majestic figure of Jehovah, his God. Around that idea, in more or less loose and sometimes seditious and rebellious colonies, were gathered his emotions, out of which flowed conduct that in his judgment was loyal to his conception of God, to the Law, to his nation and its people, and inexorably opposed to their enemies. Consequently, Saul's idea of Jehovah, his God, will furnish an insight both into his religion and into his own character and its need of integration.

How deep, how wide, how all-embracing was this idea of the young Pharisee, we cannot do more than estimate. If we were to analyze this conception exhaustively as it appeared in Saul's mind, we would find ourselves necessarily examining into his heredity, his physical and social environment, his literary education, and his own reflections. We would find every fiber of his being, every filament of his thought, every change of his emotions and every detail of his life tinted or toned with that idea. For him, around Jehovah the world revolved as about a central luminary, and all future destiny of individuals and nations lay in the hollow of God's hand.

Saul derived his idea of Jehovah from the Jews,\* and, in detail, from the Pharisees of his age and from his teachers. The existence and nature of their God had been the chief concern of the Israelites from their earliest history. Influenced primarily, no doubt, by that "primitive credulity" which makes men believe rather than not believe, like all ancient peoples they had accepted the existence of God

\* T. R. Glover, *Conflict of Religions*, 1927, pp. 154ff.

without question. Fools alone rejected such an all-pervading belief (Ps. xiv. 1, liii. 1). Neither did they derive their God from the world, but the world came from God and reflected his handiwork (Ps. xix. 1-6). Moreover, in sundry times and divers manners, he manifested himself specially to certain prophets (Heb. i. 1, 2): to Moses in the bush (Ex. iii), to Jacob at Jabbok (Gen. xxxii. 24), to Isaiah in the Temple (Is. vi.), and to others, though he never made himself fully known (Job. xi. 7; Is. lv. 9-11). In the mind of the true Israelite there was therefore not the shadow of a doubt about God's existence and the manifestation of himself through direct revelations and by special interferences with the order of human history and of natural events.

As for his nature,<sup>7</sup> to the Jew he was always a Person, and in their earliest writings he is endowed richly with human attributes (Ex. xv. 21; Judges v. 31; Amos iv. 2; Gen. xxii. 16, xi. 5, xviii. 21, xix. 24; Ex. iii. 8). The process of personalizing God and giving him bodily organs tended to localize him, and to make one particular spot the center of his power from which his influence radiated and showed itself over wide areas (I Ki. viii. 27), a characteristic of their belief which the Jews never wholly abandoned.

The idea of God went through various stages of development marked by the history of Israel. Gradually the people tore themselves loose from the embrace of surrounding idolatry and from polytheism, and struggled to the belief in one God; the agony, lasting through Judges, reached its climax under Elijah, and ended with Jehu. The prophets added nothing new, but made the image clearer in the minds of the people—Amos emphasizing absolute righteousness in his idea of Jehovah; Hosea, his unchanging love; Isaiah, his transcendency and sublimity. The Exile served to deepen the piety and the inwardness of Israel's idea of God, and left behind it the problems of Jehovah's relation to the world, his people and the individual soul, problems

<sup>7</sup> Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, "God," by W. Sanday.

arising from reflection upon the waste of their land and its Temple.

It was in this stage of their thought about God that Saul was born and grew up. The living link between Jehovah and his nation, the one hope of the future left under the subjugation to Rome by Ptolemy (63 A.D.), was the Messiah; the contact between the individual and God was the Law; and the explanation of their oppression by the world was found in the people's neglect and disobedience to the Law. God was One, a Person—to Israel, gracious, long-suffering, patient, loving as long as they kept the Law, but as ruthless and avenging as a jealous Oriental husband when they strayed from his worship or neglected his altars. Consequently, his hardness loomed large in the minds of the people, and especially in the minds of the Pharisees who believed themselves to be in his favor, and who blamed the common people for his wrath against the nation. A God transcendent, all-powerful, given to anger, inexorable in meting out justice, to be propitiated only by the strictest observance of the Law and by carrying out the traditions of sacrifices, offerings, prayer and other forms of worship. It was this side of Jehovah's character that prohibited a pious Jew from ever uttering the name of his Deity.

Another and more tender side of his character was presented in moments of complacence. Jehovah was then gracious, forgiving and full of mercies to his penitent people. Grace, however, in Saul's mind, could not have been a prominent mark of his God, for its appearances were sporadic and fragmentary, bits of his changing humors, appearing neither in a fixed and settled purpose either for the world or for the chosen people. God was gracious in many ways: in hearing prayer, for example (Ex. xxii. 27), in brevity of anger (Ex. xxxii. 12), giving his love (Ex. xxxiii. 10), granting his general favor (Num. vi. 25), and in expressing special favors to certain individuals, like Noah, Enoch, Abraham, Moses, and in the choice of Israel as his peculiar people (Gen. vi. 8, xii. 1, xxvi. and xxviii.; Ex. xxxiii. 17,

xix. 5; Dt. x. 15; Nu. xi, xii, xiv, xxi; Dt. ix. 6; Ex. xv. 13; Dt. vii. 7, viii. 14-18, ix. 4-6).

Even in their direst national distress, the Israelites felt that a remnant of grace would remain and they would not utterly perish. Certain individuals, as some of the Psalms so touchingly portray, were sure of grace in God's sight. The very Law itself was a gift of grace to Israel, and in that Law and its possession they properly felt some degree of pride and warmth of gratitude for its bestowal upon them rather than upon the nations roundabout. But altogether, grace was still a minor idea in their theology, a sentiment tempered with justice and darkened with punishment, wherein mercy entered more as a check upon utter vengeance which righteously belonged to the Lord but was graciously not pushed to the extreme.

In apostolic times the belief that Jehovah dwelt far above the world was but a part of a general tendency in the world. Plato and Philo had contributed their aid to that movement among the Gentiles. The Targums of the Jews had eliminated the old anthropomorphisms, or human attributes ascribed to God by the ancient Jewish people. He was thus removed from the sphere of human likeness and of human interest as well. His titles at that time indicate the same tendency. He was addressed as Lord of Gods, Majesty, Great, Glorious, Mighty, Most High, Holy One, Creator, and Sovereign, etc. The Law-idea of God had been gradually substituted for the more human, more simple and more emotional idea of Jehovah held by the prophets. In fact, so much had the mind of Jewish worshipers been transferred from God to his Law that that code stood as a mediator between them and Jehovah, and they almost worshiped it rather than its maker. Jehovah himself, according to one extreme doctrine of the magnification of the Law, is represented as spending his time reading his own enactments with devotion and enjoyment.

The salient attributes of this Being can be summed up briefly in the following terms: (1) his existence and attri-

butes were revealed principally to persons and through events of Israel's vicissitudes, not primarily through the study of nature; (2) he was rigidly One, and only One (3) Person, (4) endowed with reason, emotions and will, (5) righteous in all his ways; (6) the Creator (7) and sustainer of the world, (8) though not merged with it, but transcendent in the sense of being able to exist independently of it; (9) at times vouchsafing special revelations of his will in visions to individuals, and of his power by miraculous interferences with the course of natural and historical events, done on behalf of his chosen people, Israel, (10) for whom he held a special relation by covenant; (11) though he was also, though somewhat dimly, revealed as the Father who loved all mankind; (12) all of which was revealed in the Law and the Prophets.\*

The emotions which Saul built up around his idea of Yāhweh were thus many and various. They changed their complexion with the changing aspects of his idea of God, one being uppermost at one time, another at another time, and more than one primary emotion blending together much of the time. The whole sentiment thus aroused was reverence, itself a very complex compound consisting of an idea of God, emotions joined to that idea, and the actions flowing naturally out of those emotions directed by the idea.

McDougall<sup>9</sup> to a large extent follows Shand in making reverence contain emotions arising both from instincts and other sentiments. Naturally fear of Jehovah was prominent; but it was compounded with the secondary sentiment, admiration, which in turn was made up of two instincts—curiosity and self-subjection in the presence of this sublime and transcendent God. Admiration is limited to persons

\* Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, "God," by W. Sanday; *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "God," by W. T. Davison; *ibid.*, "Pharisees," by D. Eaton and W. T. Whitley; Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, "Religions of Israel," by E. Kautzsch, Ex. Vol.; Wm. Ramsay, *St. Paul*; F. J. Foakes-Jackson, *Life of St. Paul*, 1926.

<sup>9</sup> *Social Psychology*, 1912, p. 132.

or their works. When it is joined with fear aroused by the mightiness of the object revered, then awe arises and the worshiper stands still, drawn by wonder and repelled by fear and self-abasement. If then he discovers that his God is also gracious, that attribute arouses gratitude in him, which is compounded of the tender emotion arising from its instinct and also from self-submission. Gratitude is fused with awe and the total result of this compounding is reverence. The ingredients may vary from time and in different persons, but no matter how complex they are they arise in answer to an idea, from inborn instincts, and they express themselves in action appropriate to the sentiment as a whole. They lie, as it were, on the surface and are open to introspective analysis, containing nothing more mysterious than the usual emotions actuating men in their daily lives.

Added to this sentiment and mixed with it was the sentiment of Love, which Saul would feel whenever the relation of Jehovah to his people was thought of as that of a wife with a jealous husband (Ex. xx. 5, xxxiv. 14; Dt. iv. 24, v. 9; Jos. xxiv. 19; Nah. i. 2; Is. liv. 5, lxii. 5; Hos. ii. 19). Jealously, as an attribute, has its good and bad sides. On God's part it is his energetic assertion of exclusive right to Israel's worship. He demands their utmost devotion. Reverence may be divided among many persons and rendered to many gods, but for One God devotion in Love must be sacredly reserved. Nothing less than Love with the whole soul, might and mind (Dt. vii. 5; Mt. xii. 30), would suffice and satisfy a single, personal God who had covenanted forever with his peculiar people, a covenant relation carried over into the Christian dispensation with the Bride of the Lamb. A proper understanding of the nature of the sentiment of Love will do more to clarify ideas of God's relation to man, and man's relation to God and to his fellows, than any other single concept connected with religion.

The attribute of sublimity, so prominent in the minds of

first-century Jews, would contribute also its quota of emotion to the total religious sentiment of the young man. But as it was aroused by the thought that God surpassed infinitely the comprehension of man, the sublime could play little part beyond stimulating his curiosity and his wonder at the surpassing grandeur of Jehovah appearing in all his works.

As far as the volitional acts of the religious sentiment were concerned, they exhausted themselves in rites and ceremonies consisting chiefly of sacrifices, readings and prayers. The Pharisees had separated themselves from the common people and other sects by the rigidity with which they kept both the Law and the traditions. Among them two factions appeared. One branch seemed entirely satisfied with the mere mechanical and formal observance of prescribed rites and ceremonies; the other laid some emphasis upon the state of mind that accompanied such worship.<sup>10</sup> We might infer, without doing violence to Saul's character revealed in later life, that he belonged to those who put into their worship all the inner devotion they could summon. Possibly this germ of religious sentiment may have been the seed of that later complete rejection of formalism, and the formulation of a complete religion of experience.

While religion and morality with the Hebrews were theoretically one, in that they both were derived from the Law, they were not always one organically. A Jew's conscience was as tender upon his prescribed duties to his fellow men as it was to any ritualistic observances of the Law. His moral sentiment, then, consisted of his reverence for the Law, as its object, with a combined emotion of fear and self-degradation when he disobeyed it, and of elation, self-respect and approbation when he obeyed it. The Law was both the object of his sentiment and the source of his knowledge of right and wrong.

Moreover, care must be taken not to confuse a study of

<sup>10</sup> Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, "Pharisees," by D. Eaton; Ps. li.



his ethical theories with a psychological analysis of his moral sentiment. The latter is a genuinely existing compound in a man's consciousness, alive and operative, containing his ideas of what is right and what is wrong, and his feeling of abhorrence for what he thinks is wrong and of liking for what he thinks is right, together with his conduct following such ideas and feelings. The instinct of fear and of self-dejection are compounded to make up the "bad conscience"; the instinct of self-assertion with its elation and with that phase of pugnacity called "moral courage" and a large or small ingredient of the gregarious instinct, all seem to enter into that most baffling state of mind called by St. Paul the "answer of a good conscience toward God and man."

Saul's ethics, or his ideas of right and wrong, came from the same source from which his people received theirs. He traced religion, patriotism and morality all to their common origin in the Law. Because they rise together in the same source, they flow together throughout their course. The Law prescribed both individual and national duties. In the keeping of it resided righteousness; in breaking it lay unrighteousness; from it flowed rewards and punishments, directed by God. This sacred body of legislation, with its traditional interpretations, was Saul's mentor, his way of life, his revelation of God.

Thus Saul found within himself two entirely different moral systems at work. The one was natural; the other came from the Law. The former permitted, and even commanded, acts which the latter suppressed with a stern hand. The conflict arose because the Law grew up through long periods of times, was written by many people with no single system in mind, and was further complicated by interpretations, additions and traditions. The result could not be otherwise than it was. Instituted duties conflicted widely with natural, normal desires, and mere legalism was often compelled to come to the rescue of traditions which could not arouse the natural conscience on their behalf.

The result of such a situation was a natural conflict. A passionate, vigorous and high-tempered man like Saul would naturally find himself hating and loving lustily, especially since a hate directed toward God's enemies by his devoted servants was not only justified, but highly commendable. Whatever affections or tender emotions the young persecutor felt, these he held for his own people and those with whom he was most closely associated.<sup>11</sup> Like the family life usual in his nation, in his pre-Christian period at least, his home life was in all probability beautified and made most tenderly affectionate by those close bonds of love which everywhere ennoble and sanctify the family relations of the Hebrews. But it may be that whatever fine affection Saul felt began to diminish at his doorstep and perhaps vanished at the borders of his nation. The legalized hatred of the Jews for their neighbors the Samaritans is the classic example. Saul aggravated his own case still more by his prosecution of the Nazarenes in accordance with his duty to his country, but in conflict with his sentiments of humanity and friendship. Among those imprisoned were both women and men. It seems impossible to assume that the young Hebrew was already so hardened, so lost to appeals of mercy, tenderness and compassion that he could coldly torment women and give his vote for the death of his fellow Jews without a tremor of sympathy. Here his duty and his natural inclinations must have come into violent conflict. His breathing out threatenings and slaughter betrays a mind much divided, seeking support by turning a wrath generated by conflict within upon the innocent occasions of a struggle between law and tolerance. Closely interwoven with his religious sentiment, and powerfully effective also in his conversion, was Saul's patriotic sentiment. It consisted in the idea of, and his ideals for, his nation, his fellow nationals and aliens, together with the

<sup>11</sup> T. R. Glover, *Paul of Tarsus*, pp. 174f., emphasizes his friendliness, and counts 67 names of persons mentioned in his writings, p. 175, note.

emotions growing from these ideas and the activities they inspired for his country, his people and other peoples. He probably held that Israel was a peculiar people of God who had covenanted with them, made them a nation, raised them at one period to majesty and power, and conferred upon them prosperity in proportion with the fidelity with which they kept the Law. Like all Pharisees, he expected to share more fully in the coming glory of the new golden age than the common people, who kept not the traditions with scrupulous care.

Just how clearly he envisaged the Messianic hopes is hard to say. The conception of the Messiah himself, his origin, nature and function, is too variously and contradictorily defined to permit us to speak about Saul's notion of him with any certainty. Perhaps he, with other leaders of his day, either ignored or discounted the expectation apparently so fully shared in by the common people who longed for the restoration of the Kingdom of Israel (Acts i. 6). They looked either for a warrior-conqueror who would free them politically, or a deliverer-savior, the first a "son of David," the second the "son of man." Both would be glorious, and neither would suffer poverty nor endure the despised death of the cross.<sup>12</sup>

Saul's sentiment would move him to despise the nations round about, to prize his own people, his own sect, his own social group of aristocratic Pharisees, and to fear any sect or segment within his own nation which might imperil the future of the nation politically by some overt act of rebellion against Rome, of which he was a citizen, or by continual transgression and neglect of the Law prevent or retard the widely hoped-for return of Israel's glory under David and Solomon. The eagerness of the people for a Messiah is attested by the New Testament, by Philo and Josephus, and by a readiness to rebel as evidenced by popular uprisings inspired by false Messiahs. Saul the aristocrat would

<sup>12</sup> Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible and Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Messiah," by V. H. Stanton, C. W. Emmet.

suspect any sect that might imperil the nation by neglect of the national constitution, or Law, and especially any movement originating among the common people, who "knew not the law" and "are accursed" (Jno. vii. 49).

To estimate what effect Saul's conception of Jesus had upon his patriotic sentiment, which is the same as his estimate of the effect of Jesus' teaching upon the future of his nation, is a problem as nice as it is difficult. From what is known of Jewish patriotism nourished by a long and venerable history, fanned into violent flame by the Maccabean successes, and dampened again by Roman rule, and from what is known of the particular views held by the Pharisees of their future, Saul's own feelings for his people's position in the world can be fairly well outlined. But what, in the light of Israel's hopes, he thought of this new sect of Nazarenes, is hard to estimate or to describe.

It is plain that he did not, on the one hand, consider them altogether innocuous and negligible. Neither, on the other hand, did he, any more than any other living man, see in them the fruition of God's program for the world, the forerunners of a universal religion, the beginning of a kingdom that should eventually cover the whole earth. Somewhere between these two extremes his groping mind was feeling its way, seemingly aware of the danger lurking in this movement, which, as he sensed from his knowledge of history, portended vague and disastrous consequences to the hopes of his beloved Jewry.

The bases for his fears lay chiefly in Jesus' own preaching and in Stephen's work. The Master's outspoken condemnation of Saul's sect and their reciprocation of his feelings were well known and remembered. His remarks about the Law and the Temple must have still lingered in Pharisaic circles, carrying with them sinister significance to priestly minds (Mt. xii. 3, 9-14, xxiv. 1, xi. 14, xv. 12, xvi. 6, xxii. 15, xxiii. 1-36, xxvii. 62 et seq., Mk. xi. 16, xiv. 1, xi. 27-33; Jno. ii. 19, 20, 21; Mk. xiv. 58; Acts vii. 48, xxiv. 8). Much of this earlier fear had possibly been subdued

by Jesus' disciples' regular continuance in the Law and in the Temple worship.<sup>13</sup>

But it must have revived when Stephen, coming closer to the heart of Jesus' teaching than any other man then preaching, and perhaps catching a wider vision of the meaning of the Master, emphasized the futility of Temple sacrifices by proclaiming again the impossibility of confining God, a Spirit, to any locality. Though the same statement had been made before and in the abstract as a doctrine had received little special attention, in connection with the ministry of Jesus, who gained his immense influence through practical works of healing (Mt. xxiv.; Mk. xiii; Lu. xxi; Mt. xxvi. 59-61; Mk. xiv. 55-59; Mt. ii. 18-21; I K. viii. 27; II Chr. vi. 18), it again assumed new powers for evil in the minds of leaders who thought it good policy for one man to die rather than that Jewish national existence should cease (Jno. xi. 48-52). A mere foreboding of evil was sufficient for stirring up men's fears and for agitating them inwardly and exciting them to vigilant action outwardly. The persecution of the Nazarenes by Saul was a fact; his vigor and his bitterness were no less real. Both of them had their foundation in his strong patriotic sentiment gathered around his nation's future,<sup>14</sup> to him vivid and glorious with hopes for the supremacy of the Jews, Jehovah's chosen people.

Quite certainly, the new movement did contain within itself the seeds of Israel's national revolution, the dissolution of its worship and the disappointment of its national hopes. For, in the first place, if God is Spirit, or even if the people believed him to be a Spirit, then the very foundation stone of the Temple worship and the livelihood of

<sup>13</sup> Acts ii. 46. Glover, *Paul of Tarsus*, p. 199, suggests Saul saw the meaning of the teaching sooner than others because "he had a quicker and clearer mind," *ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>14</sup> His patriotism may have found other occasions for persecution; e.g. like the doctrine that the curse spread from the cross, Gal. III.13, to the land, Deut. XXI.23, and people.

the priests would both be utterly destroyed. For no spirit can be imprisoned in a habitation or localized in any place, whether in Samaria's hated hills or in Jerusalem's holy mount (Jno. iv. 20-24). That doctrine, with its logical results, once spread among the people, part of whom supported the priests, would frustrate all the centuries of effort <sup>15</sup> to make Jerusalem the Holy City where worshipers must bring their offerings to God (I Chr. xi. 4-8; II Sam. vi. 12-17; I Chr. xiii. 12, xv. 25-xvi. 3; I K. vi. 1-38). That fact alone was sufficient basis for Jesus to prophesy that not one Temple stone would be left upon another. Surely, to a zealous Jew, any means was justifiable to annihilate such ruthless enemies of the people and of the Most High.

But this was not all of the pernicious doctrine. This party was confidently proclaiming to all who would listen that a lowly carpenter in the person of the meek and humble Nazarene was indeed the Messiah. Far from being Lord, he came as a suffering servant depicted by Isaiah (Acts ii. 36, iii. 13, 18, 20, 26), and far from leading triumphant armies against Israel's oppressors, he had himself lived in poverty, had suffered seeming utter defeat, and had died, the Prince of Peace, the Law-accursed death on the tree, without protest or appeal to any physical force. In the face of such humiliating facts, the assurance given by his followers that he was alive and sitting at the right hand of God, whence he would soon come to judge the quick and the dead, availed little or nothing with the leaders of the people and the priests.<sup>16</sup>

But yet other depths of national woe were sounded by the new party. For Jesus had boldly emphasized the doctrine that God is the Father of all men. Consequently, they are all brothers, members of the same all-inclusive family, drawn together with the tenderest cords of love about the

<sup>15</sup> The Book of Hebrews shows how Jesus did away with the Temple worship.

<sup>16</sup> Conybeare and Howson, *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*, 1899, Vol. I, p. 73.

fireside throne of God, and bound together by ties that no ambitions, wars, oppressions, submissions, slavery or enemies could sunder. If this were true, then how would the Jewish chains be broken and the badges of humiliating submission to a foreign power be stripped away by the mighty hand of Jehovah through his conquering Messiah? How would Israel ever rule the nations? Small wonder that discerning Caiaphas, the high-priest, at Jesus' trial asserted it was more expedient that one man, though innocent of conscious evil intentions, should die than that the whole nation should perish (Jno. xi. 50, xviii. 14).

Such a calamitous anti-climax to all Israel's Messianic waiting and hoping spelled the ruin of the nation's aspirations. All through the ages of their varying history, the Jews—at once the most idealistic and the most practical of peoples—had been staid and buoyed up under calamities and had been led on to larger and larger visions of glory in prosperity by the ultimate triumph of Israel accomplished through the Messiah. Now, if the new teaching prevailed, no failure of ideals could be more final, no disaster more dire, no ruin of their religion, their nation, and their country more complete.

Given these views, even though in a vague and unfinished form, in a man with deep emotions and an ardent and energetic disposition, and the result is a foregone conclusion. With all his might, within the proper confines of the adored Law, Saul would prosecute to the uttermost those blind destroyers of themselves and their nation. In such an outpouring of energy all his sentiments converged and found outlet. His love for God joined his hatred of God's enemies; his love for his land intensified that hatred still more; his high conception of his duty to his country was ennobled by his conception of his duty to God; and a righteous indignation, comparable to Jehovah's ancient wrath destroying Israel's enemies, burned like a sacrifice of sweet savor to high heaven. Undoubtedly all this fine sentiment was skillfully manipulated by cunning politicians

of his day. It is indeed a most sardonic bit of cosmic humor to see that out of this eater should come forth meat, that under the Providence of God the wrath of men was made to praise him.

Saul's patriotic sentiment played an enormous part in his preparation for his own personal conversion. For by it there was added to the stresses within himself arising from his inborn instincts conflicting with the Law a new source of strain. His duty to the Law, to his nation and to his religion clearly dictated a policy of extermination toward the Way. But his sentiments of humanity, his regard for his own people, and possibly his personal affections were all involved in persecuting his fellow Jews. Duty to Jehovah and to his nation pulled one way, sentiment pulled the other way; and both were powerful in Saul. Then, in the midst of this stress, the triumphant death of Stephen, exhibiting a perfect confidence in his cause and sustained in his final hour with miraculous patience by a vision nobody could deny, sent a tremor through all the young prosecutor's heretofore solid convictions about this Way. Their dying martyr's evident possession of that perfect peace for which Saul himself longed and yet lacked must have made a serious impression upon his mind.<sup>17</sup> His fanatic pursuit of his mission, breathing out threatenings and slaughter, betoken a state of mind already shot through with doubt.

From what we know about Saul's sentiment toward God and his allied sentiment toward his own nation, we may guess what must have been his fixed attitude toward Jesus of Nazareth. His idea of that leader, though erroneous, was probably clear—he was an impostor, self-deceived perhaps, but no less dangerous on that account. His doctrines, as far as they appeared, must have appeared to a Jew of insight utterly subversive to his religion and nation. This conception very naturally aroused in the ardent young

<sup>17</sup> Conybeare and Howson, *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*, Vol. I, p. 76; Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, "Stephen."



patriot a most proper and righteous indignation. Consequently, he could, knowing the Mosaic law—an eye for an eye—and reading in Holy Scriptures stories of ordered cruelty for small offences and annihilation of whole nations with their women and children who might infect Israel with idolatry, proceed with the deepest conviction of righteousness, animated by the most unsullied hate, to extirpate a sect so threatening.<sup>18</sup>

Would not any patriot be similarly excited anywhere against an organized body of men with such potentialities for injuring settled society? Surely we can sympathize to some extent with this narrowly educated, fanatically pre-disposed young man enlisted in the comparatively small enterprise of preserving a little nation at the expense of the rest of the world. Like Newton before his great discovery of gravitation, Saul seemed to be a child playing by the seashore, amusing itself with picking up a prettier pebble than usual, while the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before it.

Bulwarking and supporting the natural disposition of the young Jew to morose persecution, stood the Law. It commanded many unconnected and arbitrary duties. The arbitrary demands for the infliction of pain on offenders, the lack of rationality and of coherence in any fundamental principle,<sup>19</sup> all conspired to fret the soul of this young Jew, so richly endowed with keen insight and possessing a reflective mind influenced somewhat by Hellenistic contacts. His natural moral sentiment must have been often offended by that Law which forbade natural relations and enjoined harsh retaliations upon his friends and relatives for offenses right in themselves, but wrong because forbidden.

This truculent and bitter picture of Saul may be ame-

<sup>18</sup> F. J. Foakes-Jackson, *Life of St. Paul*, p. 70, suggests that Saul was the hope of the Hellenistic party and leader of the persecution against Stephen who threatened the integrity of the established order.

<sup>19</sup> The influence of reason is indicated by the inquiry about the great commandment (Mt. xxii. 36.)

literated by consideration of another sentiment in him—a lovelier one, known as estheticism. It is directed toward objects beautiful or ugly which arouse agreeable or disagreeable feelings and impulses of attraction or repulsiveness. It is impossible to believe that a young man, a Hellenistic Jew, spending much of his life surrounded with the “glory that was Greece, and the grandeur that was Rome,” could have been insensible to the beauty, natural and artificial, so lavishly strewn about him, But little of such appreciation appears in the Apostle’s life or letters.

The reasons for this absence of art appreciation are many. His religion discouraged painting and sculpturing. The Jerusalem Temple was destitute of idols and of other graven images. His love of cities and indifference to landscapes and to the country in general are harder to understand. Cilicia, a flat country, dotted at times with variegated flowers, watered by the Cydnus fresh from the snows of Taurus; and Palestine, his later home, are neither one remarkable for the grandeur of their scenery, though their loveliness has inspired poetry of the first order. In this department of art St. Paul followed the genius of his nation and poured out the tumult of his soul in literature, the very carelessness of which reveals the writer’s high artistic power. This is illustrated by one of his gemlike poems in which his memory, reason, imagination and emotion all rush spontaneously together in a sudden vision of God’s everlasting mercy. The poem was written during his third missionary journey, the busiest one of all. He was writing to the Roman Christians whom he had never seen. His mind was completely engaged in following a deep and close train of reasoning on the relationship of the Jews and Gentiles, now so hopelessly sundered from each other through the Gospel. Deeper and deeper he plunges into the mystery of God’s dealing with his people, until, like one who in imagination suddenly envisages widely separated continents joined together under the sea, St. Paul beholds in amazement the revelation of these two peoples

united into one under the ocean of God's boundless love for all mankind. The thought inspires him. His imagination leaps rapturously forward to meet this exalted conception of God's eternal plan for the ages, and he bursts forth involuntarily into this rhapsody of praise:

O, depth of the riches!  
 Both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God!  
 How unsearchable are his judgements!  
 And his ways past finding out!  
 For, who hath known the mind of the Lord;  
 Or, who hath been his counselor;  
 Or who hath first given to him,  
 And it shall be recompensed unto him again?  
 For of him, and through him, and unto him are all things.  
 To him the glory forever. Amen. (Rom. xi. 33-36).

His immortal ode to Love, Corinthians xiii, marches with the tread of cherubim and seraphim through the corridors of high heaven, chanting the supreme sentiment of the Christian religion. Only a few lines are necessary to prove that St. Paul was a poet of supreme power:

If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels,  
 And have not Love,  
 I am become sounding brass,  
 Or a clanging cymbal.

Love suffereth long and is kind;  
 Love envieth not;  
 Love vaunteth not itself;  
 Is not puffed up;  
 Doth not behave itself unseemingly,  
 Seeketh not its own;

Love never faileth;

But now abideth,  
 Faith, hope and Love,  
 These three;  
 And the greatest of these is Love.

From this aspect of Paul's character, involuntarily and with some tinge of sadness our minds revert to that Galilean peasant, more pensive, less hurried with organizing problems, far from crowding cities, breathing deeply of the beauty about him, seeing in the twittering sparrows, the shifty foxes, the purpling vineyards, the woods by the roadside, the spring fields brown and ready for seeding, the seasons' coming and going, the face of the heavens in sunset and storm—in these and not in the noisy ugliness of cities—the presence of God. In them, and not in man's works, he saw the hand of the Creator, and to him the humblest lilies of the fields surpassed the glories of Solomon's court. Into the soul of Paul, so blest with intellect and heart, we wish that more of quiet beauty had found lodgement in peace and security.

This is the description of the features anterior to Saul's conversion, a description given in terms of religious sentiment. No claim is made for completeness of analysis. In fact, it is patent that a complete discussion of all the factors operating upon the prosecutor of the Way would lead to almost endless detail. Those factors selected for treatment above have been chosen because of their close connection with the purposes of psychology. The conversion itself is indeed the small neck of the hourglass through which all the sands of Saul's life in a sense flowed. All that went before passed over, renewed and transformed, it is true, into the later years of that translated and glorified Apostle known under the name of St. Paul.

Farewell, Saul of Tarsus, Hebrew of the Hebrews, Pharisee of the Pharisees, blameless before the Law, strong of limb, slim of body, clean of jaw; with your narrow nose meeting the closed and truculent eyebrows, compressed and contracted with a determined purpose, your hands sinewy with a tent-maker's strength, your bearing full of arrogance, dedicated and devoted to the service of a jealous and angry God. Little mercy can that trembling band of the Nazarene's followers expect from such a man. But, by the

way, a Peasant will meet you, and your anger will vanish quickly away like the heat of a mountainside at nightfall; the arrogance of your eye turn to darkness, your haughtiness be brought low, your form unbend, and in your life journey henceforth, he will lead you by the hand like a little child, until at last your unquenchable spirit is set free to live evermore the world over wherever the tale of the Christ is told.

## CHAPTER IV

### SAUL'S WORLD MADE WHOLE

THE preceding chapter left Saul of Tarsus traveling on his way to Damascus, charged with the duty and vested with the power to prosecute all members of that party called Nazarenes whom he considered to be dangerous to the Jewish nation and distasteful to God. In this appointed work and toward his revolutionary crisis, powerful influences from without and persuasive motives from within were conjoined in urging him on toward his destiny.

The inner forces were both inherited and acquired. The former included his instincts with their primary emotions—pugnacity being probably his most dominating disposition—and his temperament, which was melancholy. These two, pugnacity and melancholy, the one urging him so often to those passions of the “flesh” he condemns and the latter, so gloomily painting his divided condition, constituted the soil from which his conversion mainly grew. To these must also be added those other great emotional powers in him—his divided and warring sentiments of religion, self-respect, morality, patriotism—all separated from each other and so constantly offending the supreme sentiment of a man, the desire for unity shown in the established sentiment of rationality.

That some marked and highly significant transformation occurred to Saul of Tarsus cannot reasonably be denied. The evidences of its reality are scattered all around us. They appear in a Catholic church that deifies a Jew, that

counts its disciples among all the nations of the earth and claims to be the sole religion of mankind. The transition of Christianity from a Jewish party to a world religion had its moment of crisis. That moment can be discovered by tracing backwards the antecedents of this present world-enveloping cult to the point in its history when the conversion of the Apostle to the Gentiles from Judaism to Christianity is recorded. There, in the writings of the New Testament, especially in the Book of Acts of the Apostles and in the Epistles of the Apostle himself, the story is given in fair detail.<sup>1</sup>

A psychological study of Saul's transformation consists essentially of a comparison between his experience and the mental phenomena passing in our times under the same name. According to recent studies, conversions are of two distinct varieties—the sudden, self-surrender type; and the gradual, volitional type. Obvious reasons assign Saul's experience to the first class. Further, the climax usually, though not always, follows a state technically known as "conviction of sin," marked by a certitude of condemnation and future punishment, or some other belief suggested by environment and education; and by depression, melancholy, fear and agony, depending for their intensities upon the emotional constitution of the sufferer, and accompanied by a restless seeking for some relief from the woeful state. The climax comes either suddenly or leisurely and in it the seeker is convinced that he is "saved." Then his mourning is turned into joy either with a sudden and violent irruption of feeling, or with a gradual return to his original emotional health and tone. The consequences of the conversion, both immediate and more removed, vary with the individual and circumstances, but they are alike in that some permanent changes are nearly always wrought in the

<sup>1</sup> For the historical worth of these works see Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible, Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, articles on separate books; Ramsay, *St. Paul, the Traveller and Roman Citizen*; A. Harnack, *The Acts of the Apostles*, 1909.

convert's beliefs and conduct. This, in barest outline, is an analysis of modern conversions.<sup>2</sup>

Such upheavals in a person's experience may occur more than once in a lifetime. They do not always effect a radical or instantaneous transformation of character. Conversion may cover a slow process like petrification, by which the Christian character is slowly infiltrated to replace the old man. The sudden variety may engage no factors, and pursue no process different from the gradual, volitional type, though it is the latter kind that has always received the lion's share of attention from students and claims to require a supernatural explanation. The suddenness of Saul's irruption has added an enormous amount of interest to the act itself.

The word "conversion" is applied to a multitude of mental and moral changes. Coe gives six meanings: (1) "a voluntary turning about or change of attitude toward God; this is the New Testament sense; (2) the renunciation of one religion and the beginning of adherence . . . to another; from one branch of a religion . . . to another; (3) individual salvation . . . (4) becoming consciously or voluntarily religious, as distinguished from mere conformity . . . (5) Christian quality of life as contrasted with an earlier, non-Christian quality . . . (6) any abrupt transfer, from one . . . mode of life to another, especially from . . . answer to . . . a higher life."<sup>3</sup>

Other writers are inclined to be more specific in the use of the term and to confine it primarily to that change which brings about the unification of a person. Thus Pratt says "the essential thing about conversion is just the unification of character, the achievement of the new self . . . by which a man ceases to be a mere psychological thing or

<sup>2</sup> E. B. Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion*, 1899; James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1903; Amy Tanner, *The Child*, 1904, chapter on "Meaning of Conversion" gives statistics; Harold Begbie, *Twice-Born Men*, 1910.

<sup>3</sup> *Psychology of Religion*, 1917, p. 152.



a divided self and becomes a unified being . . . under the guidance of a group of consistent and harmonious purposes or ideals." <sup>4</sup> James is in essential agreement with this thought, defining conversion as "the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong, inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right, superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold on religious realities." <sup>5</sup> Starbuck's definition mentions the three stages in "the whole series of manifestations just preceding, accompanying, and immediately following the apparently sudden changes of character involved," in "forsaking the lower for the higher self." <sup>6</sup>

These definitions indicate the wide range of phenomena which may be brought under the discussion of conversion. The change is not confined to modern evangelism, to evangelical Christianity, to any one religion, nor even necessarily to religion in general. The inclusiveness of the change as well as its antiquity is indicated in the words: "In every age and race there have been minds that have turned to the light, hearts that have felt the 'expulsive power of a new affection,' wills that have striven, and not all in vain, to attain to the ideal." Seneca called himself not "so much a reformed as a transfigured man." In spite of its prevalence, the New Testament uses the word only once, when Paul and Barnabas report the "conversion" of the Gentiles (Acts xv. 3, *epistrophén*), though of course many other synonyms are used for the transformation of men into Christians (Acts iii. 26, *apotrephein*, turn away; ii. 38, *metanoésate*, repent; xv. 3; *epistrophén*, turning to). The act of believing also took the place of conversion in the New Testament. On the whole, instead of the process being a

<sup>4</sup> *The Religious Consciousness*, 1920, p. 193.

<sup>5</sup> *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 189.

<sup>6</sup> *Psychology of Religion*, 1900, p. 21.

<sup>7</sup> *Encyc. of Religion and Ethics*, "Conversion," by James Strachan.

well-defined and technical act with its steps clearly marked off, it is a large and complex procedure, involving the whole man.

From the foregoing description it can be seen that Saul's experience differed in some salient features from those experiences now denominated conversions. While his melancholy gave him periods of depression, it was at that moment apparently in abeyance, and his pugnacity and anger were dominant. Apparently he felt no "conviction of sin" (Phil. iii. 6) in the modern sense. He suffered no fear of perdition; he was not "lost." He was not separated from God, living in rebellion or in iniquity. In two things fundamental Paul was very clear: he always had a good conscience, and he always throughout his whole life served God (Acts xxiii. 1, xxiv. 16; II Cor. i. 12; II Tim. i. 3; I Tim. i. 13). At the time of his conversion he was serving his God with his whole might by rigorously and vigorously pushing his prosecution of renegade Jews who he thought were dangerous to his beloved nation and detestable to God. No one had ever suggested that he was lost, sold under sin, bound for destruction. Had anyone, at that critical moment, broached such an idea to the proud young Pharisee, the suggestion would have been repulsed with haughty surprise.

The middle stage of his change also lacks some of the modern marks. A present-day rebirth lifts a man from black darkness to shining glory. Joy floods his soul. The world gleams with miraculous newness such as the stars must have seen when they first looked down upon the freshly created earth. This beatific state is followed in the convert's soul with peace like that of the ocean depths beneath the waves and tides, undisturbed by a single doubt of God's grace or his saving act. Joy, elation, transfiguration, light, brightness, glory, cloud on cloud of trailing and columnar brilliance, and ocean upon ocean of endless bliss, these and even more extravagant expressions are used by

those who have gone through the ecstasy of conversion.\* How different is all this from Saul's quick descent from an assured position into the depths of darkness, both physical and mental (Acts ix. 8, 9).

Finally, the events immediately following the climax of Saul's change are entirely different from the acts usually followed by present-day converts. His intellect was not illumined with a sure faith, but he was bewildered and confused, and darkened with many doubts. He was not fully instructed in all the ways of salvation but bidden to seek for further directions. Objects did not shine with newness but went out in physical blackness. Emotionally he was not elated but humbled; not filled with joy but saddened; not emboldened but made fearful. Volitionally he was stunned and estopped in all his activities. From proud leadership he fell instantly to humble groping that allowed his servants to lead him by the hand like a little child. Stunned in mind, paralyzed in will, wonder-filled and fearful in heart, he followed dumbly where he was led. Had a modern evangelist chanced to meet this forlorn and wretched man, would he have recognized in this distraught figure a soul just saved by a miracle of God? Would he not rather have stopped the caravan and labored to bring this benighted creature to a realization of the light and grace of true salvation?

This situation indicates what a comparatively small part of the future Apostle's conversion really took place on the Damascus Way. It was there only begun. He was to tarry in Damascus for further instructions. The intervening three days he spent in darkness, wondering, in all probability, like St. Peter, what the vision might mean for that yet unlighted future lying before him like a wilderness of dimly outlined shapes full of doubtful import. Into the darkness comes a lowly disciple and advises the grop-

\* For examples see Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*; James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*; Amy Tanner, *The Child*; *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Conversion," by James Strachan.

ing petitioner to rise and be baptized and wash away his sins. That man, Ananias, gives the great organizer of the church the few simple directions about rites involved in his personal salvation, and they were obeyed. In this respect, too often in our times, human agents and ceremonial means are made secondary or entirely neglected in conversions which nevertheless are supposed to be following the New Testament pattern. A psychologist as well as a theologian knows that rites and ceremonies, to a man of Saul's apprehensive mass, or religious training, were inextricably involved in his soul's new welfare.

On the whole, the personal conversion of Saul exhibits large likenesses to, and differences from, those changes in religious character nowadays called by the same name. The differences may be summarized as follows: (1) Saul felt no conviction of sin, nor depression, nor melancholy before his conversion; (2) far from seeking salvation, or any change whatever, he was quite concentrated on his work for Jehovah; (3) the whole conversion, while the onset was sudden and unexpected, was not completed at once; (4) but unlike modern converts, he went to a humble disciple for final directions; (5) and immediately following the chief episode, he suffered a period of blindness, humiliation, uncertainty, totally unlike the conventional experiences of sudden illumination, full faith, exhilarating joyousness and profound peace; (6) moreover, in the procedure, some supposedly very important elements are not mentioned—repentance, for example; (7) and finally, Saul perceived certain signs which are usually absent in present-day conversions.

It was like some modern conversions in (1) the suddenness with which the change began; (2) the surrender by Saul of belief in one religion and the acceptance of another; (3) the presence of a divine element in the transaction; (4) the change of Saul's character, his ultimate achievement of peace and joy, and devotion to Christian service. When thus the comparison is impartially made, it is seen

that religious conversions have in modern times, like so many other religious ceremonies, received many accretions which alter very markedly their external appearance as well as their internal nature.

While resemblances may be traced between Saul's marvelous transformation and modern conversions, on the one hand, and the transfigurations of Old and New Testament heroes, on the other, it is not too much to say that the very common identification of such phenomena in all, or in essential details, is not justified by the facts. Saul's transmutation of life and character contained within it some elements unique and not to be duplicated every time a soul is saved. What these are will appear with more detail in an analysis of this climax in the persecutor's life.

If, then, we attempted to square Saul's experience with those modern emotional irruptions now called conversions, we should find such discrepancies between the two that we might doubt that he was "converted" at all. But such an outcome is the result of focusing all attention, to the exclusion of other facts of the first importance, upon the personal and individual changes which Saul underwent in his own character and personality. Supremely important and eternally necessary as such a transformation was, nevertheless it did not encompass the whole conversion, and cannot by itself adequately describe or explain that cosmic event. The compass of the change includes everything *from* which he was delivered and everything *to* which he was delivered, and that includes heaven and earth, the past, present and future, time and eternity.

In this inclusive light, it is possible to say that he experienced at least three fairly well marked "conversions." The first was his change from disbelief to absolute conviction that Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah of the Jews. The second went infinitely farther and made this same Jesus the Son of God, God himself. The third conversion, the one most talked and written about, was (a) his own per-

sonal transformation from a torn and divided self seeking wholeness, or peace, through righteousness, to an integrated and fully organized personality, with (b) his transformation from the persecutor of the Way into the ambassador of Christ, the Apostle of a universal religion to mankind. This call to the Apostleship furnished the sole reason, in the Apostle's mind, for Jesus' return to earth. In comparison to the saving of his soul, essential and vital as that was, his call to preach a world-wide religion was unlimited in his significance for time and eternity, for heaven and for earth.

Though these three phases of the same general event may be distinguished, they must not be separated from each other, nor torn out of the fabric of this divine drama of which they form integral parts. Taken out of its context, each part loses its meaning and its worth. They all belong to one personality. Moreover, the divine side of this cosmic crisis—though psychology may not investigate its mysteries—must never for a moment be forgotten.

The combined influence of the three conversions wrought for St. Paul a unification in two great spheres. First, it gave him a complete and perfectly unified system of thought about God, man and the world. Secondly, it transformed him from a crowd of warring inherited and acquired desires, contradictory ideas, and divergent actions into an organized, integrated person, with one sole end and aim in life, with all his desires focused upon that end, and all his activities converging upon the accomplishment of it. As McGiffert has pointed out, this twofold function belongs to the essence of Christianity. "Christianity made the double appeal," he says, "on the one side as a religion with a practical message, to every man, low or high; and on the other side, as a philosophy. . . . No movement can spread rapidly and widely unless it appeal to the common man;

. . . [nor] establish itself firmly and permanently unless it wins the thinking classes, the intellectual leaders of the world. Christianity did both." \* Such was the twofold revelation. How it came to him may never be known in detail; but we may sketch its main features and mark its chief stages. The first step was taken when the vision appeared to him, and he asked, "Who art thou, Lord?" "I am Jesus whom thou persecutest!" was the prompt rejoinder (Acts ix. 5). That answer probably left him the most surprised, ashamed and bewildered young man on earth at that moment.

For that answer initiated in him his first step toward conversion. Obviously it was the simple yet portentous identification of two ideas of two beings heretofore held to be separate by him. Jesus of Nazareth, the lowly carpenter, despised, rejected, persecuted, was indeed the Messiah of Israel. His appearance in the heavens, the radiance of his shining glory, the voice and the vision, all these coming to a man of Saul's education and training left no room for doubt about this Messiah. Yet this intellectual identification, this first union of two persons, Jesus and the Messiah, simple as it was mentally, reverberated throughout the young man's whole life and thought, and the echo of it went out into the whole world. It is interesting, indeed, to speculate upon what would in all probability have happened had this been the whole revelation, if nothing beyond the single truth that Jesus was the Messiah had ever reached the persecutor of the Way.

In all probability he would have been induced by his sincerity, like some other Pharisees (Acts iv. 5), to take his stand with the Apostles and other disciples in Jerusalem. Like them he would have testified to the resurrection of Jesus. With them he would have taught that he was the long-sought Messiah. In their hope of the Christ's immediate return to earth in all the prophesied power and glory

\* *Influence of Christianity in the Roman Empire*, p. 45, quoted by S. Angus, *The Mystery Religions and Christianity*, 1925, p. 285.

of the son of David he would have ardently shared. He, like them, would have been baptized, would have continued in the Apostles' fellowship, in the breaking of bread and prayers, in the sharing of goods, and in their community life, and with them he would have continued his daily worship in the Temple where the Messiah might be expected to reappear.

His high Jewish connections could have carried him farther. He might have laid the whole affair before his teacher Gamaliel, noted for his tolerance, and convinced him, and through him many Pharisees, that now they had been vouchsafed a solemn and well-attested fact to support their belief in the resurrection of the dead. Thus he might have established the new sect firmly among the Jews and saved himself from violent persecution. Eventually, when the promised return of Jesus, the glorified Messiah, did not materialize and the Jewish national hopes went down into the ashes of despair with the destruction of the Holy City under Titus and Hadrian, the whole movement would have probably collapsed, leaving nothing behind it to witness for Jesus except the tradition of a Jewish prophet, marvelous for the sweetness and gentleness of his character, unstained by fault during life, and sainted by a death as unresisting and serene as it was cruel and useless.

All of this, we may presume, had no other message come to Saul on the Damascus road, might have followed upon his conviction that Jesus was the Christ. His idea of God, his patriotic sentiment, and his system of morality would all have been left intact, or have been affected very little. His experience would have left him more eager than ever to worship in the old ways and in the old places that he revered always, among a people whom he loved and longed for to the end of his life. Converted he might have been, but only in the sense that he enjoyed an enlargement of his beliefs and feelings regarding a certain carpenter of Galilee, who made some good claims to the Messiahship of the Jews, promised a life hereafter through his own resur-



rection, and was sure to come again in the majesty of a King.<sup>10</sup>

As it was, St. Paul was profoundly affected by the reappearance of Christ and his consequent resurrection. His conviction about the hereafter became as unshakable as the existence of Jerusalem, as the stones of its streets, the ground on which it was built. His faith in immortality passed from a reasoned conviction to a perceived fact which no threat of physical torment could destroy nor any fear of death for a moment dim. It gave him infinitely more than the Stoic formula, "Nothing can injure a good man." It conferred upon him a new spirit, a triumphant daring, a pugnacious willingness to run out to meet and conquer mortality, and shout over its corpse, "O death, where is thy victory?"

These limited changes, profound as they might have seemed to the young man himself, would in all probability never have touched the deep-seated cause of his real trouble. He would have ceased persecution of the Way; but would that have given him anything but a renewed and deepened sense of hopeless unrighteousness? Would he have found any peace in his incurable remorse for this new wickedness? Would the death and resurrection of a mere Messiah have conferred upon him righteousness and that peace within through peace with God which he craved? No. But infinitely over and beyond his knowledge of Jesus as Messiah came the sublime conception of Jesus as God. That revelation demanded a complete revision of Saul's whole notion of the crucifixion. That dread event on Calvary must be explained afresh. Out of that explanation came his sweeping system of theology about sin, atonement, redemption, justification, adoption, the Fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man—all grounded, it is true, upon his experience, but far overtopping it. His own

<sup>10</sup> For the final dissolution of the Jerusalem group, see *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Ebionism," by W. Beveridge; for its nature, see F. J. Foakes-Jackson, *Life of St. Paul*, Chap. III, also pp. 204ff.

personal conversion certainly would not have made him the Apostle to the world.

Did it give him peace? To answer that we must recognize the various kinds of peace men may have. The first distinction is between outer and inner peace (Jno. xvi. 33; Mt. x. 34 and Lu. xii. 51; cf. Jno. xiv. 27; Rom. xii. 18; cf. viii. 6, xiv. 17; Gal. v. 22; Phil. iii. 15; Jas. i. 2-4). The soldier who said his idea of peace was charging through the Argonne forest in the late war after three weeks in the trenches had caught the distinction. According to the sources of peace, there are three kinds: (1) the pseudo-peace of passion which clamors for satisfaction only to grow more clamorous on what it feeds (Rom. vii. 6; Rom. i. 22-32; cf. Heb. iii. 13; Prov. xxiii. 32; Rom. iii. 23); (2) the peace of passivity promised to those who kill all desire, the chimera of asceticism, the peace of the grave, of privation, the rest of resignation, the Stoic *apathia* (Job iii. 13, 17, xvii. 16; Ps. lv. 6; Jer. vi. 16; (3) the peace of progress, of purpose, of power to move steadily toward a goal or ideal (Jno. x. 10, xi. 25, 26; Phil. iii. 14; Eph. iv. 12, 13; Lu. ii. 52). In the reiterated, resultless repetitions of duties enjoined by commandments Saul had found no more peace than the buffalo at the water wheel, or the ox on the threshing floor. His ardent spirit longed for growth and found none.<sup>11</sup>

At this point the path which St. Paul had been following in his search for the peace of wholeness through righteousness divides into two parts; one, theoretical, leads him onward to develop his all-embracing thought system, or theology, through his new conception of God; the other, practical, leads him forward to first an ideal of a perfectly integrated self, and secondly into an ever-active, never-halted development of himself toward that ideal. Both developments lead through Christ to God. Both are actuated by the same fundamental urges in St. Paul. One proceeds

<sup>11</sup> Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, W. Adams Brown; *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Peace," by R. L. Ottley.

by thinking, the other by doing. Both are accompanied all the way by faith; and both are ways of salvation. One ends in the idea of God as Father; the other never ends, but always advances step by step, toward Christlikeness, and hence, oneness with God. The one unifies the man; the other, his world.

St. Paul's conversion modified his idea of God more extensively than intensively. Of the existence, or being, of God he never entertained a doubt. His conception of the nature of God underwent immense expansion, as well as internal reconstruction. Still, for him, his Christian God remained the God of his fathers (Acts xxiv. 14; Gal. i. 14). But attributes of that God, implicit in Judaism, now became explicit and dominant. His Fatherhood, his grace, his Love were not only rendered concrete and visible in Jesus Christ, but they were extended to all the people of the world.

These additional and vitally significant transformations in the Apostle's idea of God came from his further and infinitely more important belief that Jesus was not only the Messiah of the Jews, but also the Son of God. Whatever these words meant to him in their fullness then or at a later time, they seemed to set Jesus Christ above men and make him equal in some sense with the one God of all the world, and carried with them all the emotions and all the worship such a Being merits.

The conception of the Messiah carried with it, at least in many minds of that day, the belief that he was also peculiarly related to God in a way best expressed by Sonship with Him. The idea of Sonship thus grew out of the Messiahship. Saul adopted both the expression and the idea without hesitancy. In the Book of Acts he is the first one of whom it is definitely stated that he preached that doctrine, proclaiming in the Damascus synagogues "Jesus, that he was the Son of God," a truth that he later connected with the resurrection of Jesus (Rom. i. 1-4; cf. Heb. i. 5 and John's general teaching). This acceptance of

the relationship between Jesus and Jehovah, so obnoxious to the Jewish leaders, naturally brought with it the most marked and radical adjustment of the new convert's attitude toward that Deity who manifested his will, not alone in a written Law, but through one who was the Way, the Truth and the Life.

From the doctrine that Jesus is the Son of God,<sup>12</sup> to that belief that he was coequal with God, which marked the Apostle's final stage in his theology, was a momentous step. The thought that Jesus "who, existing in the form of God, counted not the being on equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and being found in fashion as a man" (Acts ix. 20) must have reverberated throughout the entire thought system and the practical life of the young Hebrew nourished so strictly in the conviction of Jehovah's oneness, transcendence and personality.

The revelation of Jesus as Deity necessarily wrought changes in St. Paul's idea of the God of the Jews. Instead of a transcendent Being, he now was seen to be incarnated in Man; instead of being One in an abstract or merely substantial sense, he was in Christ reconciling the world to himself; instead of being a personality in the vague and undefined sense of that word, his personality through the incarnation of Christ and through the Holy Spirit was taking on new definition, new expansion and new richness.

The greatest single attribute thus added to St. Paul's conception of his God was contained in the word Love. The aspect of Love, or the type of Love showed by God to man, may be defined as the sentiment of grace. The sentiment was concretely expressed to man in the form of Jesus Christ (Jno. iii. 16; I Jno. iv. 9; Rom. v. 8, viii. 3-39), who himself was the product of that Love, being the first-begotten of the Father, and another phase of that same Love, which is God's essence. Thus, though God and Christ were

<sup>12</sup> *Hastings, Dict. of the Bible*, "Son of God"; also Ps. ii. 7; lxxxix. 26, 27.

one, the unity thus revealed was not that hard and fast identity which excluded all possible diversity. The unity and the diversity both were thrust upon the consciousness of the Apostle by the facts of the incarnation.

Out of this God as Love, out of this Fatherhood, out of this incarnation and consequent crucifixion flowed the Evangelist's great doctrine of righteousness by justification and righteousness by growth into Christlikeness. Through the imputed righteousness came that long-sought and long-looked-for peace which the young man had worked so hard for by keeping the last detail of the Law. Justification thus formed one of the important but subsidiary ideas of God's new character, and peace formed a stable part of the convert's character.

The mind of the convert once started upon its quest by the revelation of God in Christ rose gradually, step by step, into those higher vistas which gave him command of the views revealed by a universal religion. If Jesus is God, then God died on the cross. For what? Surely, not because he was malefactor in fact. Calvary then becomes invested with the reverence due the most solemn tragedy in all history—the death of God. The sordid execution is instantly transformed into an event portentous for Israel. It also breaks the bound of nationalism and becomes a cosmic drama. God the Father so loves the whole world that he gives his most precious possession for its redemption, for propitiation for sins, for justification and for righteousness. "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not reckon sin" (Rom. iv. 8). "Being therefore justified by faith," St. Paul finds his hunger for peace with God fully appeased (Rom. v. 1).

"Love bound Jesus to the cross or the nails would never have kept him there." This recognition of the vast and endless Love of God for man spells his Fatherhood. He measured his Love for men by his Love for his Son (Jno. iii. 16). That Love not only revealed an aspect and quality of his nature in startling terms, but also enriched and

expanded the prevailing idea of his nature. He possessed a heart as well as everlasting power and divinity.

His heart joined his head as he tenderly and sympathetically looked down upon his creatures, and instead of repenting his creation of them (Gen. vi. 13) he planned their salvation (Eph. i. 4; Mt. xxv. 34; I Tim. ii. 4; Tit. ii. 11). The Love prompted, the intellect planned, the will was there to carry the plan of salvation into action. In the fullness of time God sent forth his Son (Gal. iv. 4) that he might redeem and adopt those whom he loved. All this newly revealed knowledge of God enormously enlarged the conception of his personality and invested it with attributes requiring a unity of God quite removed from the prevalent idea of monotheism of that day.

Out of St. Paul's development of his idea of Jesus Christ came an all-embracing system which bound into one theological whole God the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, all men including the Apostle himself, and all the created world. All things, created and uncreated, were thus bound into a unity which satisfied the imperial demands of Paul's exceptional intellect.

To St. Paul the unity which he succeeded in introducing into his world through Jesus Christ was not clearly defined as it is to us after centuries of trinitarian discussion. He mentions it under several figures of speech. Perhaps his prevailing thought lingers about functional, or organic, unity.<sup>18</sup> For his purpose the idea of personality then just emerging from obscurity was sufficiently clear to think of God and Jesus and the Holy Spirit all as representing persons each acting independently of each other, but each one adopting the same purpose, moved by the same Love and using proper means for achieving their joint purpose.

Naturally we cannot under the head of descriptive psy-

<sup>18</sup> For God, trinity, personality, see Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, W. Sanday; *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "God," by W. T. Davidson; *ibid.*, "Personalism," by R. T. Flewelling; B. P. Bowne, *Personalism*, 1908.

chology enter into a discussion of that theory of unity in diversity called Trinitarianism which has engaged the stoutest minds in Christian theology, but we may be able to discuss a phase of that unity and how it satisfied Paul's purposes.<sup>14</sup> The varieties of unity may be classified as: (1) formal, consisting of the complete identity of ideas in logic, quantities in pure mathematics, or the reduction by proper focusing of the eyes of two optical images to one image of any external object; and the partial identity of complex things some of whose parts are made of the same stuff; (2) structural unity depending upon the arrangement of organs like the body and mind in human personality, societies, or machine, and in art objects; (3) functional, depending upon (a) the same end, or (b) use of same means to attain the end; (4) genetic, depending upon derivation from the same source, as the children of the same parents, or the unity in organic evolution.

The unity which St. Paul found in his new religion was necessarily reflected into and through his morality. The Fatherhood of God revealed through Christ made all men brothers and more than brothers through Christ. In him they all became, for moral purposes, one man. That is, in the ideal, St. Paul saw every other human being as an extension of himself. For, through Christ, he was made one with God. All others who were thus made one with Christ, by that act, became one with himself. He beheld an "ethical solidarity." In his plea to the Corinthians he cries, "Ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's" (I Cor. iii. 23). This moral identity of the human race appears only when men are stripped of all adventitious trappings and stand in the same circumstances. As such they are intrinsic beings, moral beings; and as such before God, one person.<sup>15</sup> St. Paul as a Jew saw men divided into God's chosen people

<sup>14</sup> T. R. Glover, *Paul of Tarsus*, pp. 211, 212, 221.

<sup>15</sup> The same thought is found in Jesus' words, Mt. xxv. 31-40. Oneness with Christ is a functional unity which does as he does; cf. also Jno. x. 24, 25, 30-32, 37-38.

and the Gentiles; as a Christian, he saw all nations, tribes and tongues united with all middle walls of partition forever thrown down (Eph. ii. 14-22; I Cor. xii. 12-27; Gal. iii. 26).

His vision of this moral world was a vision. But it could be realized by each man's choosing to treat his fellow man as himself or as God saw him. This ought to follow logically upon any man's accepting Jesus Christ as his own ideal, with the determination to be like him as nearly as possible. If such a man is one with his brother, then he will also adopt the same ideal for his brother. Out of the ideal unity in Christ, thus comes the practical unity based upon the same goal, or ideal, or end. If all men, for themselves and for each other, determine to become like Christ, then in that respect and to that degree they are one. Their ethics naturally grow out of their religion.

The next step is the practical one of realizing that likeness. How St. Paul himself proceeded in that development we will consider in the next chapter, which will treat of the Christian motive of morality. The means and methods to be followed in order to grow into Christlikeness will be taken up more fully in the last chapter of the volume. At this point we merely stress the point of the essential unity of Christian morality with religion, and the underlying unity of men in Christ which is the basis of man's duty to man.

In Paul's pre-Christian patriotic sentiment, the primary object was his own nation, with the Roman Empire second, and other peoples trailing off into obscurity. His Christian sentiment burst his hard and fast shell of chauvinism, and compelled him to consider at least three political groups: (1) his own nation; (2) the Roman Empire, with its medley of nations; (3) the Kingdom of God, or Heaven, in its contemporaneous form, inner and outer; in its coming form; and the church as its instrument, visible and invisible, made up of human beings alive and dead, converted and unconverted.



To harmonize these interrelated societies—with their statutes, governments and rulers—must, with his religion his morality and his daily life, have given the Apostle abundant theoretical and practical difficulty. Eventually he seems to have welded them into one whole. The Kingdom of Heaven possesses his primary allegiance, in its visible form claiming all his efforts, and in its coming glory furnishing him with inspiration and hope. The kingdoms of this earth are so many means to the preservation of the field wherein he worked, permitted by the sufferance of God. His own nation he always hoped would be included within the Kingdom (Rom. xi). The church was a means to the end of saving men. All the social agencies were united as means to the end of making men Christ-like. As such they all served with various degrees of efficiency, and would continue for limited times, as instruments in God's hands.

The emotions growing out of his Christian patriotism present no turmoil among themselves. His chief contemplation was directed toward the Kingdom of God. The other organizations were secondary in his attention. As that Kingdom sheltered within itself the satisfaction of all his desires, so its contemplation gave him anticipatory and compensatory blessings of feeling (Rom. viii. 18; I Thess. iv. 14-18). In fact, he defines the Kingdom in terms of inner experience—righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit (Rom. xiv. 17). How much of this state was due to right living and how much to the imminence of the Lord's return to establish his Kingdom over all the earth, is an open question. Without doubt, however, for St. Paul the expected return and the triumph of the Kingdom had much to do with mitigating, in his mind, the rigors of harsh governments and the incidental cruelties of rulers. He could well afford to be patient with governments which would soon be brought to nought (I Cor. ii. 6).

The volitional factor of his patriotic sentiment included both his own acquiescence in and obedience to various gov-

ernments under which he worked and lived, and his unceasing efforts spent in building up the Kingdom of God. In the first relation he accepted what existed—obeyed laws, hearkened to rulers, and never sought in any way to incite riots, rebellions or revolutions, though he was frequently accused (Acts xvii. 5-9; Rom. xiii. 1-7), and sometimes punished for, doing just these things. As far as politics were concerned he was a conservative. He knew no weapon for overthrowing governments beyond the Gospel of Love, and no method of revolutionizing them save the quiet, patient method of leaven working in the whole lump. The organized form of his Gospel was the church, and to the establishment of congregations he gave his time and energy with a devotion unsurpassed by any man in any occupation at any time. His practical devotion to the church indicated that he held it to be the key to the situation, and in working for it and for the Kingdom his patriotic sentiment found its satisfaction, both intellectually, emotionally and practically.

This brief outline of what seems to have been the Apostle's final and settled state regarding governments and politics gives no hint of the shock and the anxious reformation of his old patriotic sentiment which he must have suffered through his conversion to Christianity. Recalling, as we have shown above, what his own and his people's long-cherished hopes were for their nation, we can gain some slight insight into the anguish through which Saul must have gone on beholding his national hopes gone down forever by the revelation that God was not about to set the Jews in supremacy over all nations nor invest them with divine glory through a Messiah, but that he was the Father of all men, loved them all alike and would make them all one family.

The effect of such a vision might well be extraordinary. Crashing in upon the unprepared consciousness of one so narrowly and deeply grounded in the Jewish teaching and national ideals as Saul was, it was astounding and bewildering. It shook the very foundations of all his patiently

built system of faith, even as it shattered forever the foundations upon which the nation's hopes were built. The conception was too huge, too staggering, too indefinite in its outlines to be grasped instantly. Its consequences ran forward and lost themselves in a future full of foreboding and darkness. Its antecedents ran back to the beginning of time and demanded a total reëvaluation of every event of Jewish history, of every tradition Saul held dear. No wonder he was blinded mentally as well as physically.

It is quite possible that his severest shock came to him by way of this patriotic sentiment, and specifically through the complete frustration of all the prospects he had cherished for his beloved people. In the above sketch we have touched but lightly upon the problem he faced in bringing ultimate order out of the first chaos into which he was thrown and which must have grown somewhat with the perplexities thrust upon him by the relations of the societies which he later lived in and promoted. The impressive reconciliation of penal measures with Love of men by God and by himself must have furnished him with a considerable problem.

That problem was presented to him from two angles: first, through the sufferings he himself sometimes endured at the hands of rulers (Acts xvi. 19, 20, 22, 23); and secondly, through the discipline he found it necessary for him to inflict upon destructive members of his churches and upon the opponents of his work. Nowhere else does the radicalness of the change in his character effected by Christianity come clearer into view than in the incomparable difference of attitude he took toward the Nazarenes and toward his later opponents, shown especially in the inexhaustible patience and long-suffering conciliation he exhibited toward his own people. In dealing with them, and with the recalcitrant members of the church, bitterness was entirely absent. Inexorable law had no place. The past played no part. To the building up of the church and to the edification of the individual, he looked with a

steadfastness that amounted to the greatness of a Lincoln holding to a Union in the midst of a nation-swept war. Only when the individual threatened the integrity of the church did the Apostle exercise his power to chastise that dangerous enemy, and then only with a pathos of regret and tenderness of Love that was born of a steady purpose to make the sufferer Christlike (cf. I Cor. v. 11 and II Cor. ii. 1-11; Gal. vi. 1).

In such a conception several varieties of unity are distinctly preserved. First, genetic unity pervades the world, for God is the Creator of all things. But now, through Christ, he is revealed as more than the Creator through fiat; he is also the Father of all mankind, the peculiar Father of Christians, and the most peculiar Father of Christ, his first-born Son. The genetic unity of mankind thus passes over into a functional unity, since the Father wishes that all men shall be saved. To this end, God sends the one means, Jesus Christ. In spite of Stoic, Epicurean, Jewish and mystery-religion methods of salvation, there is only one name given under heaven whereby men shall be saved (Acts. iv. 12). Unity of method follows, for Christ died for all. All men spring from one Father; all are called in one hope; all are saved by one Man, who is God, over all, loving all, asking all to love him in return, and to love each other because the cement that binds the whole structure together is not logic that demands identity of ideas, but Love, a living bond of peculiar union, which can unite diversities into wholes.

The unity thus revealed appealed to and satisfied Saul's whole nature. Primarily it called to and answered his sentiment of rationality, or his desire for a maximum unity in the world, and simplicity in his system of thought. This oneness, which the Greeks had sought for half a millennium by their philosophic speculations, and which his own people had found and lost in the too straitened monotheism rabbinically defined, he saw and felt and seized in this new all-embracing idea of God. It offered the possibility of

harmonizing religion, ethics, estheticism and patriotism, concretely represented in bringing together Jehovah and Jesus, the Jews and Gentiles, the Hebrew theocracy and the Roman Empire, and lastly, in resolving into harmony the inner warfare of a non-integrated self. The sublime vision must have appealed to the imagination of the Hellenized citizen of Tarsus with an intellectual attraction that exercised an irresistible power. To such a vision of wholeness, everything within the sadly chaotic young man answered like deep calling unto deep. By such a system his intellectual cravings were satisfied as never before. The whole thought of Christianity appeared to his reason with a magnificent vision of a theology that gave meaning and purpose to all God's dealings with his people, and far surpassed any philosophical system the Greek philosophers had ever proposed. Small wonder that he was ready to discard the fulfilled Law, and to despise the wisdom, or philosophy of the world.

How much this meant to a man like Saul of Tarsus, who had been originally nourished religiously on the idea of one God, and later touched if not penetrated by the unity-loving systems of the Greeks and mystery-religions, but himself held at bay from his unifying God by the Law, we can at this day hardly estimate. Only those who have diligently developed within themselves the power of the sentiment for rationality by long and diligent systematic thinking can understand the enormous influence exerted by the mere ideal of a systematic whole upon the philosophic or theological mind. To Saul, who was possessed of real passion for unity in thought and unification in himself, it came with magnificently illuminating force. It was indeed a torch to lighten the Gentiles, shining into the uttermost parts of the earth (Acts xiii. 47, xxvi. 23; Rom. ii. 19; Cor. iv. 4, 6).

At the same moment it also lightened for Saul the path to freedom from that many-pointed Law, which like an iron-paled fence had kept him from perfect peace through the strife of his natural appetites for sin against the

Law. In Christ he saw both of these swept away through the final sacrifice, the cross. Henceforth he could stand upright, free in and for the freedom wherewith Christ had set him free. Only to a soul struggling long and anxiously to come into perfect unity can the meaning of that freedom from the power and penalty of sin, and of the immediate and closest access of God, be appreciated; a oneness at once practical and open to all by natural means, and yet infinite in its unexplored possibilities for joy, power and service. Only the pure in heart, that is, those whose minds are set singly upon this oneness with God untroubled by any other purpose, can walk these straitened paths of infinite peace (Gal. iv. 7).

## CHAPTER V

### THE MAN MADE WHOLE

THE last chapter brought the conversion of St. Paul through that stage wherein he formulated a system of world thought satisfactory to the sentiment of rationality, or desire for unity, through the God-man who through himself makes God and man one. A better example of personal unity could not be given than the oneness presented in Christ's humanity and divinity incarnate. From that concrete example as a center St. Paul drew his circle which included the whole world.

But does such a system of thought save a man? Does a systematic theology produce a unified personality? Was Saul of Tarsus himself remade when he remade his world-philosophy? These questions touch the second, or personal conversion of the Apostle, and bring to the fore problems of a practical religious nature.

The efficacy of mere thought systems for composing the warfare within a personality is dubious. If the system consists of nothing more than a supreme idea at the head of a framework of bare intellectual bones nicely bound together by logical identities, beautiful with the symmetry of simplicity and self-consistency, it may indeed command a pale kind of belief; but if it is without the power of muscles, or the sensitiveness of nerves, or unwarmed by life-giving blood, the system is dead and incapable of uniting a divided self.

The power in Christian faith is both natural and supernatural. It comes from God but expresses itself through the medium of conscious activities, the most powerful of which are the emotions and the will. Whether or not, in

the last analysis, these two powers may not be reduced to one primary Energy, is a problem for metaphysicians and theologians. As describers of human consciousness we are here interested in the emotions, and especially as emotion appears in those regulated, organized forms known as sentiments. It is to these large and important acquired components of his character that we must look for the changes made in Paul's personality.

St. Paul's conversion, beginning on the road to Damascus, did indeed make vast changes in the man. But it did not literally "make all things new" in his personality. In the first place, he retained the same physical body, though perhaps somewhat mended in its organic functions, but still carrying with it whatever anatomical defects it suffered before, and surely with some of its chronic ailments and its liability to acute attacks of disease (II Cor. xii. 7, possibly the thorn was a new affliction; Gal. iv. 13). The old pains of "hunger and thirst" and "cold and nakedness" and all the other weaknesses and disabilities common to mankind appeared to fall upon Paul the aged (Phil. ix) as they do upon ordinary folk; and perhaps they gave him a sympathy and tenderness for others which he would not have had without his own experiences. At any rate, these afflictions he accepted as instruments for shaping in him the likeness of Christ (II Cor. xii. 9, 10).

His mind was changed into the mind of Christ. In the chapter just previous to this we have seen how his principal formative ideas were changed through the revelation of Christ granted him. These new mental elements were molded by him into ideals, one of the principal ones being the new ideal he framed of the man he longed to be. Thus two Pauls came into being, one ideal, the other actual. But there was no longer any conflict between the two. For the ideal was the image into which the actual was growing, and the actual was the ideal realized. He was in some degree like his Master and Model, but he still had far to go (Phil iii. 13). He was a babe in Christ, but possessed



of all the potentialities of full manhood (Eph. i. 23, iii. 19, iv. 13; Col. i. 19). He was alive in Christ, endowed with the Holy Spirit. His spiritual food was abundant. his exercise vigorous and constant (II Cor. ix. 8; I Cor. ix. 26, 27). These matters having been attended to, he could trust that in the secret recesses of his soul the new man was filtering in, driving the old man out as mineral-laden waters gradually transform a fallen tree into petrified facsimiles of its old forms. The visible power of St. Paul's transformation was the emotion that fired and quickened and made alive his well-formed theology.

That religion contains emotion everyone admits. In fact, some have made religion nothing but emotion; and some forms of religion have permitted emotion to occupy such a large place both as a testimony to the truth of salvation and also as the chief experience of religion, that many thoughtful persons have been turned away from religion. The danger of emotion in religion lies not in its presence and power exercised therein, but in its complete severance from ideas, on the one hand, and conduct on the other. Whenever emotion is properly knit up with ideas, truths, doctrines, systems of accepted theology, to which system of ideas it imparts energy, power, dynamics, urges, drives, always dominated and directed by the ideas, and always eventuating in congruent behavior, or "works," then instead of emotion being chaotic and anarchic it becomes the harnessed power of the Holy Spirit, through faith in Christ transforming both the man and his conduct.

St. Paul, with his wonderful intellect, conceived the identity of Jesus Christ and God in idea. That conception he enlarged into an idea of the God-man which encompassed himself, God and the whole world with all its nations, here and hereafter. But a man endowed with the mighty emotions of St. Paul could never rest with a mere system of theology. His thought must become dynamic; his faith must be energized with emotion (Gal. v. 6), and in turn work itself out into action (I Cor. xiii. 4-7). He was not

enough Greek to be satisfied with philosophy alone; he was too much disgusted with formalism in worship to be satisfied with "works of the law" alone, and too much of both Jew and Greek ever to be contented with the rhapsodies of Oriental ecstasies alone.

Therefore he gathered up his whole personality—intellect, emotion and will—and organized his ideas of God, men, right, beauty, home and country, and all others, together with his primary, instinctive emotions congruent with his idea of Christ, together with all his rites and duties congruent with those emotions and ideas, into one organic compound actually functioning as a mighty power in his consciousness. The idea which performed this compounding was Jesus, the God-man. The resulting compound St. Paul called Love, sometimes Faith, sometimes the "new man." As into a mixture refusing to combine, Christ came into the separated parts of Saul, and those parts immediately fell into a compound, organically whole, faithfully functioning for an end, united forevermore in a personality, or new man. Peace and joy were by-products of this righteous functioning.

Saul of Tarsus never wanted for emotion. But, as we have seen in the last chapter, his feelings were in rampant disorder. From that commotion he was saved to a peace which, like the depths of the sea, is never disturbed whatever the surface turmoils may be. The salvation he found was threefold: (1) past (Eph. ii. 8, 9; Rom. v. 1, viii. 1); (2) present (Phil. ii. 12; Rom. xii. 1; II. Cor. iii. 18; Col. iii. 3, 5; I Thess. iv. 1); and (3) future (Rom. viii. 18-22; I Thess. iv. 16; II Thess. i. 10; cf. Pet. i. 3-6). All of these in their essence contain some form of oneness with God. The first secures the righteousness which unites with God instead of the sin which separates from God (Rom. v. 1). The second represents God working within the convert (Phil. ii. 12). The third suggests the bliss of endless life with God. (I Thess. iv. 17) which is now enjoyed as a living hope (Rom. viii. 24), never-failing (I Cor. xiii. 13) and full

of rejoicing (Rom. xii. 12), without which a man is miserable indeed (I Cor. xv. 18; Eph. ii. 12).

The powers which wrought this salvation in St. Paul were human and divine, but both bore the same name, Love. Within the human Love is lodged faith, another important word in salvation, which will receive attention in Chapter XII of this volume. In the present section the nature, structure, origin and function of Love as it is treated by the great evangelist, and as it operated within him to bring him to the peace he longed for, will be studied.

This sentiment furnishes one of the most difficult of tasks, rendered infinitely more irksome by the unhappy poverty of our Anglo-Saxon language, which possesses so few synonyms for the expression of fine gradations of emotion. The one word "love" must stand for innumerable, very different and sometimes contradictory affections. How vastly different were the feelings of David for Jonathan, for Bath-Sheba and for his son Absalom, of Mary for her Son and the Son for his mother, or for John; of God that gives the Son (Jno. iii. 16) and God that scourges every son he brings unto himself (Heb. xii. 5-10)!


The Greek New Testament uses two words, *philia* and *agape*, for love, the latter being the word used to express the relation enduring between God and men. Possibly it is best translated by the words good-will, or the Anglicized Latin "Benevolence," or "Love" capitalized, so as to distinguish it from mere tender emotion. Such expressions at least lift it from its position of comparative sentimentalism to something like the dignity and power it should occupy in Christian meaning, where it is a sentiment of invincible might and eternal virility, as well as inexhaustible tenderness and mercy.

St. Paul's definition of it is found in the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians. In that immortal ode Love is plainly described as a sentiment. It has an object; it is integrally and necessarily saturated with emotion (I Cor. xiii. 1, 2), and it just as inexorably expresses itself in

behavior (I Cor. xiii. 4-7). Without emotion it is the empty clangor of mere mechanics. Without behavior it is an equally futile rhapsodical and possibly hysterical or maniacal ebullition of feeling, or the weak and dissolving emotion of affection without intellect, purpose or will. This core of the Christian religion, this summary and spring of man's relationships with God, and man with man, this definition of the Almighty, which passes understanding, whose length and breadth and height and depth can be measured only by the Cross and the Christ, is the sentiment which made Saul of Tarsus whole.

TABLE I

DIAGRAM OF THE SENTIMENT OF LOVE FOR GOD, THE FATHER



1. As a transcendent God, he arouses wonder, curiosity and self-submission.
2. As a Person, admiration, wonder, submission, tender emotion.
3. As a Father, reverence, gratitude for his grace, possession of grace.
4. As loving and all-wise and all-powerful, peace.
5. As Savior through Christ, joy.
6. As the Christian grows in his Love for God fear becomes less and less, until perfect Love casts out fear. This furnishes an emotional scale by which he may measure his religion.
7. The figures 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively, refer to the object of the sentiment of Love, the secondary sentiments involved, the emotions of instincts, and the impulses to action given by the instincts.

How was such Love <sup>1</sup> generated in the heart of the hater and persecutor of the Way? Being a sentiment it can be developed, maintained and strengthened, or allowed to

<sup>1</sup> T. R. Glover, *Paul of Tarsus*, Chap. x.

diminish and die by neglect. It can be fixed upon any chosen object in two ways: by transferring it from some old beloved object to a new one by the simple process of showing that the new and old are really one; and by building up a sentiment *de novo* from instincts by devotion to any object. When St. Paul identified Jesus of Nazareth with the Messiah, he transferred to him whatever reverence he already held for the hero of his people. The nature of that emotion, on account of our ignorance about the idea of the Messiah held by Saul, may be very difficult to define, but we know that it changed by the revolution evident in the persecutor's behavior. What this comparatively mild and meager sentiment might have induced him to do, we have already considered above. It formed the emotion of his first conversion, or his acceptance of Jesus as the Christ.

But in addition to this acceptance, Saul also came to believe that Jesus was the Son of God and God himself. Immediately following upon this enlarged faith came the enrichment of his sentiment by the addition of all the reverence he had held throughout his life toward his God, and much more besides. For Jahveh now became his heavenly Father, revealed incarnate in the Son. All the filial affection that a man can bestow upon the most perfect of fathers St. Paul now lavished unreservedly upon God. That emotion constituted the new, warm, powerfully moving force of his sentiment; but his old training in Jewish reverence preserved it always from those "amatory flirtations" with the Deity which have too often degraded the dignified, virile and robust Love that Christians should exhibit toward the God of all the earth.

Saul's old sentiment toward Jahveh was specifically enlarged by his appreciation of the grace offered through Jesus Christ, which the recipient answered by gratitude. That organization is itself a complex sentiment.<sup>2</sup> It is

<sup>2</sup> *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Gratitude," by W. L. Davidson.

directed by an appreciative receiver of any favor toward the giver. In this instance the gratitude was unbounded. For where sin abounded, there did grace much more abound (Rom. v.). St. Paul felt that he had received mercy utterly beyond the bounds of the most daring imagination to measure. Moreover, the gift was made at a fearful cost to the giver.

The development and maintenance of the sentiment of Love as an actual, all-powerful, constantly dynamic force in St. Paul's mind is the key to all that unstinted devotion to God's service which he so abundantly displayed throughout his ministry. He himself confidently assumed that the same kind and degree of Love would be developed in all his disciples. All too sadly perhaps, he found that even in his own day the Love of some, if ever it was fired to any warmth, tended to wax cold. The later generations of Christendom, except in its great leaders, have not only shown Christian Love much diminished in warmth, but the church has not always been able to develop the sentiment much beyond a hybrid compound of awe for God in which fear plays the larger part, and tender emotion is weak indeed.

St. Paul nowhere makes the blunder of assuming that such Love could be commandeered into being. On its way to perfect unity his thought has passed far beyond the Jewish conception of two great commandments (Mt. xxii. 34-39; Jno. xiii. 34; Rom. xiii. 9). Much less does he sum up the whole matter of religion in terms of primitive feelings like fear (Ecl. xii. 13; II Tim. i. 7). With all clarity, like the Gospel of John and the Epistles under the same name, he sees in Jesus Christ a winsome, powerfully attractive, and startlingly tender revelation of God who loves all men with a consuming and passionate devotion; a Father who is not far off, but one who like Jesus himself walks in the midst of his family. And, as the children thronged around Jesus, so St. Paul expected them to rally round

this God in joyous communion with him (Rom. v. 8, 5; I Jno. iv. 10, 19). This view of God, unfortunately, is somewhat overlaid by the Apostle's emphasis upon his own worried state before he was converted, and by his preliminary emphasis in Romans upon man's sinfulness. But such melancholy emotions toward God were entirely eradicated by the free pardon and the absorbing, living Love which God revealed to him in Jesus Christ.

The new Love was in one sense not a gift from God (Gal. v. 22). It was made from natural instincts already in the man. It organized itself in obedience to laws planted in human nature by the Creator. Around the idea of God in Paul's mind, primary emotions from instincts collected themselves, became an integral part of the idea, and of the actions which flowed from them. In this there was no straining on his part. Love grew like the lilies of the field.

How did this all-powerful sentiment of Love, or Goodwill, function in St. Paul's salvation? In all three stages of it, it worked negatively and positively. Love crucified the "old man" by the "expulsive force of a new affection," and it edified the "new man" after the image of him who created him (Col. iii. 5, mortification, cf. iii. 10, being renewed; cf. Eph. iv. 24, etc.). From indifference or hatred toward many things and many people, the persecutor changed his attitude to Love for everything and everybody. In that flood of infinite Love which Jesus let loose on earth, St. Paul could not escape loving even himself for whom Christ died (Gal. ii. 20; Eph. v. 29). That Love gathered up into one whole his religious, moral, patriotic and all other sentiments, and through that unification he gained that self-respect which gave him peace.

In the first place, the grace of God, offered so freely in pardon through Jesus Christ, gave him instant freedom from the sense of guilt. This relief, this peace, this unquenchable joy of justification have been felt by many converts (Rom. v. 1). Next, it conferred upon him a positive righteousness never to be taken away. Worry about

sin and punishment was swallowed up in the joy that came from a realization of God's Love for him.<sup>3</sup>

Then the answering Love for Jesus joyously bound St. Paul to the eternal task of drawing ever more closely to him in principle and character. This launched him upon the unchartered liberty of choosing methods and means of transforming himself into that Christlikeness as nearly as eternal circumstances permitted. Henceforth, for this converted legalist, religion instead of being a safe-in-shore, careful observance of commandments becomes the adventurous embarkation of a soul upon the trail of the shining Christ, Adam's breathless, heaven-assaulting emprise of becoming like God.

The second stage of his salvation actually began when he set himself to work out his own salvation. It, too, had its negative and positive parts. Some of his inborn instincts and some of his acquired sentiments were forever annihilated. The "old man" was nailed to the cross, but his death was not instantaneous; he continued to struggle with a broken and decreasing power. "I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me," is the dying sinner's and quickening saint's pean of victory.

To change from figure to fact, it would be interesting to distinguish between St. Paul's condemnation of inborn instincts and acquired sentiments; but the task is impossible, rendered so by his failure to separate them. As the emotions of sentiments are compounds of the primary emotions in instincts, the merging of the two has its psychological justification. The Apostle included both under the term "flesh." Galatians (v. 19-21) recites a list of the "works of the flesh," mingling instincts and sentiments indiscriminately (cf. also Eph. iv. 17-31).

<sup>3</sup> Descriptions of similar experiences are given in Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion*, 1899; James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*; Begbie, *Twice-Born Men*; a most vivid picture is given in Masefield's *Everlasting Mercy*.



Opposed to "flesh," a settled disposition to sensuous and selfish desires, Love, a settled disposition to do good, worked negatively and positively within the convert. It excised with a strong, determined hand one whole class of sentiments from his being. That was hate, with all its cognates, with all its kindred demons under whatever names and guises they might masquerade. No subterfuge—like loving the man but hating his acts—could for a moment confuse the single-eyed Paul. Hate, like a stone sheltering poisonous insects, covers a host of vicious instincts which excoarce the Christian's soul, dwarf his growth, paralyze his power. From these St. Paul shook himself free like a dog coming out of muddy water.

Likewise Love, if it never quite eliminated, at least greatly subdued the persecutor's ready pugnacity with its attendant anger. A doubtful passage, "Be angry [*orgizesthe*] and sin not" (Eph. iv. 26), stands close to another condemning all "wrath and anger" (Eph. iv. 31; cf. Col. iii. 8), which is quite in harmony with the Apostle's general teaching on the subject. As a psychological fact, anger may reside in Love and yet not sin. But when it is thoroughly understood that Love punishes purposefully, even as a surgeon full of kindness cuts deep (I Cor. v. 4, 5; II Cor. ii. 5-8; Heb. xii. 6), it is seen that there is no further use for hate. It is eliminated by the "expulsive force of the new affection," Love, which keeps its intention fixed unwaveringly upon the good of the beloved one—a most difficult task for saints to perform. For "when a man has acquired the sentiment of love for a person or other object, he is apt to experience tender emotion in its presence, fear or anxiety when it is in danger, anger when it is threatened, joy when the object prospers or is returned to him, gratitude to him that does good to it, and so on,"<sup>4</sup> through a host of other derived emotions. Thus does the general sentiment of love admit within its fold a wide

<sup>4</sup> McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 125.

diversity of emotions, some of which the Christian must rigorously exclude.

Nowhere in Saul's salvation is this blending power of Love better manifested than in the positive work it did upon those two opposing instincts so marked in the young Hebrew—his instinct for self-assertion, and its antagonist, the instinct for self-suppression. In his pre-Christian career these two inborn impulses strove with one another irreconcilably. But in the convert's new Love for Christ, with its object of making both himself and others Christlike, these two contrary forces of consciousness were amalgamated in the melting pot of Love for Christ. The flux that accomplished their fusion was the purpose of Paul's life and his method of attaining it.

His aim was to make men Christlike. To do that he must make them ministers doing service for each other (Mk. x. 45; Mt. xx. 28). The graving tools used for sculpturing the lines of Jesus' character must not be the hard and harsh instruments of worldly power, requiring physical might for their manipulation. "If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight," said Jesus before Pilate (Jno. xviii. 36), and St. Paul followed that principle (II Cor. x. 3, xi. 7; Eph. vi. 12). Not by crude implements of matter, but only by the delicate and exquisite influence of the Spirit can the lineaments of Jesus' personality be engraved in the faces of men (Mt. v. 9; Jno. xiii. 33, 34; cf. Zech. iv. 6).

If then, not worldly strength of character, but humility and meekness, are the marks which the engraving tool must leave, then such work may be done by the example of the weak and lowly. If they endure under trial, and by endurance with thanksgiving, like Stephen, win involuntary homage to the Christ, their very weakness glorifies the Master. "Wherefore I take pleasure in weaknesses, in injuries, in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses for Christ's sake; for when I am weak, then am I strong," is

the very height of St. Paul's final victory over both self-submission and self-assertion (II Cor. xi, xii; I Cor. xiii. 4-7; Phil. i. 20). Either one alone is insufficient; blended they form an alloy of character invincible in its power to endure. They can be brought together only in that fusing retort of perfect devotion to Christ and his work. Their combination marks the first step in that higher synthesis of Paul's character and personality ending in his complete integration in Christ.

The positive side of the second salvation, of St. Paul's growth into the likeness of Christ—his edification, or sanctification<sup>5</sup>—presents in itself two distinct aspects. The new man was partly ideal, partly real; partly realized in the Apostle's feeling, thinking and acting, and partly held before his mind's eye as a goal to be achieved by fixing his whole attention upon Jesus Christ and forgetting the things behind, upon pressing on toward the fullness of the stature of Christ.

In that process of transformation two powers were at work; the normal faculties of the man and the divine power of God, coöperating like two men sawing, one invisible under the log in a pit, the other visible, doing his part above the log in the open. The constant coöperation of these two is mentioned in many significant passages in St. Paul's letters (e.g. Phil. ii. 12; Rom. xii. 1-3; II Cor. iii. 18). In general, on the human side, the edification of the new man can be described as the operation of the sentiment of Love kept alive and vivid in consciousness by a constant and deliberate and thoughtful devotion to Jesus Christ, in mind, heart and will.

A thorough analysis of the manner in which Saul was changed into St. Paul would lead to an almost endless dissection of his every thought, feeling and volition. Both his inherited and his acquired character would be compelled to submit to a searching scrutiny. His instincts, or inher-

<sup>5</sup> Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, "Edification," "Sanctification"; Phil. ii. 12, iii. 12; Rom. viii. 29; II Cor. vii. 1.

ited dispositions, would manifest their complete reorganization. Next, all his sentiments, old and new, organized from his instincts, would reveal marks imprinted upon them by the incoming Savior. All the convert's intellectual, emotional and volitional processes would pass in review and present in themselves the effects of his whole transformation. His physical being would command its share of attention. Nothing would, escape, for his conversion reached down to the uttermost depths of his soul and played upon every fiber of his being until it vibrated with the new life and throbbed with the new power. Into such minutiae it is manifestly impossible for us to go, and we must be content with treating only some of the salient features of that all-embracing transmutation.

The two instincts just treated, self-assertion and self-submission, were absorbed and combined with other emotions in the self-regarding sentiment which aimed to transform St. Paul into the likeness of Christ. Did he accept the man Jesus as a perfect example of what he himself wished to be, and then render him due hero-worship? This process might have satisfied the self-regarding sentiment alone. But it would have made of Saul a smaller man than he became. For his full personality not only included a self-regarding sentiment satisfied with an ideal concretely presented in Jesus, but it also combined in that same new personality his religious sentiment directed toward the Absolute as a whole, with his new moral sentiment bringing within its scope every fellow man on earth, together with his patriotic sentiment, and with these all his minor sentiments. He thus became an actual hierarchy of sentiments, molded together, bound in a federacy, built into a monarchy, as vigorous and efficacious for the government of the individual as an absolute dictatorship is for the control of a nation. All of this self-organization was accomplished under the spur of the sentiment of rationality, which works as powerfully in forming a personality as it does in formulating a system.

The personality he envisaged and partially achieved during his earth life can best be symbolized by a cone. Its apex is the idea or image a man has of himself; the base of the cone is the circle of interests he has, the feelings and acquired emotions he includes within his Love; the body of the cone is made up of his activities guided by his idea, incited by his Love. The small, hard man is represented by a low cone with a small circle. He is organized, possibly a strong character and possibly devoted to some material aim. Contrast him with the monk, with his tall, thin, conelike character, high of apex, narrow of base representing but few interests in the world. But the Christian man is one whose idea is the most sublime conception he is able to form of his God, one whose Love takes in everything both great and small; a cone with a sublime apex and a base with an infinite diameter. Such a cone, drawn in dotted lines, represents his ideal self; another, smaller, within it, drawn in a solid line, may represent his actual self. When the actual grows to the ideal, then by that time he has framed a new and higher ideal represented by a larger conception of his God, and so the growth goes on forever.

As in his moral struggles Saul was engaged in one of his sharpest inner conflicts, so in his new-found Christian morality he discovered one of the chief factors in his self-integration. Needless to say, he did not discard or for the first time receive his moral sentiments. Conscience in him was always agitatingly alive (Acts xxiii. 1, xxiv. 16). As he always felt the disapprobation of the voice within even at the contemplation of wrong, and its warm approbation of right, so he continued to hear the voice. But instead of conscience calling upon him to revere a body of dead statutes, it urged him to copy the spiritual image of a living man. He had cleansed his conscience from dead works to serve the living God, is the way another writer puts it (Heb. ix. 14). In his Jewish days, to be legally correct was to be Pharisaically righteous. In his Christian

days, to be right with God was to be legally correct (I Cor. x. 23-31, iv. 2-4; cf. Rom. iii. 7, 8). In short, his Love for the God-man, Jesus Christ, was the motive power within him moving him, as conscience, to do what he thought would make him Christlike.

But how did this Love for Christ become his moral impulsion toward his fellow men? Just what the movement was in St. Paul's mind is not clear. Unlike the process in John's letter (I Jno. iv. 19, 11; cf. John iii. 16), St. Paul, who also sees clearly that God always loved man (Gal. ii. 20; II Cor. v. 19), himself passed from the perfectly natural and universal love of a man for himself to that higher and wider Love for God and for men (Eph. v. 29; Rom. xiii. 9; Gal. v. 14). If they are all one, it makes little difference whether Love descends from God or rises from self; all loves meet in Love.

No ethics worthy of the name spends itself developing the individual's own soul. To be morality it must reach out beyond one's own person to others. The transition is easily made by human nature, though not so easily by logic. The process is accomplished by the very common act of relating the new object with the old object upon which affection has hitherto been lavished. "Why," asks Professor James, "does the maiden interest the youth so that everything about her seems more important and significant than anything else in the world?" Why cherish faded flowers, old gloves, baby's shoes, and gifts sanctified by friendships unalterable? "Love me, love my dog!" replies the common-sense man sententiously, implying that, in some sense, he and his dog are one. So with Christian morality which makes all men potentially one with God, and therefore one with each other.

Failure to say much about ugliness or beauty is one of St. Paul's peculiarities, as we have pointed out above in Chapter I. His esthetic sentiment expressed itself in a narrow channel. His conversion did not seem to change it much, if at all. He does, however, mention one of the

striking features often accompanying sudden conversions, that is, the appearance of startling newness, freshness, cleanliness and sparkle in old surroundings. Trees seem to be more vividly green; the sky was never so blue before; the common streets and ordinary houses strike the eye with sudden charm; sparrows twitter with joy; flowers bloom with unwonted glow; the common weeds take on a humble but real beauty. John Masefield puts these same thoughts in the mind of Saul Kane, just converted:

I did not think, I did not strive,  
The deep peace burnt my me alive.

O glory of the lighted mind,  
How dead I've been, how dumb and blind!  
The station brook, to my new eyes,  
Was babbling out of paradise,  
The waters rushing from the rain  
Were singing, "Christ has risen again."  
I thought all earthly creatures knelt,  
For rapture at the joy I felt.  
The narrow station-wall's brick ledge,  
The wild hop withering in the hedge,  
The lights in huntsman's upper story,  
Were parts of an eternal glory,  
Were God's eternal garden-flowers,  
I stood in bliss at this for hours.

Such was "The Everlasting Mercy" fallen upon a poor, benighted soul made new. St. Paul's sweeping and swinging statement, "Wherefore if any man is in Christ he has become a new creature; old things have passed away; behold, all things have become new" (II Cor. v. 17), may suggest more than merely the theological point he is enforcing. The man is made new; he makes the world new (Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 10). Not only the heavens, but the common earth, the stones of the streets, the bare houses and the masses of people all declare his glory. "Every common bush is afire with God." "In every form of the human,

some hint of the Highest dwells." The spiritual plays over the material, the beautiful over the useful like lambent flame, and the inward glory shines through the outer like the glow of a precious stone. Beyond the threshold of the visible, loom sublime qualities and godly uses discerned as through a veil, or in a glass darkly. Such estheticism is often taken for mysticism.\* Possibly the new convert saw all things with the eyes of his Christ (Mt. vi. 28, 29).

So in Jesus Christ St. Paul found the organizing, unifying ideal of himself, and in his Love for Christ he found the inwardly working power which made him approximate more and more closely the Ideal Man he held close to the heart of his imagination. Logic which identifies, and so builds systems of ideas through reason, was thus satisfied in the Love which united the man and his world into one whole in God.

By such an ideal was Saul, a forlorn and divided self, a cabined, cribbed, confined legalist, transformed into a man wholly new, fresh, strong, breathing into his lungs, as it were, a vast freedom, lifting himself upright as from the easement of an impossible burden, suddenly inspired by a limitless spirit to do good, and endowed with a tireless and efficient power to do it. Specifically stated, Saul was unified, integrated, harmonized. His various instincts were made subservient to an ideal. His sentiments were organized into a monarchy with Love for God supreme. His whole being was saturated with the new sentiment, in which gratitude for grace abounded. His sentiment of rationality found full and concrete satisfaction in an Absolute, a Whole, which in thought and practice was specifically focused upon the God-man. No religion could go farther in satisfying the yearning heart of a man hungering and thirsting after righteousness. No religion could give greater peace in the sense of an inner and outer wholeness.

\* B. Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetics*, 1900; A. Bain, *Emotions and Will*; H. Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, Chap. ix treats the esthetic sentiment.



No religion could give a more perfect satisfaction of the sentiment of rationality, man's intellectual desire for maximum unity, than this religion of the God-man who in himself unites religion, morality, estheticism, philosophy—the good, the true, the beautiful—and who, at the same time, by the sentiment of Love for him in the Christian's own life, organizes that disciple into an Ideal Man around the Christ, and also inspires that same disciple to use every available means, natural and supernatural, uninterruptedly to grow into that Ideal. A universal idea—God—is thus joined with a universal urge—the sentiment of rationality—to produce Christian behavior. The result is a universal religion. The sentiment dominating this whole process is the hunger for unity, the impulse in the mind of man urging him to simplify by combining his ideas into some kind of whole.

Beginning as an unconscious impulse, it becomes a passion. As a sentiment<sup>7</sup> it has for its object the largest possible unity or all-inclusiveness; its feeling of dissatisfaction in the face of diversity, and its peace when wholeness is achieved or approached; its theoretical activity in human reason always moving onward toward more unity, and its practical activity always building up men into more unified personalities and simplifying machines and societies as means to this end. Peace always, and sometimes the joy of achieving an intensely desired goal, are its by-products. Blessed is the state of that man who has found an eternal ideal which never can fail nor ever be achieved—oneness with the Absolute, or Whole.

Like any other sentiment, the desire for unity has its origin and stages of development in the lives of men. Its roots seem to go deep down into what Aristotle and Kant<sup>8</sup> called the "category of unity." As such it operates to make human experience what it is even before the child or thinking man is conscious of its presence. In fact, the

<sup>7</sup> James, *The Will to Believe*, "Sentiment of Rationality."

<sup>8</sup> Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*; Aristotle, *Categories*.

masses of men probably never, or only dimly, became aware of it throughout their whole lives. Only in conscious thinkers, the theologians and philosophers, does it develop into an absorbing passion, and only upon such choice spirits does it confer its lasting and rich gift of enjoyment found in thinking.

St. Paul was one of these gifted mortals. His lofty, personal idealism, or self-regarding sentiment, could never be at peace until he himself was made whole. His powerful intellect could never rest until that wholeness encompassed the entire universe.<sup>9</sup> He combined within himself, in a rare degree, the practical and theoretical, the intellectual, emotional and volitional powers, passion and precision. Christianity, therefore, for him eventually became the most rational construction ever revealed to man, the best religion, the true <sup>10</sup> religion, because it satisfied supremely the sentiment of rationality. Jesus Christ brought into one working whole Saul's previously warring esthetic, patriotic, moral and religious sentiments, making him and his world one.

<sup>9</sup> Sir Henry Jones, *A Faith That Enquires*, 1922, elaborates this view.

<sup>10</sup> E. A. Singer, *Mind as Behavior*, 1924, chapter on "Choice in Nature" defines truth as the satisfaction of the desire for maximum unity.

## CHAPTER VI

### PHYSICAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE CONVERSION

OF all the study spent upon St. Paul's conversion, the most interesting part is the attempt to explain it. That might appear to be a work of supererogation. For he himself not only gave a description of it, but also explained it fully as a direct and immediate act of God. The message was spoken by the Lord; the light and sound came from him. That such an account involved a miracle troubled St. Paul not one whit. Neither did it worry the post-apostolic writers, or the medieval church. Only when modern science rose to lay its hands—impious hands, some devout people would call them—upon things sacred, did naturalistic explanations begin to oppose the supernaturalistic. Twentieth-century investigations into conversions have tended further to strip the Apostle's experience of its share in the miraculous. That extraordinary occurrence is often pared down so as to fit into the molds of scientific description and explanation.

In the broadest possible sense, the word "explanation" stands for a result and a process. The process consists in discovering that something strange is really like something already known, and the result is a state of mind called knowledge or belief. If, in the course of their wanderings, men come upon something new, they are by reason of its novelty unable to act toward it with intelligence and confidence. Then, aroused by their needs, or urged by curiosity, they ask for an explanation of the stranger. If, then, someone points out the fact that the new thing resembles other members of a larger class with which we are familiar, or is like something else in structure, or is derived from a well-known source, or finally, that it either functions in a

well-known way or for a recognized purpose, we are satisfied. If the strange object is said to be a quadruped, has organs like a dog, has sprung from the wolf and can be used for drawing sleds, we feel we have full and adequate knowledge of the beast. These four ways<sup>1</sup> of explaining will be followed in giving an explanation of St. Paul's conversion.

Ever since the days of its founders, Descartes and Bacon, modern science has defined things, classified them according to structure, and then explained them and their attributes as the effects of antecedent causes. The causes, since modern inductive science gains its knowledge of observations made through the special senses, must be physical, or material. The whole world, then, is nothing but a network of causes and effects, linked together like chain mail.

The theory of universal causality has had a long history. It originates both by observation of man's own power to initiate action, and of the uniform way in which events in nature happen the same under the same circumstances. Stout, Leuba, Pearson<sup>2</sup> and others suggest the idea arose from the action of human will, as indicated by such words as pressure, strain, stress, energy, resistance, impact, etc. Herschel identified gravitation with will. On the other hand, J. S. Mill says cause is the "sum total of conditions, taken together. . . . which being realized the consequent invariably follows," a truth that is "found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature and some other fact which has preceded it."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle's four causes, in his *Physics*.

<sup>2</sup> *Analytic Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 178-179; *Psychological Study of Religion*, 1912, p. 81; *Grammar of Science*, 1911, p. 121.

<sup>3</sup> For the study of causality: Wm. Whewell, *History of Ind. Science*, 1837; J. S. Mill, *Logic*, 1843, B. III; W. S. Jevons, *Principles of Science*, 1872, 1913; *Grammar of Science*, A. Ritchie, *Scientific Method*, 1924. Older writers: Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*; Locke, *Essay on Human Understanding*; also *Encyc. Brit.* "Metaphysics"; *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Cause," by F. R. Tennant.

Science has erected this causal principle into a universal and exclusive explanation of all things. It explains both the remote past, as in mechanical evolution; and the ultimate future, as in astronomy. By this relation every event from the planet's swing to the atom's dance, from the earthquake's tremor to the gnat wing's buzz, is eternally fixed and determined. Moreover, this principle has been erected into a test of fact, reality and truth. Anything explicable by causes is a fact, exists, is real; anything not so explicable is an illusion, hallucination, apparition, dream or error.

Thus out of the confused notions of commonsense the scientist has whittled this clear definition of cause and effect: (1) everything has a physical cause; (2) the same cause always produces the same effect; (3) causes precede their effects in time; (4) effects and causes are alike; (5) all the cause goes over into the effect. These qualifications of cause are not arbitrary but are dictated by the demands of the nature of modern science. Popular explanation usually overlooks the commonplace and fixes its attention upon the extraordinary when asking explanations. Science is prone to do the same. The reason for the tendency is plain. First, the commonplace is familiar and explanation is merely identifying what is unfamiliar with what is familiar, so that we will know how to react toward it. Insofar, then, as Saul's conversion or its parts are identified with natural phenomena, they are to that extent explained; they are assumed to come from usual causes. But insofar as they cannot be connected with causes, they cannot be scientifically explained, no matter how common or usual they may be. None of the items can safely be omitted from consideration. Saul (1) perceived (a) a light, (b) saw a vision of Christ, (c) heard a voice; (2) understood a message delivered in Hebrew; (3) judged it came from God; (4) believed it to be a (a) valid commission for (b) himself; (5) obeyed the call by immediate obedience and life-long service; (6) and the event occurred at a certain time and place.

Some of these features are too commonplace to require any special causes; others are extraordinary. The conversion itself is not unique. Similar experiences occur both in secular and religious life. Neither is the suddenness of the onset itself extraordinary. Speediness of action may not introduce any new factors into an operation. A log rotting in the woods and one burning in the fireplace are both examples of the same chemical process of combustion. Sudden changes of mind are common in business, politics, war enlistments, celibacy, suicides, reforms in character. Conversions may be either sudden or gradual, and yet be alike in their ultimate psychological processes.\*

The light and voice have attracted attention because psychology holds to a theory of their origin. According to impressionistic psychology, upon which the inductive method of science is based, every true perception is caused by an external, physical stimulus. Unless some object external to the body excites it, it is an illusion or hallucination. This sharp differentiation between true and false perceptions by their origins is in entire harmony with all scientific explanation.

The light and the voice claim first and foremost consideration. Nothing new in their kind and constitution appears. Their structure, as far as it could be discerned, was like any other light and sound. Their function was normal. They seemed to Saul to strike his eye and ear with the usual effect. What is startling and unfamiliar is their unexpected place in the course of natural events. Both appeared out of order. Suddenly, at noonday, a light greater than the sun appeared; and just as suddenly a voice, not from human throat, but from the skies, gave forth a message of endless significance. Not their suddenness in time alone, but the break in natural order, the invasion of the uniformity of nature, the infraction of the supreme law of causality, gives science its concern. Were there any

\* Both Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion*, and James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, recognize both types.

special physical causes for their appearance at that time?

Arguing from the usual origin of light and sound, the physicist affirms that these must be scientifically accounted for by waves in some medium—sound by waves of air, light by vibrations of ether. These antecedents are not only the usual, but the sole possible causes of genuine sights and sounds. Their existence and operation, at any moment, however, can be revealed only by instruments of requisite fineness and by methods suitable to the nature of the experiment. That such instruments were, at that far-off date, utterly undreamed of is obvious. Consequently, the material existence of the sensuous symbols employed in God's call to his Apostle is something forever beyond the power of science to prove or to disprove. Upon this question it has no direct evidence whatever. The deficiency carries in its train momentous consequences and necessarily modifies the whole case for scientific explanation of this far-away marvel.

If the possibility of making direct observation upon the causes of the light and sound thus vanishes, may not some indirect method of obtaining evidence as to their reality be found? Does astronomical or secular history contain any references to some special terrestrial or celestial disturbance—say, similar to the Star of Bethlehem—which may be pressed into service here? The query holds within itself a vague hope that this marvel may be explained by physical causes, but in this instance none appears and this final hope is doomed to disappointment.

Physical environment having failed to yield a cause accounting for Saul's conversion, we must next turn to special conditions within his own body to explain it. Here it is not permissible to propose the usual popular explanation by using mental antecedents as causes; for, in the strict sense of science, they cannot be so used, simply because they are not known by observation of the senses as all causes must be known. Due to this ever-present

limitation, a rigid scientific explanation must seek for organic causes of external behavior alone. Moreover, these organic conditions must be exceptional, or special; for the conversion itself is unusual and out of the ordinary course of nature. The cause, therefore, must explain both the event itself and the fact that it came just when and where it did.

Quite naturally investigators seek first to find a sufficient explanation for this sudden change of behavior in the normal conditions of the body. Among these, adolescence, with its rapid organic developments, its new and reorganized physiological functions marking the transition of the body from immaturity of childhood into the behavior of the adult, has been most widely exploited for explaining religious conversions.<sup>5</sup> But, obviously, in Saul's case, such a recourse is impossible. He was a mature adult, a leader of men, one entrusted with power and charged with grave responsibilities befitting only a character already settled and fixed. This fact, together with the absence of any overt causes of the change, added to the too-lightly accepted judgment that sudden conversions are unusual, all conspire to compel naturalists to seek for some exceptional, and hence pathological, bodily condition to account for this unusual change in the man.

Very recently, attempts have also been made to connect human behavior with the activity of certain glands in the body which heretofore have seemed to possess no clear or decisive functions. The movement began with the discovery that the absence or nonfunctioning of the thyroid gland was related to a certain type of idiocy called Cretinism. Other glands have successively come under consideration and have been assigned more or less decisive functions in determining the behavior of men. Some specialists, deeply impregnated with a mechanical ideal, have

<sup>5</sup> Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion*; Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, pioneers in this field, both give instances of conversion to show that they occur most frequently during adolescence.



also asserted that gland secretions determine character. But in their anxiety to promote mechanism, they have forgotten that if glands make character, it is equally comprehensible to say that mind operates the glands—a conclusion that no mechanist could tolerate. It is best, therefore, to consider merely the effects, supposed and real, wrought by gland secretions thrown into the blood upon the behavior of both normal and abnormal people.

The field thrown open to investigation is entirely too new to permit more than cautious and tentative statements. To assert that glandular function of an unusual kind or intensity caused Saul's conversion would launch us out far beyond the support of facts. For, even if gland activity was, in general, related with changed behavior, the specific cause of such change would not thereby be revealed. Formerly Cretins were benefited by feeding on the thyroid gland of sheep. Later it was discovered that the active principle in the compound was iodine. Very recently, however, Dr. Lorand<sup>\*</sup> has contended that heat and sunlight excite the thyroid gland to special activity. So the cause is not yet discovered, and when it is, it may be very remote from present proposed causes. Finally, the whole human personality is really involved in the situation, and that fact engages forces and influences which cannot be ranked with physical causes at all. This phase will be treated in the next chapter, when mind and body are considered together.

Since no normal bodily conditions appear to explain adequately Saul's sudden change, naturalists have frequently turned to pathology for aid, and for two main reasons; first, because the episode itself in some respects was exceptional and therefore seems to demand an exceptional cause; and secondly, because such a cause fails to appear in envi-

<sup>\*</sup> W. B. Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*, 1915; L. Berman, *Glands Regulating Personality*; S. J. Morris, *How We Become Personalities*, 1926; Arnold Lorand, *Human Intelligence*, 1927, are a few books out of many that deal with this fascinating subject of gland effects on character and behavior.

ronment and in any normal bodily conditions. Pathology seems to furnish a special corporal state and thus, in a vague way, promises scientific satisfaction to those looking for natural causes for the strange event. Let us see how pathology serves this purpose.

It stands both for a study of disease and also for disease itself in some organ, tissue or fluid. But disease is far from being an absolute or fixed condition. It is defined by being contrasted with health. A high authority asks: "What do we mean when we talk of a healthy organism? Our ideas upon the subject are purely arbitrary. . . . Health is simply that condition of structure and function, which, . . . we find commonest. . . . Disease we may define, accordingly, as any departure from the normal standard of structure or function of a tissue or an organ." "Disease, then, instead of being an independently existing state, absolute in itself, is a wholly secondary one, entirely relative in its being and nature. This is highly significant for our purposes.

But specific diseases seem to be real enough. The organic or lesional types depend upon germs or abnormal organic structures, and are as many as the varieties of germs and lesions. But functional disorders reveal no causes. They arise because organs refuse to work properly. Surgical interference and chemical reagents seem to have no effect upon them. Where medicines fail, suggestion is often the only recourse. Sometimes all treatments fail, and so diseases, according to prognosis, are divided into acute and chronic attacks. St. Paul seems to have suffered from both types.

With this brief introduction to pathology, we are ready to see how it applies to St. Paul's conversion. In that connection we must consider disease under three headings: its causes, itself as a cause, and its effects. Of the first, we have already seen that functional diseases reveal no physical causes. In fact, it is not certain that infectious diseases

<sup>1</sup> *Encyc. Brit.*, "Pathology."

are caused by germs. A germ appears to be only one incident in a series—perhaps a necessary one—the straw that breaks the camel's back, in this case the patient's resistance. The apparent immunity of some persons during epidemics is a sufficient refutation of the theory that germs are the sole causes of disease. Drugs and poisons also produce diseases, and one system of therapeutics makes well people sick with the same drugs that make sick people well.

But to trace St. Paul's conversion to some pathological condition which itself can be carried no farther back, is wholly unscientific. For all scientific explanation must show that a given event belongs as a link in a chain of physical causes reaching backward interminably. A special event, like this conversion, demands a special cause, which in turn must be explicable by ever-receding natural causes. Unless pathology can become a special cause, and at the same time also remain a natural effect in a chain of causes, its utility in this connection vanishes. Obviously, it cannot perform this double function. Some diseases are without causes as science defines cause.

On the other hand, when we consider pathology as a cause and study its consequences, we touch upon its high significance as an explanation. For it presages sinister consequences. For, in the public mind, some of its etymological associations (from Greek, *pathos*, suffering) augmented by the rags and tatters of superstition, still cling to it, and carry a warning to the uninitiated to shun, fear, despise and flee from what is abnormal, diseased, pathological. St. Paul speaks about the Galatians' kindness in not "spitting out" at the acute illness he suffered in their midst (Gal. iv. 12, marg.).

The awesome attitude of our modern populace rests partly upon the implicit, though not fully recognized fact that causes produce effects like themselves. For, scientifically speaking, all causes are motions and produce only motions. Consequently, when it is inferred that disease

caused Saul's change, the implication cuts both ways, backward and forward. Since pathology is evil, and is produced by evil, the conversion so caused could not come from God. For God is good. Neither can it, being evil, produce good fruit. On both counts, therefore, such an explanation counsels the rejection of the conversion with all its works. The change cannot be God-wrought; its revelations cannot be God-inspired.

These insinuations are hard to combat, not because they are true or valid, but because they are vague in themselves and even more vaguely connected with pathology. That disease produces results is beyond cavil. That acute and chronic ailments reveal fairly well-established symptoms, that each attack follows a prescribed course, and sometimes leaves behind it physical consequences in the form of sequelae are all true. But with physical effects, disease as a scientific cause emphatically stops. From that point on, whatever mental correlates it may have, whatever moral consequences may follow, whatever religious effects may be alleged, none of them can be properly attributed to strict causation.

In the first place, this is proven by the fact that, contrary to popular assumption, neither disease itself nor its consequences are always evil. That disease itself is only relatively evil is clearly shown when a person is vaccinated with cowpox to prevent smallpox, or submits to antitoxin injections, or takes drugs, sometimes highly poisonous, to ward off or cure worse troubles. None of these illustrations proves that disease is in itself and by itself a good; but they do show that its worth is relative and that its value fluctuates widely with circumstances, something a true cause cannot do.

In the next place, the consequences of disease are sometimes good,\* sometimes bad. Often, though bad for men,

\* The original "white black-berry" of New Jersey was a pathological variation but advantageous to the berry. *To Christ Through Evolution*, by L. M. Sweet, 1925, p. 174.

they are good for others of God's creatures. Every germ infection, for example, spells health and prosperity for a colony of germs. When Simon the Stylite replaced a maggot fallen from one of his sores with the words, "There, worm, eat what thy God hath given thee!" he sensationally and horribly exposed the relativity of disease. Infection of men only is bad. Else, why should not a loaf of bread cry out against its infection with yeast "germs"? Or a field protest against infection with "germs" of wheat? The human point of view, not the absolute point of view, defines disease and sets the values upon it and its results. But it cannot be the "cause" of changing values. A true cause must always produce the same effects under the same circumstances. If disease was the "cause" of Saul's conversion, that cause must always cause conversion, for a real cause when present always works its effect, and when it is absent, that effect does not follow.

Moreover, among human beings disease does not always maintain the same nature nor lead to the same results. St. Paul himself suffered from a "thorn in the flesh," apparently some grievous physical ailment, one from which he besought the Lord to deliver him without avail. In time, he came to count that selfsame disease one of his marked blessings, an essential contributor to his humility (II Cor. xii. 7-9). At another time an acute attack of illness led him to preach to the Galatians when health would have directed him to a smaller field of less importance (Gal. iv. 13). These cases prove that sickness, though it may be dangerous and destructive to human life, never, in the true sense, is a determiner of the sufferer's whole behavior. The patient himself determines his attitude toward his burden. To him who accounts it an evil, it is an evil.

Not only toward disease itself, but also toward those physical sequelae of which it is sometimes the cause, the same position must be maintained. For disease can be the cause of physical consequences only. No mental, moral or religious consequences can be said truly to be caused by

physical ailments. Between a man's body and his mind the law of physical causation breaks down. Between mind and brain a high correlation may exist, but this is not cause and effect.

Certain ills to which flesh is heir taken by themselves are almost universally condemned as defects, detriments and obstacles to men's highest aspirations. But taken not alone, but as components in life as a whole, they may be made "stepping stones to higher things." St. Paul might never have secured his measure of humility (II Cor. xii. 7) and faith in God (II Cor. xii. 9, 10) except through the stabbing pain of that thorn in his flesh. This is but another way of saying that pathology is not a cause, but a value. Its effects vary from individual to individual, as the man may determine. No disease can be depended upon to convert any particular man. A St. Francis may be turned from a worldly way to a holy path by a death-threatening illness, but other millions fall ill and die and are never converted. No man dare assert that disease is the school-master that brings men to Christ, nor that it is a law which saves us from sin and death.

In spite of the inherent and insuperable obstacles in the way of explaining Saul's conversion by general pathology in a manner satisfactory to the strict canons of mechanistic science, attempts have been frequently made to trace his changed behavior and also his inner experiences to some specific disease. Of these, epilepsy has received much attention and presents some plausible claims to consideration. It is a disease that affects both body and mind, and announces its presence by a sudden attack upon the nerves and muscles of the body, accompanied in instances not numerous with hallucinations. Consequently, it lends itself very well to that transition in our treatment which moves from the study of strictly physical causes in environment and in body, through psycho-physical correlates, over to mental explanations. We will first consider the purely physical aspects of epilepsy and then examine its mental and moral

correlates to see what bearing they both may have on Saul's sudden attack.

Epilepsy is a habit spasm, or a series of spasms recurring irregularly. These series are divided into two varieties: the *grand mal*, in which seizures consciousness is lost; and the *petit mal*, or lesser spells, in which the sufferer usually retains consciousness. The attack may come on without warning, or be preceded by an aura consisting of motor spasms of hand, or foot, etc., or sensory tingling, or other signs. At the beginning of the fit the face grows pale, the eyeballs roll, the pupils expand, and violent muscular spasms follow, driving the air out of the lungs with a cry; the patient falls, possibly with a fracture of bones, dislocation of joints, straining of muscles, bruises, etc., and often bites his tongue very severely. Clonic convulsions follow this first stage, with frothing at the mouth; then cyanosis gradually disappears, air enters the lungs, and consciousness returns; the patient then passes into a deep sleep, awakes with headache, and when that passes away he feels better than he had for a long time previous to the attack. In the *petit mal* a great variety of symptoms occur; consciousness is lost only momentarily, if at all; there is no fall, but a mere drooping of the head, a fixed stare, a few foolish words, and the patient returns to himself. Both kinds of attacks may be frequent, especially the lesser kind; and may increase both in number and in severity as time goes on. The prognosis is very doubtful. If the disease continues for two or three years, a cure is almost hopeless. The cause of the trouble is not certainly known. Heredity accounts for about one-third of the cases. Fright, excitement, blows, heat, falls, scarlet fever, constipation, etc., may be the occasion of the first attack.\*

\* The account is condensed from L. Emmet Holt, *Diseases of Infancy and Childhood*, 3d ed., 1906, pp. 708-716; see also Gowers, *Diseases of the Nervous System*; W. P. Sprattling, *The Psychological Aspects of Epilepsy*; E. Flood, *The Psychology of Epilepsy*, trans. Amer. Medico-Psych. Assoc., Vol. 10.

If the attacks continue for three years or more, epilepsy is counted incurable, at least in the very large majority of the cases. As time goes on, the fits tend to increase in frequency and intensity. Modern medicine has found no sure cure for them. Ancient medicine certainly had none.

The treatment prescribes rest and bromides. To rest, physical or mental, St. Paul seems to have been a stranger. To a regular régime of intense bodily activity, to frequent journeys interrupted only by imprisonment, to privations and dangers, he added without thought of himself mental activities of the most intense kind, and worries innumerable. No régime could have been better calculated to increase epileptic attacks. Yet, judging by his mentality indicated by his first and last letters, the attacks, if he ever suffered any, did not increase. His physical stamina and his nervous energy, unabated except by the natural diminishment due to age, deny the presence of any disease like epilepsy.

From this description of epilepsy and its attendant circumstances, can we safely attribute the disease to the Apostle? This question is a more fundamental one than the effects the disease might or might not have had upon his conversion and doctrines and character. If he did not suffer nervous attacks, then epilepsy could not have been a cause; if it is doubtful, then the cause of his change remains open to further investigation; if he did have epilepsy, then the relation between that ailment and his conversion must be thoroughly investigated. The astonishing conclusion might be unavoidable that Christianity grew out of a disease, and that a humiliating and deplorable one, affecting the very soul of its victim.

Doubt about St. Paul's being an epileptic cannot rest upon his concealment of his true condition. The attacks come often without due warning, not allowing the patient to conceal himself from view. In fact, the chance of his falling into the fire or water, or other danger, makes it imperative for him to confess his defect, at least to some friends or relatives. Now, there is no indication anywhere



that St. Paul sought to hide his physical ailments, either the chronic "thorn in the flesh" or certain acute attacks he suffered at times. Consequently, silence upon epilepsy in ancient traditions cannot be attributed to the ignorance of those surrounding the Apostle, nor to his own concealment.

But had it been known, his enemies,<sup>10</sup> of whom he had many, would gladly have seized upon that disability to discount his mission, his teachings, his work and his authority as an Apostle. Every argument against these drawn from epilepsy to-day might have been urged then with equal force. Yet, except for his own references to some kind of illness, nothing specifically is brought forward by friend or foe to indicate that his sufferings were due to seizures which, from ancient times, were attributed to some form of demon possession.

Further, just as epilepsy is difficult to conceal, so it is easy to diagnose it. The disease is very ancient, well-known, easily recognized, and lends itself readily to description in terms not easily misunderstood. If we accept the theory that the Apostle was accompanied by Dr. Luke, his physician, whom he met at Troas when he first consulted his later companion and historian about his health,<sup>11</sup> it seems certain that, had this formidable nervous trouble been present, it could not have escaped sure diagnosis. Being diagnosed it seems improbable that a seizure so closely related to superstition should have passed without a hint by his literary attendant. Surely the attending physician would have protested against the many rigors Paul underwent and which would have inevitably increased the symptoms of his disease.

In the light of these and other circumstances, it seems improbable that the Evangelist of many journeys suffered from epilepsy. The final answer to the question, however,

<sup>10</sup> His enemies never taunted him with "having a devil," which seizures might have prompted in an age when epilepsy meant demon-possession.

<sup>11</sup> Ramsay, *St. Paul*, 1896, pp. 200ff.

if any can be even tentatively proposed, should come from the unbiased and impartial and expert judgment of neurologists. The best that laymen can do is to present probabilities, biased consciously and unconsciously in favor of theories already held. Their evidence, therefore, cannot be accepted as decisive either way. But this admission proves how comparatively unimportant the problem really is. It does not play anything like the vital part in deciding the larger question of his conversion that some assume it does.

For the habit spasms which attack the body of the patient cannot be counted legitimate causes of specific kinds of later conduct. They come and go without sudden and material changes in the habits and purposes of their victim. Their constant recurrence, and their increasing intensities, may in time wear down the sufferer's nervous system and general health; but a single fit does not itself offer ground for assuming that the entire behavior—to say nothing of the character—can be completely reformed by it alone. Therefore, even though the persecutor were epileptic, that does not compel us to believe that his conversion was caused by a single fit near Damascus.

The most that can safely be drawn from the presence of epilepsy is the probability that Saul, if afflicted with such nervous instability,<sup>12</sup> might have been subject to great oscillations of behavior, brought on by excitations which would hardly move a normal nervous system. Such hyperexcitability, however, neither requires nor excludes any of the usual factors in conversion. Except that the nervous poise is more easily disturbed, the causes of conversion remain the same. Such a person might be more easily converted, but not by the omission of any essential factor.

<sup>12</sup> James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 197, 198.

## CHAPTER VII

### PHYSICAL-MENTAL EXPLANATIONS

THE previous chapter began with a search for the causes of Saul's conversion in the physical antecedents that lay outside his own body, and then passed on to a consideration of certain pathological conditions which at first sight seemed to offer some elucidation of those heavenly appearances which were the immediate occasions of his transformation. The specific pathological condition studied was epilepsy.

But since the purely physical sciences, like physics and chemistry, have failed to give an adequate account of the affair, the undaunted seeker for light turns to that group of sciences known as psycho-physical. They deal with those phenomena which involve both a body and mind. Consequently, they possess a special cogency in connection with conversion. For, without doubt, Saul possessed a body and a mind, and both of these were completely concerned in his conversion. Within them both we must seek for the antecedents leading up to that event, for the episode itself, and for the consequences that followed during the remainder of his life.

This demand leads us at once to the psycho-physical standpoint and its psychological implications, very different from those discussed under behavior in the preceding chapter. For psychology, during the greater part of its career, has recognized both consciousness and its expressions in conduct. Hence the failure of purely physical science, with its law of cause and effect, to furnish adequate expla-

nations of conversions now leads us to that broader field of activities involving the mind.

This review of psychology, which has generally been recognized as a psycho-physical science, reveals how well suited is that department known as abnormal psychology to a study of epilepsy, a disease which affects both mind and body. We now turn to a study of the mental side of the disease in order to consider, first, the usual effects wrought upon the patient's mind by years of seizures; and secondly, the probability of epileptic hallucinations as the source of Saul's vision.

Obviously Saul's Damascus attack cannot be fitted into the mental picture of a major fit. He did not lose consciousness even for a moment. His wits seem to have been keenly alive. He could recall his experience with a vividness possible only if a sharp impression had been made upon his senses. He felt no fear apparently, and uttered no cry of surprise or anguish. Therefore, major epilepsy must be discarded from consideration. The only epilepsy that can possibly be proposed as an explanation of Saul's vision is the mild form with which, so it is said, hallucinations occur in some instances. Let us see what possible effects mild attacks of fits, granting for a moment their possibility though not their certain presence in this case, could have upon the validity of the great Apostle's doctrines.

Epileptic attacks cannot be used to invalidate St. Paul's whole mental output. That assumption is effectually precluded by a glance at history, which shows that some of the greatest minds that ever directed human thought, founded dynasties or organized new nations suffered attacks of the disease. The names of Cæsar, Mohammed, Napoleon, Rousseau need only be mentioned in this connection to demonstrate that intellectual power of a high order and organizing genius of the first rank may coexist with this disease, dreaded more for its superstitious affiliations than its certain evil consequences. Epilepsy is found associated

with mentalities ranging all the way from idiocy to genius.<sup>1</sup>

The mentality of epileptics is not necessarily imperiled by a lifelong continuance of the attacks. Only when the fits grow in frequency and intensity does mental deterioration follow with any certainty. Under such adverse conditions, instigated and augmented by strenuous and worrisome living, the mind of the sufferer in time generally shows marked stages of diminishing power. This appears to have been anything but true of St. Paul's mind. To the end of his long, hard and excessively active life, he appears to have kept all his mental powers remarkably alert and strong. His last epistles prove the keenness of his intellect and the normality of his emotions and his will. The retention of these powers unimpaired furnishes a strong argument against the theory of epilepsy, and proves conclusively that his seizures, if any, did not increase in number or intensity as time went on, though every hardship, every anxiety and every pain he suffered would have contributed to such an unhappy outcome.

The final question concerns the effect of possible epilepsy upon the authenticity and validity of St. Paul's appointment to an Apostleship and upon his doctrines. Two answers can be given to the question. First, the results of the Apostle's conversion are so obviously beneficial to the world at large that they have long since validated both themselves and their founder's mission. If epilepsy gave them being, we behold another miracle in which an eater brings forth meat. Secondly, to assume that one defect in the Apostle's mind or character discredits the whole of his work is preposterous. Every product of a sick body or soul is not foredoomed to rejection. The children of parents suffering bodily diseases are not, on that account, to be strangled at birth. The whole mental product of a Rousseau, or the campaigns of a Napoleon, or the brilliant

<sup>1</sup> McDougall, *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, 1926, Chap. XXIV, likens epileptic seizures to babies' "natural convulsion."

writings of a Nietzsche are not to be ignored because certain maladies of mind were suffered by these supermen. Because one part of the body is sick, it does not destroy the products of the whole body. Cripples may produce art; dyspeptics may write learned treatises; paralytics from brain strokes may teach and philosophize with power and truth. One part of the brain may be woefully affected and still leave much of its gray matter intact for splendid functioning. If the optimism of the tubercular patient is praised, and the irritability of the dyspeptic and the diabetic sufferers, and the melancholy of the liver-complainant are all counted unworthy in themselves regardless of their origin, why should all the ideas of a partially diseased brain be wholly despised? Cannot insane people utter some very remarkable truths? Shall all of Tycho Brahe's astronomical observations—on which Kepler and Newton reared their immortal truths—be entirely invalidated because he kept an idiot with him in his observatory and listened to that idiot's babblings as if they were truth? If we make a practice of discerning between Brahe's observations and the idiot's babblings, why not make a distinction between the ravings and the sanities of a partially diseased brain? These distinctions we ought to make and not permit the dread word "pathological" to strike terror into our hearts so that we cry, "Unclean!" to every word that issues from a sick person.\*

Moreover, it seems incredible that St. Paul's own physician, his friend, biographer, disciple and coworker would take seriously his master's teaching and work, and risk his own comfort and possibly his life, in forwarding an enterprise that was tainted with the possibility of hallucination growing out of a manifest diseased state of body and mind. If Luke did indeed know that this leader was afflicted with some sort of habit spasm, he certainly did not believe

\* Mental disease must be finally defined in terms of social values. See the author's *Conservation of the Child*.

that such attacks seriously vitiated the truth of the Gospel they were jointly carrying forward.

This particular disease, however, is not invoked as an explanatory principle for its general symptoms, but for the specific observation made by some specialists that hallucinations sometimes, in some persons, accompany the preliminary stages of the fit. In this way the habit spasm becomes of importance as a possible substitute for supernatural powers in furnishing the traveler to Damascus with his vision. This specific claim now demands our attention, and along with it we will also examine the mental symptoms of an attack in order to see whether the symptom complex fits the Damascus situation described in the New Testament.

If it is affirmed that epileptic auras are only occasionally accompanied by hallucinations, then a scientific explanation is given up, and in its stead is substituted correlation, or merely a coincidence of some degree. The degree of coincidence between the two might be established by the law of probability. If we guess that about a trillion epileptic seizures have taken place in the history of mankind, and about a thousand have been accompanied by visions, we can calculate what the chances are that such a coincidence occurred in the case of St. Paul. The probability, however, is so small that the relation cannot be advanced as a scientific explanation. For science demands in its explanations a far higher degree of probability. If it were shown that fits and visions come together fifty per cent of the times either occurs, that would amount to nothing more than chance coincidence. Chance, it must be remembered, is not science.

What, then, shall we conclude regarding the presence of epilepsy in St. Paul and its validity as a scientific explanation of his conversion? First, regarding the presence of the disease, it seems entirely fair to the facts to say that the total symptom complex of his chronic complaint does

not fit epilepsy. It is hardly conceivable that a modern neurologist would have pronounced his Damascus seizure a genuine epileptic fit. Secondly, if epilepsy is a scientific explanation, or a cause or correlate—and not a coincidence merely—its connection with conversion can be stated in a natural law. Then, in the name of natural law, why does not epilepsy produce conversion at least seventy-five times out of a hundred?

If it did, religious converts could be made by inducing epilepsy. No evangelist, not even the most sensational, has gone that far. Yet such possibilities follow legitimately upon the assertion that Saul's conversion can be scientifically and causally explained by an epileptic seizure. If such consequences are not allowed, and still the conversion is explained by epilepsy, then the coincidence is either a mere blind accident, or a deliberate, rational employment of a disease as a means to an end, used once and then discarded, or employed only occasionally. Either epilepsy cannot be allowed, or it is an instrument used by a Divine Mind.

The final dismissal of epilepsy as a cause of the conversion under consideration does not, however, carry with it the dismissal of illusions and hallucinations as possible explanations. For both of these pseudo-perceptions arise in many situations and connections. Illusions particularly are so common in ordinary life that they can hardly be pronounced abnormal, though they lie outside of the recognized field of real knowledge and, by inductive observers, are sharply distinguished from true facts.

Among the sources of illusion and hallucination, sun-stroke has been suggested, with a displacement of the real sun's disk, and with its common radiance deceptively magnified into miraculous brilliancy. But such a suggestion does not by itself explain the voice; and besides, illusions are so common that they can hardly be pressed into service to explain such an exceptional event. A distortion of the sun's image would require a special explanation; and so



our illusion, instead of explaining the matter satisfactorily, simply raises new questions which clamor for ultimate satisfaction.

Still other sources of delusion are found in the temporary effect of drugs which are widely used to produce ecstasies, both secular and religious; these have never been seriously urged in St. Paul's case, though alcohol, opium, soma, hasheesh and other narcotics have been freely used at times by various religious devotees to induce, along with physiological disturbances, striking and sometimes ineffable emotions.\* Like those diseases which are accompanied with mental disturbances, drugs are really psycho-physical reagents and the explanation of their effects involves the relation of mind and body. Their mental effects, however, are usually dismissed with the appellation hallucination, or illusion, and therefore to be regarded as unreal.

This brings us to the meaning of reality and its antonyms, delusion, illusion and hallucination, which are defined in antithesis to the real, true, actual facts of perception. The word reality is one of the most facile words in our language, slipping as it does from meaning to meaning with the sinuosity of a weasel gliding through underbrush. We may summarize the definitions under four heads. First, a real thing is either a material or spiritual substance. A real chair is composed of matter, and a real ghost is a disembodied spirit. Secondly, an object is real when it can be decomposed into various sensations given by different senses, like sight, touch, sound, smell, taste, etc. Thirdly, a real sensation or perception arises in the presence of some external object of which the perception is a true and perfect copy. If the object evaporates when

\* G. A. Barton, *Religions of the World*, 1924, on soma, p. 147; E. Letman, *Mysticism in Heathenism and Christendom*, 1910, on wine, pp. 61-63; *British Journal of Medicine*, 1896, Vol. II, Weir Mitchell on hasheesh, pp. 1626-38; *Popular Science Monthly*, 1902, Vol. LXI, Havelock Ellis on hasheesh; S. Fumet, *Notre Baudelaire*, 1925, on hasheesh.

we wake, we call its first appearance a delusion; if an object is distorted, it is an illusion; if no object whatever is there, its appearance is a hallucination. The three are alike in the falsity of their seeming. Fourthly, a real thing refuses to change its nature at the mere behest of our reason, desires or will, but remains a stably existing or permanent functioning being in spite of us. With these suggestions in mind, let us examine Saul's experience to see if it fulfills any one of the above definitions of reality.

The first one requires the appearance to be made of some substance.<sup>4</sup> So accustomed are we to deal with material objects that it is almost impossible for the untrained mind to think of perceptions as composed of anything but matter. But this disability, common to children, savages and idiots, is overcome by philosophers and scientists. The latter become so accustomed to dealing in thought with atoms and electrons that they often arrive at an implicit belief regarding the actual existence of these imperceptible, formless and imageless entities. Such a belief is a distinct attainment and marks a high degree of mental culture. The lack of it makes it nearly impossible for anyone to believe in the existence of pure spirits. The common disposition is sadly evidenced in those sorry but persistent reversions of men to idolatry in various forms of image-worship. A mind used to abstractions can think of Saul's vision as composed of a spiritual substance, and not necessarily made up of atoms or electrons, or preceded by waves of a material ether or of air.

The reality of a perception is next defined by its composition or structure. Real objects are supposed to be compounded of many sensations. If, then, a thing perceived appears first to the eye, like Hamlet's father's ghost, it is besought to speak, that it may also be heard. Saul's vision

<sup>4</sup> For a Hegelian discussion, see F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 1902; on physical reality, George Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, 1776.

satisfied both his sight and hearing (Acts ix. 3, 4), and possibly took on the form of a man. Next, if possible, in order to see if it possesses tangibility, palpability, impenetrability, the vision is tested by touch. If the exploring fingers meet something solid and resisting, then to most minds the perception possesses undeniable reality. But, as a moment's thought will reveal, all these various contributions by the senses are made to images in dreams and in hypnotic suggestions, and yet dreams are not counted real. Therefore, neither singly nor all combined can the senses alone prove the reality or truth of any appearance, though such tests may be demanded by, and be satisfactory to, some doubting Thomases.

When all the senses of a single person have made their contribution to the formation of an object, and doubt of its reality still lingers, the testimony of other people is sought. If they also testify to its reality, then the experience is said to be objective and not merely subjective. If many persons apply the test of the senses and are satisfied, the reality of the thing is verified beyond cavil for the masses. Saul's vision satisfied, to some extent, this test also; for other people with him at least heard the sound of a voice, even if they did not understand what it said (Acts ix. 7). But here again, for those seeking absolute certainty, the testimony of many people fails, for the reason that a multitude of them can all be hypnotized and deceived in the same way at once. Crowds are peculiarly susceptible, even in waking moments, to illusions and hallucinations, and especially in regard to religious appearances. Thousand of witnesses have in the past testified earnestly to the presence and sure existence of events that later proved to be mere shadows of reality, fantastic distortions of common objects. So here again, sense evidence does not give certainty. In fact, we must admit that the observations of single individuals, or of crowds of people, or of both together, are not final in this realm. All the

senses of one person, and the senses of all persons, may be grievously deceived by events usual and unusual, secular and religious.

The third definition of reality vests its validity in its mode of origination. This procedure is the one science adopts and maintains. Upon the manner in which a perception arises in consciousness, inductive science risks the whole truth and actuality of its facts. Locke assumes that an external material something exists and that any perceived fact is simply a copy thrown upon the mind by the object perceived. Like a mirror the mind reflects the outside world. Truth is the correspondence between the copy and its original. If the reflection is a true and perfect copy, then it is a fact; if not, then it is a delusion, illusion or hallucination, and consequently untrustworthy, to be ignored and discarded from real knowledge.

This psychological theory of knowledge, called impressionism, has been proven to be untenable both by the ancient Greeks and also by the modern Humians. The objections to it are many and insuperable. First, because nobody in perceiving ever has the slightest hint of two things—an object and its reflection; secondly, because it is hopelessly impossible to compare an image in the mind with a reality out of the mind to see if one is a true and perfect, or an imaginary or distorted copy of the other; lastly, if it is not a copy, then the relation between the two cannot be conceived, and truth by correspondence vanishes.

Such considerations show conclusively that the so-called scientific test of reality is completely inadequate to decide which perceptions are true and which false. Nothing whatever appears on the face of a true perception, nor is discoverable in its psychological constitution, nor is discernible in its generation, nor discoverable in its relation to its so-called stimulus, that marks it off infallibly from illusions and hallucinations. In short, science has no test that it can

apply to Saul's vision to determine whether it was real, actual and true or not.<sup>5</sup>

The final method of defining reality makes it an experience derived from any source in any manner, made up of the usual sensuous and intellectual components, and imposing itself upon us so as to remain unaltered by our reason, desires or will. Dreams may impose upon us till we awaken and drive them away. Falling snowflakes and raindrops appear to be streaks, a straight stick standing aslant in the water seems to be bent, a spark of electricity in the form of lightning appears to be a branched or zigzag streak, but all these illusions can be reasoned away. We may hold the glowing end of a stick quiet in the dark, and it is an ember; swing it, and it becomes a circle of light, only to resolve itself into a spark again when we stop its motion. A strong desire may shape the pictures in glowing coals or clouds; the hunter's lust may transform a bush into a wild turkey, a stump into a hare, a fallen tree trunk into a deer; and all these, upon closer inspection, change their shapes and eventually harden into stern and stable realities, finally impervious to desires, cunning reasoning or dominating will. If instead of passively resisting, something seems to rise up, seize upon us, and like an earthquake, shake us and shape us, we cannot help feeling that the reality has taken upon itself the form of a spirit or personality.

<sup>5</sup> The unwarranted assumption that the inductive method of science gives absolutely certain facts is so widespread that any question of its infallibility here may seem to be preposterous to those unacquainted with the literature and truths of epistemology. The literature is enormous, coming in steady stream from Plato and Aristotle down to David Hume, Immanuel Kant, the Mills, Bishop Samuel Butler, Ernst Mach, W. Stanley Jevons, Karl Pearson, F. C. S. Schiller, William James, John Dewey, James Ward, Wm. McDougall, E. A. Singer, A. D. Ritchie, and a host of others. A survey of the situation can be had from the *Encyc. Brit.*, articles "Induction," "Metaphysics," "Idealism," etc. The list includes inductive, or special scientists, and those thinkers who have given much thought to the scientific method.

Not in substance, nor mode of origin, nor structure, therefore, but in function, resides the reality of things material and spiritual. Reality, then, is never directly perceived as such, but is discovered by reflection and experiment. Only by considerable thought does one realize that the world he sees so definitely fixed consists of two images on his retina, both upside down, and that it probably requires some infantile practice to fuse the two pictures into one. Such facts cause James Sully to ask, "Is perception, as popularly understood, a big hallucination?"<sup>6</sup> G. M. Stratton takes the more hopeful view, which acknowledges that "in the perceptual life, as elsewhere, there is a mingling of good and evil, of true and false."<sup>7</sup> God has not created us, as Descartes mournfully feared, "so that we are always deceived."<sup>8</sup> "A thing is what it does," is a test that pragmatism has given us.<sup>9</sup> Experience sorts out the tares from the wheat when both are matured, but not before.

The questions about the reality of the light and voice Saul saw and heard derive their importance from the conventional conclusions based upon them, and which concern both St. Paul personally, and also the whole of Christendom. For, it is assumed, if Saul was called by a voice that existed, not in the skies, but only in his own being, then his commission could not possibly come from God, but from his own subterranean self. Consequently, it was not authentic and valid for him nor anyone else. Moreover, if he thought it came from a source outside his own personality, when it did not, he was deluded. Being deluded

<sup>6</sup> *Illusions*, 1886, p. 350.

<sup>7</sup> *Experimental Psychology and Its Bearing upon Culture*, 1908, p. 121.

<sup>8</sup> *Principia*, I, 5. For further condensed study see Robinson, *Readings in General Psychology*, 1923.

<sup>9</sup> For the impossibility of differentiating by structure or genesis between facts and hallucinations, see A. D. Ritchie, *Scientific Method*, pp. 155ff. How scientific facts are made, see W. S. Jevons, *Principles of Science*; K. Pearson, *Grammar of Science*; E. A. Singer, *Mind as Behavior*, essay, "Choice in Nature."

in this one respect, he may have been deluded in many or all of his other doctrines. Therefore, his whole system of thought, pretending to be revelations from God, is unauthentic and untrustworthy. The eternal significance of his experience, therefore, hangs upon the reality of the celestial signs.

These are the contentions of that science which explains everything by physical causation. Its refusal to allow any objective, material reality to the signs Saul beheld has been the source of some anxiety to faithful disciples who have longed to see in such special miracles a sure proof of God's existence and his immanence in the world. Against this primitive desire of all religion which springs from the perception of and reflection upon the strange events of life, science, moved alone by the instinct of curiosity, finding ample satisfaction in busying itself with the usual, has set itself with a rigid, but partly legitimate and not wholly unprofitable intolerance. Its opposition to miracles, however, has not sprung from a single-eyed desire for human welfare, but from the necessities of its own purpose to predict coming physical events, which compels it to postulate a universal material connection between all events. In taking this vow of voluntary poverty it has cut itself off from some of the richest and realest values of life reached by religious faith.

In the final analysis, the difference between so-called real events, or genuine facts, and illusions and hallucinations, must be discoverable, not in their psychic constitution nor in their origin, but in their function, or their power and efficiency in serving some end or purpose. Such a view entirely revolutionizes mechanistic science and its modes of explaining by physical causes, and puts an entirely new face upon all biologic, psychologic, moral, esthetic and religious phenomena. Skeptical eyes are opened to the fact that dreams, illusions, hallucinations may reveal some of the most precious truths men can ever discover and possess. In this light, St. Paul's vision becomes vastly

rich and new; excites entirely novel questions and yields most suggestive results. For, first denying that the vision itself confers any validity whatever upon the message, we ask what its worth, value, truth is for humankind? What did it do? What good was it? These questions must be answered in the light of the injunction, "By their fruits ye shall know them" (Mt. vii. 20), and St. Paul's own word, "Prove all things; hold fast to that which is good" (I Thess. v. 21). Science judges by roots; but the roots of a pear tree have no visible effect upon the apples growing on one of its engrafted branches.

The moment we attempt to evaluate St. Paul's vision we must ask the purpose for which it was given. Its purpose plainly lay in the message he received. The message, then, was primary and all-important. The means, method and medium through which the message came were all secondary and altogether unimportant for that end; as indifferent to an heir as the telephone, telegraph, wireless, radio, or word-of-mouth which announces his inheritance. What difference does it make in St. Paul's Gospel whether his call came via the air, through his ears, by way of his brain cells, or immediately from God's mind?

Next, since it was a message for St. Paul alone, it is entirely immaterial to its value whether it was given by subjective or objective means.<sup>10</sup> It makes no difference whatever to its validity and worth whether anybody else in heaven or on earth heard it, perceived it, or had the slightest inkling of it. If the mind of St. Paul understood the message, God's purpose was fulfilled.

Moreover, since the essence of the vision lay not in its external trappings of light or voice, but only in its meaning to St. Paul, that meaning needed to be clear to him alone. To be clear to him, and to be valid for him, it must fit itself

<sup>10</sup> The fact that the Scriptures are ambiguous on the objectivity of the voice (Acts ix. 7; cf. xxii. 9, Greek "phone," voice, sound) has not impaired the value of the vision, which has grown rather than diminished in the last nineteen centuries.



into his character, into his vocabulary and language (Acts xxvi. 14), into his total background or apperceptive mass. For God's message must come from the skies, be accompanied with light (Gen. i. 3; Is. v. 1), be spoken in a human voice, as to prophets of old. Suppose that, instead of a light, the earth had suddenly yawned, a chasm opened, and from it smoke and fire had rolled up and in the midst thereof a gloomy figure all in raven black had emerged, what would Saul of Tarsus have done? Fallen prostrate, covered his head, stopped his ears, refused to hear or see. In order that the message with its meaning might reach the mind of St. Paul, it had to come with some such manifestations of the divine as his education and training expected. Likewise, it must come to him in the fullness of time, when his mind was prepared, when his temper was ripe, when the message answered the deep and insoluble problems of his intellect and gave promises of peace and joy to the agonizing cries of his yearning heart.<sup>11</sup> Such demands make the message individual, personal and subjective.

The value of any revelation, whatever its source or the nature of its medium, finally depends upon the use<sup>12</sup> its receiver makes of it. In a dream a solution of a problem, long considered, comes to a mathematician, and he enlightens the world with it. In another dream the shape of a bent pin comes to Eli Whitney, and he invents the cotton gin and founds a huge industry of incalculable value to the race. Through a dangling string the vision of a suspension bridge comes to Roebling, and he builds it. In the

<sup>11</sup> It is interesting to compare St. Paul's reaction with St. Peter's when the latter received a similar call (Acts. x. 9-16; cf. xiv, xv, xvi).

<sup>12</sup> St. Peter received possibly a clearer suggestion of Christianity than did Saul; but the former made but a limited use of it, due probably to his limited intellectual powers and the weakness of his sentiment of rationality (Acts. x. 9-48; vide vv. 34, 35, which contain in principle the universal Gospel; cf. Gal. ii. 11; Acts xv. 7-11 and Mt. xxv. 14-30, parable of the talents.

streets of Jerusalem, in broad daylight, a startling vision, in full color, of Jesus before Pilate comes to Tissot, and he spreads it upon canvas famous forever after. A man hears a voice from space and rushes to a neurologist to be examined for approaching insanity. Saul hears a voice from the skies and revolutionizes the world. In the final analysis, then, many other conditions being fulfilled, the test of a vision or a revelation of new truth depends upon the will of the person who receives it. "I was not disobedient to the heavenly vision" marks the apex of St. Paul's conversion experience on the Damascus Way. From that moment onward, the world has been stamping the truth, worth, value and validity upon it, as in ever-widening and deepening spheres of influence it radiates from that single figure, fallen and forlorn on the sands of an eastern desert.

Our conclusion, then, is this: a fair consideration of the facts does not justify the certain conclusion that St. Paul suffered epilepsy; and if he did, it is utterly contrary to the scientific conception of causality to affirm that epilepsy caused his conversion. For (1) conversion is not the consequent of epileptic seizures in one hundred percent of the cases as the law of uniformity or causality demands; (2) to reply that Saul plus epilepsy, plus his past, plus his contemporaneous circumstances altogether constituted the cause of his conversion is practically inconceivable, useless, and based upon the impossible assumption of universal mechanism, which we discuss further in Chapter X; (3) if a group of physical factors did combine actually to convert St. Paul, if these same factors were imposed upon a multitude of people and converted fifty percent of them (chance), and still further, if the physical factors were so improved as to convert say seventy-five percent of those upon whom they acted, still this would not fulfill the demands of a strict, scientific causal theory; for cause must convert one hundred percent of the people one hundred percent of the times; (4) finally, the cause must be like its effects, and

a habit spasm in a body is not like a conversion in the mind. In general, then, having faithfully examined physical causation, or the scientific method of explaining events, we conclude that physical causation, and hence, scientific explanation, fails in accounting for the conversion of Saul of Tarsus. We must look further for an explanation.

## CHAPTER VIII

### EXPLANATION BY THE SUBCONSCIOUS

THE last chapter shows that men ascribe reality to events which oppose their endeavors in spite of all they can do. That which commonly opposes their efforts is matter, both in the form of our own sometimes sick, weary and lazy bodies and in the form of material objects in the world. Therefore, largely by association, we tend to ascribe primary reality to those material walls which everywhere circumscribe our freedom.

Oppositely, our inner life seems to be largely inhabited by unrealities. Much, though not all, of what goes on inside of us is subject to our direct control. Our emotions do sweep down upon us like storms, and passion overcomes us. Fear sometimes holds us like fettering gyves, or shakes us like the cold. Thoughts recur with such demoniacal persistence that some souls, wearied and worn out, succumb to their importunities and drift off into insanity. But, usually and normally, our bodies obey our wills, our minds can be kept in fair order, and our emotions, like trained animals, learn to obey or go snarling to their cages. Hence, what is inside our skins tends to be called unreal and dependent upon us.

Therefore, when a man is seized upon suddenly, and by some unseen power beyond his control is converted in mind and character, he is prone to attribute the change to some outside agency. If the result is a change for the better, he insists that the agent is divine; if he goes to the bad, it is a devil that possesses him. Scientists, denying the existence and intervention of God or demons in human affairs, seek to show that the power which apparently

seizes a man really comes from within himself.<sup>1</sup> If it gives him new ideas, then they call the revelation illusion or hallucination. If it changes the man's desires and conduct, they ascribe the power to subconsciousness.

The word "subconscious" itself strikes the eye and arrests attention by its *prima facie* contradiction in terms. It is a compound that escaped prematurely from the studies of scholars and all too young entered the world of popular discussion, where it has suffered many distortions of meaning and has been forced to play fantastic rôles in the philosophies of well-meaning people not versed in the delicate handling of a new-born scientific idea.

The two contradictory words have stood as contrary representatives of mutually contradictory states of mind. The emptiness of meaning encouraged by so fascinating an entity as an "unconscious-conscious mind" thus lent itself freely to fancy-free speculations unrestrained either by self-consistency or relation to facts. Having no meaning, the words could take on any meaning anyone wished to read into them. Being above the laws of logic and science, the "subconscious mind" could do anything. Consequently, it is difficult to disentangle what is good in the theory from its evil associations with pseudo-science, underworld psychology, false philosophy, superstitions and therapeutic systems dear to the hearts of neurotics who seek solace anywhere except within the safe and well-tested, common-sense modes of healing.

The subconscious has been invested with such weirdness and awesomeness that it partakes more of medieval witchcraft than it does of a twentieth-century, scientific concept. To make use of it at all requires, therefore, a ruthless stripping away from its essential meaning of the fanciful drapery with which its true form has been shrouded, so that it may stand forth, a clear-cut word, an idea represented

<sup>1</sup> In this way religion originated, according to Ivy G. Campbell, "A Study in the Psychology of Religion," *Jr. of Psy.*, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, Jan., 1918, pp. 1-49.

by that word, and a state of mind symbolized by that idea. Nowhere else does psychology labor with more difficulty to keep itself free from mystical speculation than in dealing with this idea, so ready always to betake itself to twilight zones, there to function like a spirit flitting about with the indeterminateness of a ghost. Our first effort will be directed to freeing the idea from its obscurities, and that can best be done by tracing its origin and development.

This obscure, mysterious and vaguely defined feature of man's mentality has recently been pressed into valiant service, by both technical and popular writers, to eliminate the supernatural from conversions. Ever since Professor James proposed to explain these remarkable religious changes by it, the subconscious has seemed, in popular estimation at least, to be a divinely predisposed instrument for lighting up the dark places in the psychic, psychopathic and religious experiences of men. At least it has lent a fascinating color to otherwise gray and drab metaphysical and theological discussions.

But the theory neither sprang from a primary desire to serve religion nor was it maintained during its short period of popularity by the service so rendered. The hypothesis first originated in the minds of philosophers, and like all theories was formulated to serve a purpose—in this instance, the preservation of a theory of knowledge based on the assumption that all things are continuous. The universe, like a flowing river, moves on but nowhere breaks asunder. Novelties, creations, sudden leaps into being are abhorrent and disastrous to such a conception of the world.

But it seems to be manifest that perceptions of the senses, ideas of the intellect, emotions of the heart do leap full-grown into consciousness, apparently coming into immediate being out of nothing. Are they really creations, or do they grow gradually? Inductive science must insist upon the latter theory. Therefore the subconscious, or the subcellar, unconscious world was called into being, to serve, like a mushroom cave, as a germinating ground for mental

constituents, the spores of which lodged there, sprouted, matured and finally thrust themselves up through the crust of consciousness into full being. The irruption, instead of marking a sudden creation, was the end of a long and presumably natural development.

The origin of the theory is not as recent as some might suppose. In the seventeenth century, Gottfried W. von Leibnitz (1646-1716), "the father of German philosophy," in his endeavors to preserve continuity throughout all mental activity, proposed that the soul always knows everything, though the individual person is not conscious of all his knowledge. He supported his theory with much learning and many ingenious arguments, one of which pointed out that a single grain of falling wheat makes no appreciable sound, but a thousand do. Since, he argued mistakenly, the sound of a thousand grains is simply the sum total of the sounds made by each grain, each grain must make an unconscious sound. The unconscious sensations he called "perceptions"; the conscious ones, "apperceptions." To this theory, his English opponent, John Locke (1632-1704), though he admitted gradations of intensities in sensations, replied that the existence of subconscious perceptions was pure assumption, a criticism that has never been fully met.

From Leibnitz, the problem of the arrival of new knowledge in anyone's mind passed through Wolff to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who in his *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, (Critique of Pure Reason, 1781), followed Leibnitz in placing many of those processes by which ideas are formed outside of self-consciousness. Instead of calling it "subconscious," however, he introduced the term "transcendental," and made the unity introduced into a perception a "transcendental unity of apperception," which later Wilhelm Wundt and James Ward called the "creative synthesis." Kant's transconscious processes, though subconscious or unconscious, did not explain the arrival of any particular idea or perception, but knowledge in general.

The main thread of the unconscious theory was carried forward by G. T. Fechner (1801-1887) in his *Elemente der Psychophysik* (1859), one of the founders of the new psycho-physical psychology. Among other scientific concepts, he first introduced the term "subliminal" (Lat. *limen*; Ger. *Schwelle*, door-sill, threshold) and made this figurative partition stand for the boundary between the conscious and the un- or subconscious, between the cellar and the living-room in the mental household. Below this threshold, all mental things, no matter how separate and distinct they may appear to be, are joined together. Further, in this vast underground region, all minds are united, so that all mental activity, and all its heterogeneous products which rise into consciousness like the islands of an archipelago, are one under the surface.

The same solicitude for unity is expressed in James Ward's *Psychological Principles* (1918), in which the great English psychologist says that when sensations become conscious they seem to pass immediately from zero intensity to a finite quantity. In the face of such a creative act, science must assume that they really develop gradually. So the hypothesis of the subconscious must be entertained. It is nothing more, he says, than the application of the "law of continuity" in nature to the facts of perception, in which he recognizes definitely the fundamental motive for the subconscious theories. They are proposed to overcome the evident fact that sensations, ideas and feelings do leap suddenly into consciousness without apparent previous connection with any antecedents, a fact wholly at variance with modern science, which seeks to connect every event with some previous cause.

The purely philosophic meanings of the subconscious theories were enlarged at times by the injection of interests from special fields, theoretical and practical. The doctrine has been freely applied to psychic, psycho-therapeutic, psychoanalytic and religious teachings and practices, where the subconscious has been employed almost without limit



in fact or reason to explain multitudes of problems and to cure many diseases of body, mind and morals.

The Society for Psychical Research, established in England in 1882, has done much to define the concept and enlarge the field of subconscious operations. The theory was applied widely, but especially to the doctrine of the hereafter, by F. W. H. Myers, in his classic work, *The Human Personality and Its Survival after Death* (1903), in which the theory was made to embrace enormous numbers of facts from divers fields, like genius, idiocy, clairvoyance, hypnotism, hallucinations, illusions, mental healing, and many other bizarre and unusual phases of human mentality, normal and abnormal. This luxuriant field of speculation was also freely drawn upon by William James, in his *Varieties of Religious Experiences*, to explain conversion, but, as we shall see later, in a manner entirely out of line with the historical development of the theory. Its wide application to the cure of mental diseases in recent times has attracted enormous public attention to the subject.

The doctrine of the subconscious has been popularized by Dr. Sigismund Freud and his followers. By them subconsciousness has been transformed from a breeding-ground of ideas into a burying-ground of repressed conscious elements. The disciples of Freud are not always in harmony with the master, but they seem to agree generally in the thought that men suppress much of their conscious experience and that this repressed material, instead of being annihilated, is pressed down into a subconscious realm where it lives a precarious existence, sometimes thrusting itself up again into consciousness, changed and arrayed in strange forms. No one undertakes to write clearly on Freudianism, but a brief sketch of his system may be here attempted in order to fill out our historical sketch with one of the latest and most popular ramifications of the subconscious.

Freud himself, out of his psycho-therapeutic practice

begun about 1890, developed a theory of psychology and philosophy which made free to touch upon all sorts of mental phenomena, normal and abnormal, and attracted to itself many adherents both technical and popular through whom it made itself widely known. Before the death of its founder it already showed signs of disintegration. Some of the earliest disciples forsook the master and set up systems of their own, some of them differing radically from the original.

Freud's theories, derived from his practice, were based upon his experiences with neurotic patients. In that practice he used his famous psychoanalytic method for burrowing into his patients' past lives and finding there some forgotten episode which might be plausibly associated with the melancholia, fear, worry, hysteria, or other neurasthenic condition from which he was suffering. His frequent discovery of long-forgotten and suppressed experiences, chiefly emotional, caused him to posit the existence of hordes of buried subconscious entities which are normally kept below the threshold of consciousness by the "censor," or normal self, during his waking hours, but which escape from their dungeons and run riot in dreams.

Hence, he concluded, dreams give the chief evidence of the subconscious world. It originates through the repression of innate sexual impulses, active according to this strange system, in infancy; but which, through the activity of the censor, guided by moral ideals and social conventions, are put down with a ruthless hand, so that, at about the sixth year of life, they seem to have been entirely annihilated, though they are merely latent. This passage of the fundamental impulses of the human being from the arena of his conscious life to the dim unawareness of the subconscious region is not accomplished without struggles, "conflicts" and "repressions," each of which has its peculiar significance.

At puberty the battle begins again. The sex impulses, energized by the libido, again demand expression but are

checked by the censor. In revenge they form "complexes," the nucleus of the subconscious. This mass, originally formed by the suppression of infantile sex impulses, is enlarged from time to time by the addition of desires suppressed by the censor. The signs of the existence of this mass appear in dreams.

The machinery for generating the Freudian subconscious is in reality very enormous, complicated and unwieldy, a thorough study of which is here quite impossible. Our chief interest is the fact that such subconsciousness comes from repressed consciousness which at first arrives by the usual modes of organic inheritance in the form of instincts—with Freud, the sex instinct alone—which is traced back to remote ancestors in the somewhat fantastic theory of "regression."

But it is in the realm of dreams that Freudian theories take on their most interesting colorings. The theory luxuriates in unrestrained fancies. All dream contents become revived symbols of sex, sometimes seeming to be removed from reality by impossible chasms which the interpreter bridges with happy abandon and admirable ingenuity. At the hands of this theory, sticks, swords, daggers, canes, spears, clubs, pencils, spires, pens, fingers, cups, saucers, pails, kettles, pans, tubs, rooms, cells, dungeons and myriads of other commonplace things are molded into the most subtle forms, pregnant with significance and portentous with meaning for the past life of the dreamer and all his race.

The common-sense reader coming for the first time upon Freudian literature enjoys something of that feeling animating his first perusal of *Alice in Wonderland*. The Freudians revel in the same delightful and unexpected changes, in the same happy disregard of nature's laws, and withal produce the same wonder as to what will happen next. The reader is prepared for anything. No idea is too fantastic to be brought forward and urged upon his

belief with the same seriousness that characterizes the "Wonderland." He is asked to accept on their own face value theories and interpretations of dreams that shame the *Arabian Nights* and make *Gulliver's Travels* seem tame and steady. Yet, underneath this surface jungle, one feels the presence of a serious theory.

Dr. McDougall, a sympathetic critic of Freud, gives a "particularly good and instructive dream interpretation" from Dr. A. A. Brill, "a leading American exponent of Freudian principles."<sup>2</sup> A condensation of the account states that a young woman dreamed she was walking in a lonely place, anxious to get home, but was prevented by "a wall in the way" in a city street "full of walls." A flock of chickens suddenly appear all blurred, except a large one with a long neck, which said, "Come with me into the dark!"

The interpretation of the dream is given as follows. The large chicken (a rooster?) was an old sweetheart of the lady, who had proposed to her thrice, but had been put off because of his poverty and because the lady's money was invested in Wall Street. "Come with me into the dark," according to Brill, "is the realization of the wish for a renewed proposal; for dark stands for the mystery of marriage." The lady is in "a lonely place," a spinster at twenty-eight, anxious to reach "home," i.e. matrimony. The wall of the dream is, of course, Wall Street, New York. The correctness of the interpretation is vouched for by certain association tests, though McDougall maintains it is not an interpretation made on strict Freudian principles, for the sex impulse is not traced back to the infancy of the dreamer. She met the "chicken" first in school.<sup>3</sup>

The extravagant lengths to which the theory may be carried in the hands of extremists is exemplified by one dis-

<sup>2</sup> *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 185-186, from Brill's *Psychoanalysis*.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 186.

ciple's statement that if a tramp throws a stone through a window, in order, as he says, to secure a winter's lodging and board in jail, he does it in reality to satisfy his repressed desire to return to his prenatal state, and a cell is as near as he can come to that condition.\* A theory that permits such license of fancy can naturally, by the exercise of its holder's ingenuity, be made to explain any behavior whatever. No thoughtful person, however, is required to accept one such explanation rather than another.

What can be said for the system as a whole? Discarding the adventitious draperies, the following essentials of the philosophy seem to remain: (1) every human being strives for self-betterment as a birthright; (2) on account of which ambition, conflicts quite normally occur between his personal ideals and obstacles both within him and without; (3) in such conflicts the vast majority of people triumph over their nonsocial and immoral tendencies sufficiently to live and have their being as acceptable members of society; (4) a small percentage, badly endowed perhaps with weak nervous systems, succumb in the struggle and turn into nervous incapables; (5) of whom a certain percentage can be cured by psycho-therapeutics based on suggestion, by which the occasion of the trouble may be discovered or, on the contrary, entirely covered and hidden forever, and the patient relieved because he thinks he has found the cause; (6) the colossal machinery of the subconscious may be much simplified and reduced from Freud's conception of it, or entirely eliminated, together with his reduction of all impulses to the sex instincts and his fictitious connection of human impulses by "regression" to remote racial activities. Stripped to the bone, Freud's system emphasizes the well-known struggle of human life for health and happiness, magnifies the rôle of inborn dispositions in that striving, calls attention to the essential part emotions play in well-being, and by an analytic diagnosis of abnormal cases

\* *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. X, No. 2, April, 1926.

throws some light on normal processes engaged in the wholesome conflicts of life.<sup>5</sup>

On the whole, the subconscious theories which have played such a large part in modern thought, and have been urged in explanation of many religious phenomena, may be summarized under four heads. The philosophical theories first propounded the hypothesis to explain the gradual arrival of conscious states, which often broke into conscious awareness without any seeming previous existence. The psychological theories gave this doctrine a more definite form, introduced the threshold, and widened its generalizations. From pure science, it next passed over to applied science and found use in two regions: first, in psychic phenomena and its better-known religious phases; and secondly, in psycho-therapeutics and its allied activities of hypnotism and suggestion. Throughout its history, the doctrine never revealed the actual "subconsciousness" to direct observation. Its existence always remains as doubtful as its definitions are varied and imaginary. The tendency at the present time, among thoughtful scientists, is to minimize the importance of the subconscious, or else to eliminate it altogether from the realm of the actual. Morality, philosophy, psychology, religion and mental healing have all felt its influence, whether for better or for worse, it is hard to say.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> For a sympathetic account of Freud, see McDougall, *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, 1926.

<sup>6</sup> The literature on the subject is very voluminous. F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality and Its Survival after Death*, 1903, applies the doctrine very generally; Joseph Jastrow, *The Subconscious*, 1906, criticizes the various theories; James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, Vol. I, Chap. X, criticizes the theory and denies the existence of the state, but in *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1903, applies it to conversion; Boris Sidis and Simon Goodhart, *Personality*, 1905, treats the famous Dr. Hanna case; Sigismund Freud, *Traumdeutung*, 1919, uses it to explain dreams; Beatrice Hinkle, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, 1916, treats both Freud and Jung; J. B. Pratt, *Religious Consciousness*, 1912, applies it to religion; J. A. Bruce, *Riddle of Personality*, 1915, treats the subject popu-

From the foregoing historical sketch of subconscious theories it appears that (1) the state may be defined as that portion of the mental life which lies beyond consciousness, consisting (2) of (a) the raw stuff of perceptions, ideas and emotions, in process of development, or (b) the forgotten remnants of former conscious states; (3) the first generated by psycho-physical stimuli operating too slowly or too rapidly, the second by repression; and (4) both functioning so as to develop constituents of consciousness gradually, or to preserve them from annihilation. From this conception two very different types of subconsciousness may be deduced: one, the rudimentary, in which the origins of new consciousness are found; the other, vestigial, in which the remnants of former consciousness still linger.

Paulsen says the vestigial consists of old experiences "down to the most completely forgotten, which, however, insofar as they have determined the condition of psychic life, have not become altogether inefficient and unreal."<sup>7</sup>

James,<sup>8</sup> with a liberal hand, endows this region with a huge variety of furnishings, which include both the vestigial and rudimentary portions of conscious life. It contains, he says, "such things as all our momentarily inactive memories," "the springs of all our obscurely motivated passions, impulses, likes, dislikes, and prejudices," our "intuitions, hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, persuasions convictions and in general, all our non-rational operations"; it is "the source of our dreams" which "apparently return to it"; in it "arise whatever mystical experiences we may have, and our automatisms, sensory or motor; our life in

larly and gives in the last chapter a valuable list of works bearing on the hereafter; T. J. Hudson, *The Law of Psychic Phenomena*, 1893, applies it to telepathy; McDougall, *Abnormal Psychology*, gives a comprehensive treatment. Also articles in *Encyc. Brit.*, "Psychology"; *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Subconscious."

<sup>7</sup> *Introduction to Philosophy*, trans. by F. Thilly, 1895, p. 124.

<sup>8</sup> *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, p. 483.

the hypnotic, and 'hypnoid' conditions"; "our delusions, fixed ideas, and hysterical accidents"; our "supra-normal cognitions"; and finally, "it is the fountainhead of much that feeds religion." This gives some idea of the confusion that may reign in the nether-region, or subconscious mind, if such a region exists.

In general, this hugely complicated conception has been defined in four ways: (1) as a fringe, or sphere lying outside of consciousness ready to be included in consciousness by attention; (2) unconscious cerebration, or brain activity with which no consciousness is at the moment correlated; (3) a stage of organization in the subconscious mass in which it takes on more or less the attributes of a secondary personality; (4) a huge, immeasurable, incalculable region, mass, or activity unknown and unknowable, whose existence is postulated to explain certain aspects of consciousness.

Subconsciousness has been used most frequently to explain conversion by the irruption into consciousness,\* without the person's wish or will, of new ideals of life and character. Such ideals are assumed to have been incubating in the subliminal region. The germs of the incubating ideals are planted in subconsciousness in the ways just noted. Both varieties, of course, trace their ultimate origin to psycho-physical stimuli; but the second come into consciousness, and then pass into subconsciousness.

But if both kinds of subconscious material ultimately come from psycho-physical stimuli, why is it that sometimes the result is conscious and sometimes not? Because, so it is asserted, the stimuli themselves are presented to the mind either too rapidly or too slowly. Thus a single sound may be heard distinctly. But if it is repeated above a certain given rate, then it loses its identity and is merged with other sounds into a tone. Or, again, we may run our finger along a paling fence slowly enough to feel each paling. If the speed of movement is increased, then we lose

\* James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1925, p. 36.



all sense of individual palings and feel roughness. The feel of each paling, the sound of each sound, becomes "sub-conscious."

Such was the explanation given by Sir William Hamilton, J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, and W. B. Carpenter. The last-named writer called the explanation of the subconscious "unconscious cerebration,"<sup>10</sup> and supplied numerous instances of its power to furnish spiritualistic phenomena like table-tipping, planchette-readings, etc., all of which possess the common attribute of giving the operators irresistible impressions of being controlled and moved by some power outside of themselves. These manifestations are in reality, according to Carpenter and others, merely the results of growing, developing, incubating subconscious elements which finally arrive in full consciousness.

This form of subconsciousness is the unconscious stimulation of brain cells. When the same cells are again stimulated, then sometimes consciousness arises. If at that moment an appropriate object is present, its presence surprises the perceiver, who accounts for it by saying, "I never noticed it before." But if no appropriate object is present, and he sees one, then its appearance is an hallucination, and is often explained on supernatural grounds.

A man touring in France for the first time one day saw a perfectly familiar village street scene. About its appearance of familiarity he was thoroughly puzzled, until, at home again, above his washstand he noticed for the first time a picture of that very street! How many thousand times his eyes had rested upon that picture without his ever seeing it, nobody can tell. Another traveler, stopping overnight in a house where he had never been before, saw at the foot of his bed in the night a very clear image of a bearded gentleman totally unknown to him. The next day he learned that such a man had died in that very bed a few months previously. He was sure, then, that he had

<sup>10</sup> *Principles of Mental Physiology*, 1874, Chap. XIII. See also James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, Vol. I, pp. 151f.

seen a ghost, until he noticed on the wall of a room through which he had passed the evening before a large crayon drawing of the very person whose image he had seen at night.

Such reappearances are explained as memories received and held and brought back to consciousness by the subconscious. The eye beholds, the brain registers, but the mind does not perceive. Later on, for what reason nobody knows, the brain cells are again agitated, consciousness comes with their agitation, and the vision appears.

Can such an explanation apply to Saul's experience? He saw a vision of Jesus (I Cor. ix. 1, xv. 8; II Cor. xii. 1; Gal. i. 1, 12, 16—note the "in me"), not described in detail, whom he did not recognize, but asked, "Who art thou, Lord?" thus proving that the vision was strange, without resemblance to the lowly carpenter whom Saul had not seen (I Cor. xv. 8). Neither had he ever heard the words now spoken to him. Therefore, in these essentials, subconsciousness as unconscious cerebration fails to account for this wayside vision. It is not by such a device, traced to some previous experience in Saul's life, that the vision can be accounted for. If, however, it is suggested that his vision was made up unconsciously of his own past fragmentary thoughts about the Messiah, who or what built these fragments into the vision? An answer to this query will be ventured later.

Quite different is the process by which vestigial subconsciousness is generated. The denizens of this underworld first enter normal consciousness, there to enjoy a longer or shorter life in the sunlight of clear and active participation in the experience of their possessor. Then a conflict between his desires and his ideals arises, and the desires are defeated and driven down into the subliminal region. But they are not annihilated and continue a quasi-existence, resilient with the power to press upward again into their former sunlit state. Their sudden reappearance at propitious moments in the form of hallucinations, new ideals and

tumults of emotion constitute conversion. Their ultimate origin, then, is to be traced to repression of well-known conscious elements.

All kinds of conscious experience is subject to repression. St. Paul must have suppressed some of his intellectual processes—his perceptions, memories, imaginations and reasonings; some of his emotions, primary and secondary—his blind, inborn instincts, his likes and dislikes, etc.; some of his volitions—his attention to certain objects and ideas, his choices, his actions. By such practices men are civilized, educated and made decent and self-respecting members of cultivated societies.

Much of this suppressed activity often remains and shows itself both in unconscious forms of behavior and in consciousness itself. It is quite common to learn the name of a person, then forget it, and sometimes try to recall it when it refuses with a strange and perverse contrariness to come to mind. The consciousness thus generated is full of uneasiness, irritated, strained, altogether different from that induced by someone's describing some strange person we have never met and asking us his name. The same is true of emotions felt often and embodied in sentiments which are quiescent most of the time, but ready on occasion to leap again into consciousness, which they tone and color even when we are not aware of their effect. Actions, of course, when often repeated sink into mechanical habits unconsciously performed, and even habits repressed often leave remnants which affect behavior without our knowing it. Their effects are the so-called subconscious influence, of which so much is made. All these experiences by which vestigial subconsciousness is manufactured are monotonously common. They indicate nothing abnormal.

One of the most signal refutations of the theory of the subconscious and its usefulness as an explanatory principle in conversion is furnished by James, who in his *Psychology* (1890),<sup>11</sup> examined and refuted ten arguments in its favor,

<sup>11</sup> Vol. 1, pp. 162-175.

and then, in 1902, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*,<sup>12</sup> not only returns to his disproven hypothesis, but applies it with brilliant effect to conversion in general, and especially to the sudden changes of the Pauline type.

But in doing this—with that sardonic humor in which the history of science sometimes indulges—he deals the whole theory one of its most damaging blows. For, as we have seen above, the theory was first invented to forestall creation, and to explain the arrival of sensations in consciousness by psycho-physical stimulations. According to the theory, the “nascent” sensations, as Spencer called them, develop in the subconscious and then burst into consciousness. They are not created, nor does God have aught to do with their arrival.

But, in explaining conversions, James, in 1902, suggested that through this unknown, subterranean passageway of the subconscious, God might find direct access to the souls of penitents and so convert them. Such employment of the theory glaringly annuls the whole purpose for which the theory was originally devised, brought into being, and maintained as a doctrine for several centuries. Never was a theory so decisively betrayed in the house of its friends. It had been designed to keep God out of a conscious process into which it was now employed to bring him. Any theory thus ready to serve science based on causation and, at the same time, on religion requiring miracles, must be ambiguous indeed. Is conversion occasioned by the “irruption of incubating ideals,” or by God? One is sufficient, two superfluous.

If difficulties attend both the origin and the subconscious development of new ideals, equal obstacles lie in the way of their irruption into consciousness. How do they push their way up? The human will cannot force them to rise. In fact, writers agree with Sanday in saying “there is a lower realm into which the conscious mind cannot enter” and yet “it possesses a strange magnetic power by which

<sup>12</sup> Pp. 233, 511f.

the contents of the lower region are, as it were, drawn upwards and brought within the range of its cognition."<sup>13</sup>

The passageway between the subconscious and the conscious, according to the writer just quoted, seems to be like a one-way bridge. Subconscious ideas are like bubbles; they rise to the surface, but cannot sink. Consciousness can receive what is handed to it, but it cannot dip down into the wealth of its subliminal storehouse and take therefrom what it needs. Neither does any upholder of the theory of the subconscious make it clear how the subconsciously incubating ideas, emotions and decisions do pass from their lower to their higher states in consciousness. Not only is the generation of subconscious ideas left obscure, but also the passage of the mature ideas from their breeding ground into the light of day in the known mind. Yet, it cannot be too often repeated, the subconscious theories were formulated to explain the origin, development and delivery in consciousness of all its component parts.

When new ideals have fully incubated, they are supposed to have arisen in consciousness. They often come with a geyser-like gush and impress their percipient with their power to have their own way. This quality gives them their superhuman attributes. The person enduring such an uprush seems to be helpless in the grip of a higher power. Is such a power resistless? Or can it be successfully opposed by the will of the person affected?

Sometimes, at least, resistance is possible. "At the very moment when the act suggested by subconscious forces," says Bergson, "is going to be performed, something may revolt against it." The revolter is "the deep-seated self rushing

<sup>13</sup> *Christologies, Ancient and Modern*, 1910, quoted from *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Subconsciousness and Experience (Religious)," from which much of the above material is taken, by J. L. McIntyre and H. M. Hughes. James quotes Starbuck, vaguely suggesting the self *in posse* directs the operation (*ibid.*, pp. 209, 210). If the self directs the operation, the function of the subconscious, and sub-consciousness itself are rendered superfluous.

to the surface.”<sup>14</sup> Therefore, in the final analysis, granting everything which the most ardent supporters of subconscious theories may demand, we see that subconsciously incubated ideals fail, sometimes at least, to coerce the self into the performance of any act deeply repugnant to the will. Unless the self is dethroned and his rule repudiated, subconsciousness cannot be the decisive factor in conversion. “I was not disobedient to the heavenly vision” (Acts xxvi. 19), St. Paul asserts, and thereby offers a final challenge to any mechanistic theory of his change, no matter how it may be disguised by naming it “subconscious mind.”

Between certain stages in the generation of vestigial subconsciousness and Saul's experiences certain limited parallels may be traced. He suffered inner conflicts which rent his personality into warring factions. In this conflict the beginning of a subconscious mass may be seen. Then, too, the battle was carried on between his instincts and his personal ideals of right embodied in the Law. Here again obvious resemblances to certain types of conflicts ending in repression may be noted. But with these meager similarities the parallelism abruptly ends, not to be resumed again.

For St. Paul speaks of no repression. On the contrary, he depicts with full detail his inner life which must have been very vivid at the time, and which remained clear in his memory the rest of his life. Nowhere does he hint that the conflict itself was assuaged, or that any of its factors disappeared from view, before his conversion. Consequently, none of the members in opposition within him were forced down and out of sight in a subliminal realm, there to incubate and later to irrupt in new forms.

Much less is there any indication of subconscious factors struggling unknown within him. Very oppositely, the “sinful passions” in the “flesh” rose openly under his inner eye, and carried on their rebellion immediately in sight of his

<sup>14</sup> *Time and Free Will*, 1912, p. 169; *Matter and Memory*, 1911, p. 188.

self-consciousness; and he describes the battle with the minuteness of the Jewish maiden telling the bedridden Ivanhoe how the castle siege was going.

Contrary to some theories, conflicts do not always end in repression, nor in subconscious continuation of the stresses generated in consciousness. Sometimes the opposition between ideals and desires continues in men throughout their lifetime, and the unfortunate one is never united into an efficient whole. McDougall gives an interesting account of the terrible struggle undergone by a young minister on account of his cowardice in the late war. Being a conscientious citizen, he early enlisted in the medical corps, where he was made a stretcher-bearer. At the front when under fire he suffered uncontrollable attacks of terror that drove him to the nearest cover. In every way, by every means, in prayer and self-condemnation, he agonized to overcome his fear, but to no avail. Finally, almost a nervous wreck, he was sent to the hospital; but the conflict still continued "in the open, on the full plane of consciousness."<sup>15</sup>

Another device applied at times to explain conduct by the subconscious is called "rationalization." It is the process by which a man surrounds himself with illusions, and that, as the term implies, by the use of his reason in the service of his desires. In adolescence, for example, youth becomes highly inflamed with visions of his own intrinsic greatness. But time and experience woefully diminish his actual accomplishments. To console himself for the sore disappointment of his hurt vanity, the disillusioned man begins to erect fanciful situations, imaginary worlds and unreal states in which he is all that his youthful imagination pictured himself to be. These shams, no matter how plausible they may seem, are in reality nothing but the cover designs of the cunning self-assertive instinct.

This theory has been applied to the origin of all religion, and it suggests a possible explanation of Saul's conversion. Because he was somewhere and sometime disappointed in

<sup>15</sup> *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, 1926, pp. 217ff.

his fundamental desire (was it for the Jewish high-priest's daughter's hand?) he felt the sting of utter failure, and so to soothe the smart of his hurt soul his subconscious mind suggested to him the vision of Christianity in which he saw himself its chief exponent, its founder and the spiritual conqueror of the world. Those who know the character of the great Apostle will recognize this as slander. All others, however, should at least be cautious about accepting a theory so universal when it can be based upon only a comparatively few known cases of self-deception, or secret motives of aggrandizement.

But such a theory cannot apply to Saul, who was already on the road to renown among his own people, already one of God's elect, proudly conscious of his eternal heritage in far-flung and momentarily looming promises (Rom. ix. 4, 5, iii. 1). Far from being humbled and disappointed, he was singularly proud of his station and achievements, and sure of his future participations in the special blessing prepared for his sect, the Pharisees (Rom. xi. 1-6; Phil. iii. 3-7). Added to all his racial and religious glories were his Roman citizenship and his Grecian culture. What need had such a man to fabricate delusions of grandeur about a despised and insignificant group who followed a crucified carpenter of Galilee—a fabrication that would cost him all his wealth, his family, his Jewish standing, his future prospects, and gain him the poignant condemnation of his friends?

The various theories of subconscious, both the rudimentary and vestigial types, fail in general and in particular to explain Saul's conversion. The particular failures have been pointed out above. Besides these specific failures to account for the young Hebrew's particular conversion, the theory suffers some very weighty general defects. They may be summarized in the criticism that the subconscious hypotheses undertake to account for the fairly familiar by the less familiar. They do this first, by assigning the origin of the matter to be explained to a multitude of excessively small germs, or parts, or spores; secondly, they



entirely conceal from view the necessary processes of germination and development in a hypothetical, subterranean region; thirdly, they finally attribute the changes wrought in the convert's character to demons, or some other personal agents.

No fallacy besets scientific explanation with more tenacity and perversity than the very common act of cutting up what is to be explained into parts so fine that they cannot be perceived, and then tacitly assuming that each part so small as that can come into existence without effort and without explanation. The favorite device of "concealed motions," of molecules, atoms, electrons, etc., all of which are so microscopically small that they require no explanation, is as old as Democritus. In the subconscious theories it appears in the beginnings of the ideals incubated in the subliminal realm. What are these spores of subconsciousness, these "nascent" sensations, these atoms of the mind? <sup>16</sup> Are they matter or spirit? Whence come they? If they are real, they require as elaborate an explanation of their origin as does the solar system.

Concealing them underground does not help the matter. Are germinal processes of a plant rendered any more describable and explicable because they take place underground? Do they explain, in the sense of making more familiar, the arrival of the infant plant above ground? When a conjurer does his trickery behind a screen, is his jugglery thereby exposed? What occurs in consciousness, in our minds, may be with some difficulty observed, described, and perhaps explained. But when this whole process is elucidated by plunging its antecedents into the gloom of oblivion, or else explained by merely duplicating its machinery and processes, the mind is left as blank as it was before.

The necessity of attributing conversion to the free-will of

<sup>16</sup> For criticism of mind-stuff theories, see James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, Vol. I, Chap. VI; James Ward, *Realm of Ends*, 1911.

the agent affected, though such an eventuality was supposed to be precluded by the onslaught of subliminally developing and uprushing ideals, might be foreseen from the nature of the subconscious mind. For that entity must itself take on more or less fully the attributes of personality. Though its beginning is traceable to physical stimuli, these stimulations are like those giving us our ordinary perceptions. From these given, "nascent," half-made spores of perceptions, ideas, ideals, visions, emotions and all the other paraphernalia of a full-fledged consciousness are supposed to be manufactured in the dark unknown. But if the usual type of consciousness-making, of which we are aware, requires, as it does, a self-conscious being, a self, or "I," why then does not this subconscious manufacture of the same materials require such an overseer and director of its operations? The subconscious mind performs all and, according to some authors, many more exploits than those performed by the conscious mind.

Such activities cannot be performed by blind, mechanical forces. Consequently, subconsciousness speedily acquires the attributes of personality and becomes a sub-conscious mind, standing forth arrayed in all the vestments and endowed with all the rights and privileges of a person. Are such beings good or bad?

Professor James, who attributed conversion to subconsciously working powers, also showed that some conversions are good, some bad, some religious, some anti-religious; some men change into misers, some into atheists. To explain such varied effects, one kind of agent is not enough. Good and bad demons must be assumed to exist. When evil thoughts arise, when sinful passions deluge the soul and the struggle grows fierce and fiery, how easy it is to allege that angels and demons are battling for the soul of the tormented one? To such assumptions subconscious theories give aid and comfort. For they open an unguarded passage into the keep of the soul's citadel and nobody can predict what spirits may enter into a soul not protected by

the will.<sup>17</sup> James says the incoming power "is felt to be 'higher'; . . . but it is primarily the higher faculties of our own hidden mind which are controlling"—a statement that leaves the question still unsettled.<sup>18</sup>

The unknowability of the subconscious mind is notorious. Its nature, structure, origin and function are all matters of mere speculation. Consequently, as James remarked, it readily becomes a "tumbling-ground for whimsies," enabling anyone to say what he pleases about the mental life of man and then "explain" it by the subconscious. The effect is ruinous to ordered and logical thought, and to respect for facts, and disastrous to science. For the trend is straight toward demonology. These hypothecated denizens of a dark underworld are forced to take upon themselves powers and attributes sufficient to explain the functions they are fancied to perform. Good and bad demons are the result, as we noted above.

If the dealer in this kind of black magic must assume the existence of two kinds of demons—good and bad—he will be lucky to escape the corrupting contagion of a whole legion of subsidiary spirits—a condition common enough to primitive animism, and one not yet wholly shaken off by modern religions and some forms of philosophy, especially those that fall into the hands of popularizers of esoteric doctrines. But such a contagion, if not watched, may also spread to the most determined materialists, who explain our known world and all its phenomena by invisible particles endowed with imaginary qualities. To such a sorry end has come this theory of the subconscious, originally framed by philosophic thinkers to account for the miracle of creative thinking and now fallen into near-demonology.

<sup>17</sup> E. S. Ames, *Psychology of Religious Experience*, 1910, p. 295, makes the subconscious the breeding-ground of saints and sinners alike.

<sup>18</sup> *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 513.

## CHAPTER IX

### CONVERSION EXPLAINED BY MULTIPLE PERSONALITIES

IN the first section of this volume we endeavored to show that Saul of Tarsus found himself a disintegrated personality, a divided self, and the state gave him much dissatisfaction and inward pain from which he was rescued by conversion. Conversion, therefore, may be described in terms of personal consciousness. But such a description involves more than that which lies on the surface open to the inner eye. Personality includes more than consciousness and behavior. In the consciousness and the behavior of a normal person abides a coherence, unity, purposiveness which cannot be accounted for by the mere mass or crowd of mental and physical elements going to make up mind and body.

In former times this unity was sufficiently accounted for by the assumption of a simple, spiritual substance which held the otherwise scattered and discrete mental elements together moment by moment, and which furnished the thread of continuity, or personal identity, which strung together these experiences in time like beads in a necklace.

"A person is an individual substance of rational nature."<sup>1</sup> Like all definitions this venerable statement of human essence was designed for a purpose. In this case it served

<sup>1</sup> Boethius, 6th century A.D.; Th. Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, p. 318; and Jos. Butler, *Analogies*, 1736, emphasize the simplicity and identity of a person. The word is from the Greek stage, and denotes a character sounded through the mask. W. H. G. Thomas, *Holy Spirit of God*, 1913, gives many references and definitions. See also *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Personality," by J. E. McTaggart.

the purposes of morality and religion. It gave, first, the basis for moral responsibility, according to which the individual was held eternally responsible for his deeds. A youth might commit a crime which was not detected until he was a mature man. Should he be punished? Certainly. Why? Because the essence of the man, his real personality, is the same as when he committed the crime. Secondly, it also furnished a similar basis for rewards and punishments in the next world for deeds done in the body. Finally, it gave basis for the hope of a hereafter by furnishing a permanent, simple, spiritual substance that must endure because, being simple, it had no parts into which it could separate and so be destroyed by decomposition into its elements. This essence of personality was called the Soul or Spirit.

This conception of personality has furnished the basis for certain theological theories of conversion. The religious changes witnessed in the converts have been explained by the actual creation of new persons. St. Paul's references to the "old man" and the "new man" (Rom. vi. 4, vii. 6, xii. 2; Gal. ii. 20; II Cor. v. 17), and St. John's statements about the "new birth" (Jno. iii. 3, 5), have been brought forward to support these doctrines. Into these theological discussions it is not the duty of the psychologist to go.

His concern lies with certain modern theories which seek to explain conversion in terms of multiple personalities defined in quite another set of terms very closely allied at their inner edges with subconscious theories. While at their uttermost extremes, multiple personalities and subconsciousness are different, yet they tend to approach and merge. The subconscious, at its most definitely defined stage of co-consciousness, appears as a secondary self coexisting in the body with the primary self. A further step in development transforms this halfway entity into an independently functioning psychic organism, exercising all the rights and privileges of a real person, separated from the primary self by a loss of memory of that being and all his works.

Modern studies of such disintegrated personalities have

led to a new conception of normal personality.<sup>2</sup> It is no longer defined simply in one term of spiritual substance. In its highest known development in the human being, personality is a unity of unities, consisting patently of a body and a mind or consciousness, and of an invisible Soul, or Spirit, which unites and holds together this combination of almost infinite complexity in a working whole. The first two members of this trinity are clearly evident, one, the body, to the senses; the other, consciousness, to the inner eye. Their coördination in rational action, or purposive behavior, is also a matter of observation. That mind and body work together seems to be evident. That which unites and directs their coherent action is said to be the Soul, or Spirit, which like the land under the sea joins the islands of an archipelago; or, like the Energy behind electricity, magnetism and light, animates the functions of these three phenomena which are so alike that they can be transformed one into the other.

The other two chief components of personality—the mind and body—are themselves functioning wholes made up of many organs. The body is obviously an organization of many physical members. In the total triad it is probably best considered to be the mechanical instrument through which the person expresses himself, and as such requires no special consideration at this point.

The mind is less obviously, but no less really, an organization of processes—intellectual, emotional and volitional—all phases of the central effort made by the person's constant striving for self-betterment which presents itself concretely in goal after goal in life.

These processes are gathered around a nucleus, or a relatively permanent activity, riding in the midst of changing consciousness like a whirlpool in a river current, or a cyclone in an onmoving storm. The first recognition of this self, that unique moment in each person's development when he disengages himself from the impersonal relations in which

<sup>2</sup> C. H. Judd, *Psychology*, 1910, Chap. XII.

he has heretofore lived as a mere social unit, and recognizes himself to be a person, marks the entrance of the child into self-conscious selfhood and definitely launches him upon that striving for self-satisfaction which makes the man.

Naturally this "I" is the most interesting member of all the occupants of consciousness. It is always there. It associates itself constantly and intimately with all the other members of consciousness which come and go, arriving and departing like transient guests of this host who remains forever. This self seems, too, to be the supervisor, the executor, the critic of all that goes on. Yet, as Professor James<sup>\*</sup> noted, when we turn around and try to catch that self in the act of overseeing, it eludes us. The effort to detect it seems something like the attempt to stand behind ourselves and see the space between our shoulder blades. Somehow that uncharted area seems to be the home of this elusive self. It seems to peer over our shoulder. Yet the psychologist tells us that it is really only the mass of feelings coming into consciousness from our bodily organs. As such it may change its character, and so change the self.

The discovery of the fact that a human personality is not only a complex organization, but that it also has its distinct moment of inception in life, and develops into more and more stable and solid integration, leads very naturally to the possibility that it can also be disintegrated and broken up into a number of lesser or coördinated wholes. Not only is this a possibility, but about a century of observation has demonstrated beyond a doubt that unhappy mortals are subject to such division of themselves into secondary and multiple personalities. Such occurrences have been readily seized upon and have been used with brilliant effect to explain at least some phases of conversion.<sup>4</sup> The explanations thus offered ally themselves with the pathological, and

<sup>\*</sup> *Principles of Psychology*, 1890; Chap. X, pp. 291ff.

<sup>4</sup> This was the central thought of William James' brilliant *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1903.

conversion consists in the cure of such sadly divided individuals, sometimes by treatments given in a clinic and without the necessary intervention of any divine powers whatever.

Just as in medicine many discoveries concerning the healthy body have been made through observation of the sick, so in the modern studies of human personality many new conceptions have been revealed by a study of sick souls. This study has concerned itself chiefly with secondary, double, alternating and multiple personalities, a department of psychology so fascinating that its story reads more like the romances of another world than like sober scientific data. But the investigations, covering over a century of time, are so many, and carried on by men of such undoubted skill and training, that the results cannot be called into serious question. A few illustrations of alternating personalities is all we can offer in this limited space. They are chosen to illustrate the various classes of alterations in that essential of the human being which seems to constitute his very being.

In one sense of the word, double personalities are common to all of us. We all are familiar with the experience of a divided mind, a balanced judgment, a conflict between duty and pleasure, and of arguing backward and forward as if two people were debating inside of us. The division is often carried forward in dreams wherein other imaginary people oppose us, battle with us, and sometimes, as Dr. Samuel Johnson reported of himself, not only debate with us but win the debate—though it is a personal consolation to remember that we really won, for we debated both sides. A still further step is taken in cases like the philosopher who dreamed he was lecturing, then remembered in his dream that he had gone to bed and that this must be all unreal. But when he announced that fact to his apparitional audience, they protested so violently that they waked him from his slumbers, and so were annihilated! Certain diseases bring even more violent experiences of the same



sort. But all of these are but partial and temporary doublings of self, and disappear as soon as the waking, or a healthy state, is regained.

Besides these experiences other fissures of self go deeper and remain obstinately present even under the most prolonged treatments. Three varieties of doubling and multiplying mark as many stages from the unified personality to a total division of the whole person into two or more distinct persons. The first comes with a sudden and marked change in the coenaesthesia, or general bodily feelings called the empirical self, or "I." The second arrives with the presence of a co-conscious but secondary self who can express himself only partially through the body, and at opportune times, unknown by and to the primary self. The third variety represents the complete doubling of the personality, its breaking up into two or more persons, each unknown possibly to the others, and with complete breaks of memory between certain ones of the group. The perfectly divided self is therefore marked by amnesia, or total forgetfulness of the other self and all he does, thinks or feels.

An example of a change in personality wrought by some sudden transformation in the organic sensations of the subject is quoted by Thomas Ribot as following: "A soldier believed himself dead since the battle of Austerlitz, at which he had been severely wounded. When asked about his condition he would answer: 'You wish to know how fares old Lambert? He is no more; he was carried off by a cannonball. What you see here is not himself, but only a wretched machine that has been made like him.'"<sup>5</sup> With some changes in the wording, this testimony might well come from the lips of those who have experienced "conversions" and "rebirths" of the religious kind common in revivals. The impression of newness in the self is in all probability coördinated with some sudden and deep change in the visceral organs or their functioning, following which the mass of organic feeling denominated the "I," together possibly with

<sup>5</sup> *Diseases of Personality*, 1891, pp. 34ff.

the temperament of the sufferer, is transformed into something so new that the person experiencing it calls himself a new man. This is the simplest case of a changed personality.

The next step toward a complete disruption of the unitary self occurs when the patient writes out short or long discourses with his own hand which seems to be guided by some other being independent of himself. James<sup>\*</sup> gives a most interesting account of a very intelligent journalist and member of Congress who practiced such writing for years, and who—or his co-conscious self—produced large amounts of scientific, philosophic, moral and religious literature, some of it written in hieroglyphic characters impossible to imitate with a free hand. When the work is in progress the chief personality is “in a normal condition, and seemingly two minds, intelligences, persons, are engaged,” one doing the writing, the other looking on surprised at what comes from the hand of his own body. “It is not myself,” he says, though he does think it is some genuine personality which does the writing. This astonishing situation has been studied in many other cases and marks the second stage in that division of the human personality which may, if carried further, end in complete doubling of the self.

The cases in which amnesia, or forgetfulness, utterly dissociates the two selves, who at the same time may present wide divergencies in traits of character, are all alike in that the thread of self-identity snaps, but very different in the way they end. Lurancy Vennum, the “Watseka Wonder,” a girl of fourteen, seemed to be suddenly changed into Mary Roff (a neighbor’s girl who had died in an insane asylum twelve years before) and went to live with Mary’s family, there recognizing scores of things known to the dead girl long before Lurancy was born. Lurancy did not remember anything connected with herself, her own family, or her

<sup>\*</sup> *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, Chap. X, pp. 394ff. Other instances and references are also given.

own past life. Later she recovered, went back home, and settled down to her normal life.<sup>7</sup>

Mary Reynolds,<sup>8</sup> in 1811, in Pennsylvania, changed into a secondary self who lost all memory of her former life, and her character changed with her amnesia. After alternating fifteen years between the two persons, she finally settled down in the new, or secondary self, became a rational, industrious, cheerful woman, a school-teacher, and died in 1854, at the age of sixty-one years. In her case the original self seemed to pass out of existence entirely.

The famous case of Rev. Thomas C. Hanna,<sup>9</sup> who fell from a buggy, lost all memory of his former self, built up a new character which for several months alternated with his old self, and then united with that self to form a new personality, presents still a third type of happy ending to a disunited life. The well-known case of Dr. Morton Prince's Miss B.<sup>10</sup> gives us perhaps a fourth type, in that the four or five persons, including the unhappy "Sally," were merged into the former personality, the real Miss B., and Sally was "squeezed" out of existence in this new formation. These four types of multiple personalities, all alike in their loss of memory, are quite different in their outcome. Why they thus ended differently is not known. Those that were treated by skilled physicians yielded to suggestion, usually given during the hypnosis of the patient, though the Rev. Mr. Hanna himself willed to unite the two personalities which he was and was not, an act that leads to the perplexing question about the third self who did the uniting.

Our diagnosis or character analysis, given about in this volume, Chapter II, which stressed Saul's melancholy temperament correlated possibly with his peculiar organic

<sup>7</sup> James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, Vol. I, Chap. X, pp. 396ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 381ff.

<sup>9</sup> Boris Sidis and Simon P. Goodhart, *Multiple Personality*, 1905, Part II.

<sup>10</sup> Morton Prince, *Dissociation of a Personality*.

constitution, or hepatic torpidity, at this point lends support to that other kind of changing personality arising with sudden changes of the organic functions. Of such a transformation James says: "If a man wakes up some fine day," . . . changed so that he recalls the facts of his past life in a cold abstract way as things he is sure once happened; or if, without the loss of memory, his bodily and spiritual habits all change during the night, each organ giving a different tone, and the act of thought becoming aware of itself in a different way, he *feels* and he *says* that he is a different person. He disowns his former me, gives himself a new name, identifies his present life with nothing from out of the older time."<sup>11</sup> Allowing for some overemphasis, this description fits St. Paul's case with ready similarity. Is it possible, or probable, that his conversion can be accounted for adequately in terms of organic changes in physiological functions?

Manifestly not. The vision still remains to be explained. Moreover, any sudden modification of his anatomical organs could affect nothing more than his coenaesthesia, or temperament, and not work a radical transformation in his thought and behavior. No hint of any such change is given; his heart, the New Testament seat of the personality, beat as ever; his liver, the ancient seat of melancholy, and his reins, possibly closely associated in his time with sympathy, seemed to function as always. Further, there is no foundation for thinking that he was entirely liberated from the burdens of his temperament by his conversion. He still worries, is often depressed, weighed down, burdened, suffering, though always he has the consolation, the comfort and the hope in Christ which he lacked before. His natural inclination to depression remains; Christ lifts him up out of it. Reform in his character did not depend upon the reform of his visceral functions.

St. Paul's conversion, instead of offering support to the doctrine that a changed organic functioning conditions a

<sup>11</sup> *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 336.

changed personality, argues for the opposite. For his change in character can be traced directly to his message from the skies, an intellectual process involving understanding. The meaning of that message wrought a wondrous change in the man's spiritual condition. But it did not, by any means, work a parallel improvement in his physical being. He still suffers the "thorn in the flesh," sometimes falls ill, comes nigh unto death, and goes through fits of despondency. His body still drags him down.

Finding no sufficient similarities in the structure of St. Paul's total change and those unusual transformations in personality due to sudden organic changes and to doublings of self by amnesia, we now ask if the great Apostle's travails can be likened to that form of secondary personality known as co-consciousness. Such a state is often exhibited in automatic writing, as we showed above. The person sees his hand writing out connected, coherent and rational statements about life and its various phases which he himself feels he never knew. These thoughts come to him as revelations from some source outside himself. It is quite conceivable that under other circumstances, similar revelations might come in the form of visions and voices. Such enlightenments we will consider in the next chapter. Just now our quest concerns more closely the unification of St. Paul into a single, self-conscious, organized personality.

Now, if he was subject to that particular kind of secondary-personality state known as co-consciousness, and the proof of the existence of that state was found in the automatic communications he received, then his conversion did not cure that condition. For throughout his later life, after his Damascus experience, he continued to receive what he believed to be special messages directly from God. The Lord commanded him to leave Jerusalem (Acts xxii. 17-21). A man of Macedonia besought him to come over into Europe (Acts xvi. 9) in a nighttime vision. Again, a vision consoled and encouraged him at Corinth (Acts xviii. 9, 10). An angel of the Lord strengthened him during his ship-

wreck with promises that came true (Acts xxvii. 23, 24, 25). These are few, probably, out of many similar instances (II Cor. xii. 1). Apparently such revelations were spread over much of the Apostle's life, and certainly did not disappear after his conversion. That event, therefore, did not resemble the modern doubling of personalities in the important fact that it did not eliminate this secondary self—if there were such a self in St. Paul's case—and in the further most significant and vital respect that the communications given him were not only coherent and rational, in some instances at least, but they guided his conduct into socially worthy and historically revolutionizing undertakings, in addition to sustaining his energy, his courage and his endeavors.

The possibility of explaining Saul's vision by a new variety of secondary personalities is interesting. Quite recently Dr. Morton Prince has studied some very suggestive instances in which the hand of a person unconsciously draws pictures of scenes which the primary personality at the same moment sees as mental images, somewhat analogous to the *Pickwick Papers*, in which an artist draws the pictures and a Dickens writes stories around them. In Morton's case the two personalities use the same body. To the primary personality the pictures appear as hallucinations. He saw them as if they really existed, though they were only in the mind of the secondary self. Some of the patients thus observed were well-marked double personalities; some were not so well marked.

McDougall, commenting upon the matter, thinks the facts may be accepted as illustrative of the way in which constructive or creative hallucinations arise, though it need not be invoked to explain simple, reproductive apparitions of past scenes. They therefore support the theory that apparitions of the Pauline type arise from within the person himself. But to give them being, a new person, or

<sup>12</sup> *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, Chap. XXI, discusses *The Unconscious*, by Morton Prince.

secondary self, must be brought into play, though how this is done remains a mystery; so much so that, to explain the origin of comparatively simple hallucinations, a marvelous creation like a personality must be invoked.

The facts seem really to indicate that two persons, both using the same body, may by unknown means communicate directly with each other, interchanging messages which appear in one mind as visions. The nature, genesis and function of human personality, single or double, is not thus illuminated, and the origin of hallucinations only traced from one mind to another, between which it is carried by telepathy. The discovery of this type of double personality and the intercommunion apparently possible between the two does not aid in explaining how visions arise, though the evidence does seem to give some aid to the general theory of telepathy, or the transference of pictures from one mind to another without the employment of material media.

With this survey of secondary personalities in mind, can we apply any of the various types to the explanation of Paul's conversion? The first step in that endeavor—in harmony with explanation defined as identifying the less familiar with the familiar—consists in showing that he himself was a divided personality in the same sense that we have used the word above. Was his experience like that of any of the unfortunates who have suffered a disunion and multiplication of themselves?

His cry, "I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me" (Gal. ii. 20), taken together with his picture of himself presented in Romans vii and his doctrine of the "old man" and the "new man," lends some color to the supposition that his conversion was the reuniting of a divided personality in the same sense that we have studied it immediately above. But such resemblance is merely superficial. First, because there is not a sign that he suffered amnesia, or forgetfulness of himself. His life was not divided into two halves,

one coming before and the other after his conversion, totally divorced from each other in his memory.

Throughout his whole life winds the sure, unbroken thread of self-conscious identity. Trances he may have fallen into; voices he heard; in tongues not understandable even to himself, he may have voiced his rhapsodies; departures from the body and visits to the ~~highest~~ heavens he may have made; but in all these indescribable experiences not once is it recorded that he suffered any lapse of consciousness after which he could not recall heightened states of intellect and feeling which were his very own. Added to these mystical explorations, he suffered hardships of labor and pain that would have broken a more loosely knit self into fragments; but throughout all these, as steady as the needle to the polestar, his earlier and later devotion to God rationalized all his acts and words, and gave unity and continuity to all his life and its experiences, whether natural or supernatural, in the body or out, on earth or in heaven.

But, after indicating certain structural resemblances between a certain type of so-called secondary personality and St. Paul's life-long experience with visions and revelations, how far have we traveled toward a scientific and naturalistic explanation of his conversion? Not one step. For no one has yet summoned the audacity to explain such phenomena by mechanistic and physical causes. In fact, they stand to-day as immense bulwarks supporting spiritual theories of human consciousness and conduct. The invoking of secondary personalities, then, interposes an insurmountable obstacle between conversions and physical events alleged as causes of them.

But, does not the admission of a possible secondary self as the source of St. Paul's visions and his consequent conversion explain that unique event naturalistically? This relation of the natural and the divine we will take up further in the next chapter; here we pause only long enough to point out that by explaining a mystery already difficult



by secondary or double personalities merely interposes other and more impenetrable mysteries between the event and the explanation offered.

For the normal development of the ordinary personality is one of the most complex and baffling problems science has ever attempted to elucidate. That children do develop into adult persons is undeniable. How they so develop remains an impenetrable realm of darkness except in its most superficial and salient features. The development is an example of God's regular and normal work in the world. Now, to attempt to explain the arrival of one unified personality by positing the existence of two or more dissociated and disjointed selves, simply piles Pelion on Ossa, adds mystery to mystery, explains bricks by electrons, clocks by "principles of horology," locomotives by placing horses inside the boilers.

Not only is the theory insufficient for the task imposed upon it, but brings with it a train of insuperable difficulties for Christian theology, which has treated conversion as a literal destruction of the "old man" and a literal creation of a "new man." Many authorities call St. Paul and St. John as witnesses for this doctrine.

For, suppose that an infant has been duly regenerated by baptism, or that an adult has been duly converted by the Gospel, and each has received a new personality, but that later they become victims of that nervous instability which manifests itself in double personalities—do these two Christians require renewed baptism or rebirths? And if they should happen to break into several persons, as sometimes occurs, would a rebirth be necessary for each of such persons? And if these several persons alternate in possession of the body, would the body be compelled to undergo a series of baptisms? And, to make the matter more complicated, suppose as it has happened with more than one case, that the double or multiple personalities were finally reunited into the original person—then what?

Or, in the case of Dr. Morton Prince's "Sally," who seemed to be a distinct person but submerged in Miss B., how could her soul be saved by rebirth?

For any ethical religion, equally embarrassing moral questions might be raised. For we have always accepted it as a moral axiom that the person who commits the crime, and he only, should be held responsible for it. How then could we treat a poor physical body that was the domicile of a number of persons each succeeding the other at indefinite intervals? Who is to judge which person inhabited the body at the time of the moral delinquency? For society, which cares not for real morality and concerns itself only with social and antisocial conduct, such questions, of course, do not arise. But for religion, with a belief in essential morality, and with means and methods of passing moral judgments upon delinquents and awarding deserts here and hereafter, the new theory of multiple personalities might compel some modification of older theological and ethical views of individual moral responsibility.

Our conclusion, then, is that double personalities, in any form known to science, as metaphysical devices fail to explain Saul's conversions. First, no such explanation is demanded by the facts. Secondly, the explanation is far too clumsily mysterious itself. It merely confounds a situation already confused enough; merely adds mystery to mystery and piles wonder on the pyramidal tip of wonder. Thirdly, the nature of double personalities makes it impossible to fit Saul's experience into the frame of any such picture. There are not enough elements of similarity to make secondary personalities a genus of which his experience is a species. Fourthly, the explanation required should observe more closely the rules of science and be economic with entities like personality. Lastly, though we have not particularly referred to it in this connection, many of the explanations offered involve the problem of the relation of the mind and the body, a relation upon which

science has not yet made any final pronouncement. Any explanation that assumes this relation to be of a certain kind is open to attack and refutation.

To summarize the results of our examination of metaphysical explanations for conversion effected by using the concepts of secondary personalities and the subconscious, we may offer the following suggestions: (1) No such concepts of entities or processes lying beyond the possibility of direct observation can be called, in a strict sense, scientific explanations. (2) They are and must be explanations frankly offered by our speculative faculties, and therefore mean little more than individual and personal choices of words empty of content. (3) The best that can be said of them is that they plunge the problem to be solved into the blackness of darkness, and then make affirmations which cannot be refuted because they cannot be proven. (4) The subconscious as a posterngate through which some miraculous power may squeeze its way into the known world degenerates into the subconscious as a subcellar full of indescribable demons. (5) The secondary personality is too little or too much: too little if it is merely a subconscious something; too much if it is really a new personality which presents all over again all the problems of conversion, salvation, regeneration, etc., which it was brought into being to solve. (6) The use of such inconceivable contradictions and indescribable and uncontrollable entities to explain conversion gives no practical aid whatsoever to the religious worker endeavoring to bring men and women into newness of moral and religious life.

## CHAPTER X

### SPIRITUAL EXPLANATIONS

IN the previous chapters of this section our endeavors to explain St. Paul's conversion naturalistically have led us to examine the applicability to this problem of the scientific method, which uses only material causes and effects; and of psycho-physical correlations, which use centrally excited visions or hallucinations, and subconsciousness and multiple personalities. For various reasons none of these methods yielded satisfactory results. They either fail completely to explain what they undertake to make clear, or else they succeed only by elaborating machinery more cumbersome and complex than the facts to be explained. All of them reverse the true method of explanation by involving antecedents more unfamiliar than the condition they undertake to elucidate.

For these reasons we will now go back to the first section of this volume and recall that there we described St. Paul's conversion in terms of sentiments, all unified in a master sentiment, organized with its emotions and volitions around the idea of the All-father. The sentiment being mental, or spiritual, we will now turn to spiritual explanations for the arrival and organization of such a sentiment in the man's consciousness. Such an explanation will necessitate a study of both God's and the man's functions in the episode, and the mental means wherewith the new condition was brought about.

The first consideration must be given to the intellectual section of the sentiment. From that the other components—emotional and volitional—naturally follow. The specific question that demands first attention is this: Whence came Saul's new ideas? Some clearly came to him from

other people by natural communication. But the sublime vision of a new religion, the sole, solitary religion satisfying the needs of men eternally and the world over—whence came that revolutionary idea? From within him or without? Which?

The natural modes of securing ideas may be classified as: (1) psycho-physical, or by the agitation of brain cells excited by stimulations either (a) outside the body, or (b) inside the brain, illustrated by spoken words and dreams; (2) psychical, or through associations of ideas by (a) contiguity, whereby ideas that have been fellow occupants of the same consciousness before tend to come back together; (b) by similarity, or reasoning through identity in logic, or equivalency in mathematics; and (c) by suggestion, used both in a nontechnical sense of receiving ideas without a clear comprehension of the means, and in a technical sense, of securing belief for propositions upon evidence logically inadequate, as in normal, daily intercourse, and in hypnotic suggestion and in thought transference. These various classes seem to cover all the ways by which new ideas arise in mind. At a glance it can be seen that quite probably some of St. Paul's doctrines arose in one of these ways.

In general, they either came to him from outside himself or else rose within his own consciousness, and cannot safely be traced beyond that. One of these new thoughts—Jesus is the Christ—undoubtedly came by the perfectly ordinary way of hearing it publicly proclaimed, though belief in that statement came later and only upon what Saul accepted as the testimony of God. Another idea—Jesus is the son of God—probably came from the tradition then extant among the Jews, and held, in all probability, by Saul himself. Finally, we come to the third and supreme idea: Christ's is the sole and universal religion of mankind. This was a new proposition so startling and so vast, so utterly beyond the imagination of other men, so completely different from Saul's previous conceptions, that it stands by

itself and demands special consideration. Did it come from Saul's own consciousness? If so, how?

For light upon its origin, we turn quite naturally to those laws of association mentioned just above. For, in spite of appearances to the contrary, ideas do come and go with more or less fidelity to a certain order. This order is not for a moment to be identified with physical uniformity. Ideas are not the products of mechanics; they require no material carriers; they are not the consequences of motions; one idea does not collide with another literally and move the other by its impact, itself coming to a standstill in the mind of the thinker until he can compare it with what results. Yet a fundamental tendency can be noted by introspection in the apparently haphazard comings and goings of phases of thinking, feeling and willing.

Our primary disposition always tends to recall events just as we observed them in the past, for that is easier and simpler than rearranging them. Therefore, whenever we think without a goal in view, or contiguously, we merely permit past events to pass in review in the order they occurred. This fundamental tendency is often obscured by other temporary influences, like frequent repetition which forms habits of thought, cuts grooves in the mind; like recency of experience which injects the thought of an event just passed into the stream; intensity which so often brings up a never-to-be-forgotten pain, perhaps; and feeling tone which brings up thoughts in harmony with our glad or sad feelings.

But such laws of association do not explain St. Paul's new idea simply because it was new to him. He did not remember it. He thought of it for the first time. But may it not have happened that he, like other men, while ruminating upon the new religion, suddenly had the idea of its truth and universality thrust upon him? Perhaps, out of some part of it, suddenly a new conception shot out from its crowd of associates and staggered him with its stupendousness?

Such a description may be true; but it is not an explanation in the sense that it is connected with any antecedent thought, nor is it an example of a law. It must be set down as an accident. Being such, it cannot belong to the natural world, which according to all accepted science proceeds by law and not by accident or coincidence. Nevertheless, the psychologist seems to be driven to just this unscientific position. "Why a single portion of the passing thought," says James, "should break out from its concert with the rest, and act, as we say, on its own hook, why the other parts should become inert, are mysteries which we can ascertain, but not explain."<sup>1</sup> Then he adds the pious hope that "a minuter insight into the laws of neural action will some day clear the matter up," but such laws have not yet appeared on the horizon of anyone's imagination. The advance of knowledge tends to deepen the mystery.

If psychology by the laws of mental association cannot explain how new ideas come to our minds, perhaps the philosophers, who have especially devoted themselves to the origin of knowledge, may aid us. Their instrument is logic, which tells us how to think constructively with a goal in mind. St. Paul, the theologian, without doubt was versed in the art of thinking by the laws of reason. Through the fourteen years of his obscurity after his conversion, could he not have reasoned to his new view?

Waiving for a moment the question of when he received his revelation of the new religion, we must answer in the negative this natural question about logic. For logical deduction, or the use of the human reason alone, never gives any new knowledge.<sup>2</sup> It merely draws out in more detail the knowledge already contained in its premises. This disability, discovered by Kant, served decisively to dispose of the deductive method coming from Aristotle, and to substitute for it Bacon's inductive method. Logic begins

<sup>1</sup> *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, Vol. I, p. 581.

<sup>2</sup> Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1781, shows that pure reason cannot give knowledge.

with general propositions and from them draws out less general statements. It begins with a whole and proceeds to its parts on the supposition that what is true of the whole is true of its parts.<sup>3</sup>

But Christianity, as it appeared to St. Paul so suddenly, was a stupendous expansion of idea. His old ideas of God were suddenly and enormously enlarged. His Jewish faith did not extend the Love of God as a Father to all men. To a good Pharisee that extension of God's grace would have been inconceivable, traitorous to his patriotism, quite contrary to all his nature, training and hope for the future. Nothing in Saul's previous career gave promise that such a vision was being nourished within him. When it came, it appeared like a flash of lightning out of a clear sky, a root out of dried ground. Even though, later in his life, the Apostle could discern to his satisfaction strong connecting links between Judaism and Christianity, and could envisage Jesus Christ as the consummation of an age-long historical development, this fact does not explain how the steps were revealed to him by which he wove the old and the new into such a seamless fabric.

Since deduction fails to account for St. Paul's new knowledge, we will turn to induction, that method of modern science which is accredited with so many new and startling discoveries. It is so well known that it needs no detailed description. It gathers facts observed by the special senses, and from these facts so garnered it derives theories, truths and laws. The progress we have made through its help in our knowledge of the world suggests that somewhere in its minuter processes we ought to find the secret of revelation.

The conventional origin of scientific truth is assigned to facts. But the facts in the case we are now considering were the signs and wonders. Instead of their revealing

<sup>3</sup> W. Stanley Jevons, *Principles of Science*, 13th ed., 1913, asserts that induction is deduction in disguise, and that it can give no new knowledge with certainty.



the origin of truth to us, they themselves furnish mysteries difficult of explanation. If we grant that St. Paul received his information from the facts presented to him—from Jesus Christ through the words he spoke—then our task is done; but naturalistic explanation is entirely and irretrievably surrendered.

But do facts give truths? If so, how? Do theories develop out of facts or in heaps of facts by some kind of fermentation? Or do the truths, or theories, come from the minds engaged in studying the facts? Since the days when David Hume showed that induction could never give certain truth, and Kant, quoted above, showed that knowledge must begin in human minds, the latter has been the accepted doctrine. All the facts in the known world, brought together and heaped up sky-high, would never of themselves make a truth or theory.

A theory or law asserts that the same or similar properties (in modern science, motions) can be found in facts of a certain class. The "discovery" that such a resemblance exists is made by the imagination working under reason. It does not arise from facts observed, nor is it read off from the face of nature. It is more true to say that man gives laws to nature than that he takes them from nature, says Pearson.<sup>4</sup> But how does the apprehension, or intuition, arise? How did Newton think of gravitation, Darwin of natural selection, St. Paul of Jesus as the Son of God? Induction fails to tell us.

Finally, it may be that St. Paul used both deduction and induction in creating his new system. Perhaps, as with certain notable scientific discoveries, the vision flashed upon him bit by bit as through many years he elaborated it, by reasoning, into the shape it finally attained. Suppose that St. Paul himself could now be interviewed and he would confess that that was the way his religion came to him.

<sup>4</sup> *Grammar of Science*, 4th ed., 1911, p. 87. See also *Encyc. Brit.*, "Induction"; F. C. S. Schiller, *Essays on Humanism*, 1907, "Freedom," p. 416.

Would that not solve all our difficulties and answer all our questions?

It would not. For, first, to cut a task up into small sections does not perform it. To divide a general truth into small parts does not explain the origin of the parts, any more than to divide the ocean into drops of water would explain its origin. In fact, such a division of ideas only renders the problem more difficult. For the more they are cut up, the harder it is to tell how they are ever put together into a theory. The cementing together of parts of knowledge into wholes is one of the most difficult problems the mind of man has ever attacked, and it is as yet unsolved.

Secondly, if St. Paul slowly thought out his system, that fact would merely make his method of securing his divine truths the same as that pursued by many thinkers. For hosts of men—seers, philosophers, dreamers, prophets and scientists—have elaborated their systems by that method. But, though the world is strewn with examples of the method, we are no nearer to the ultimate answer than before. The question simply changes its form into, How do these thinkers receive their bit-by-bit revelations?

As an illustration of the problem we might cite the epoch-making work of Immanuel Kant, both as an example of how men's minds work, and also as a hardy and enduring attempt to solve this very problem of how we get our knowledge. He was awakened, so he says, from his "dogmatic slumbers," from his perfect trust in the deductive method, by David Hume. For ten years afterwards he reasoned and reflected, and finally produced a revolutionary philosophic system in his marvelous *Critique of Pure Reason*, which was solemnly pronounced by some scholars to be a divine revelation. Yet his system has been traced back to the rationalism that he himself held in his precritical period.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> F. Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant, Life and Doctrine*, 2d ed., 1899, Part I; Part V refers to his work of 1875; see also *The Decay of Rationalism* by the present author.

Here is a case analogous to that of St. Paul's revolutionary system. But, does it remove the mysteries? Can we trace the passage of Kant's mind by smooth, unbroken continuous paths from thought to thought, idea to idea? By no means. Though he dealt valiantly with the very problem we are discussing—the origin of knowledge—yet he left scholars, if not more bewildered than ever, at least with insoluble problems on their hands. So we may conclude, without going into more discussion, that even if St. Paul arrived at his new ways of thinking about Jesus Christ by methods identical with those daily and hourly pursued by men ignorant and learned, that conclusion would by no means explain how his new ideas came into his mind. Even if they came bit by bit, the mere cutting up of big mystery into tiny particles does not solve it. Like the saint carrying his severed head a hundred steps, it is the first step that counts. Mrs. Easy's nurse could not excuse the illegitimacy of her infant by urging that it was such a little one. Thinking over a million old ideas will not necessarily give one new one. There is no evidence that St. Paul's vision of the new and revolutionary religion, its initial inception or its gradual development in thought, came from within himself.

If the new vision did not come from within St. Paul, possibly it can be traced to some other person on earth. Several remotely possible modes of communicating this idea to him by natural means present themselves. The one immediately suggesting itself—and just as quickly dismissed—is the suspicion that he received the message from someone else, Ananias perhaps (Acts ix. 17-19, xxii. 13-16).<sup>\*</sup> But this theory leaves the origin of the conception in that man's mind wholly unexplained; and besides, St. Paul is emphatic in his everlasting denial that he received his Gospel or his commission from any human sources whatsoever (Acts xxvi. 16-18; Gal. i. 11-12).

This belief of his, honest and sincere as it plainly was,

<sup>\*</sup> Paul himself never mentions Ananias.

still leaves open the possibility that, unknown to him, someone on earth suggested it to him, possibly by thought transference. But this aid seems to fail for the simple reason that nobody on earth possessed even the elementary constituents of that vision, so startling in its magnitude, so ambitious in its scope, and so assertive in its supremacy and uniqueness.

None of the first Apostles or disciples, as far as we know, indicated that they possessed even the rudiments of such a stupendous program (Acts i. 6, ii. 46, vi. 11-14, vii. 48, x. 34, 44, 47, xi. 20, xv. 5). They remained steadfast Jews, worshiped in the Temple, mingled freely with their countrymen, kept the Law, and seemed to count themselves no more than any other sect of Jews, like the Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes, Rechabites, Zealots, Baptists, and others. None of them appeared to grasp Jesus' emphasis upon the Fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man. At the time of Saul's conversion Christianity was not fully conceived, much less born. His conversion constituted the new religion. He converted it more than it converted him.

For, taking into account all the facts concerned, it seems certain that, in spite of the Master's most strenuous endeavors, his disciples saw in him nothing more than the Messiah of the Jews,<sup>7</sup> and in his mission nothing more than the meager work expressed in that aching question: "Lord, dost thou at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?" (Acts i. 6.) Stephen, the martyr, may have caught the rudiments of that vision, but nothing more. St. Peter was amazed by the thought that a proselyte to Judaism might be admitted to the new sect, and even that bit of liberalism required a vision from heaven (Acts x). If the humble disciple Ananias gave Saul the vision, the Scriptures are strangely barren of information on this marvel of a man who could make such a staggering discovery. If he obtained his revelation from God, then to make him the source of

<sup>7</sup> Acts ix. 20 seems to be the first statement in Acts that Jesus is the Son of God.

St. Paul's sudden illumination merely explains one miracle by another. How this conception of Christianity as the sole and single and universal religion of mankind was born into this earth and lodged in the mind of Saul of Tarsus furnishes a still unsolved problem in his conversion.\*

All the natural avenues by which St. Paul may have received his revelation of Christ have now been explored. It did not come from the depths of his own soul, consciously or unconsciously; nor from mortal man, either by verbal communication or by some secret mode unknown to Saul. The idea was new in the world. It came through the Apostle. Its truth has been established by its worth. Yet no scientific theory of its origin seems to be forthcoming, for science has no theory for the origin of any truth.

This defect is obscured by the practice of the special sciences which begin their operations with certain axioms and principles already assumed to be true, and seldom indeed does the special scientist examine the validity of those principles upon which his whole structure is founded, nor hardly ever does the geometer question the validity or the origin of his axioms. It seems to be sufficient for him to say that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points is self-evident.

But in any thoroughgoing philosophy or epistemology, and above all else, in religion which presumes to be all-inclusive, every depth must be plumbed, all sources of knowledge must be explored. If so-called scientific methods fail to reveal the sources of ideas, then the ultimate sources of all knowledge must be searched. If, finally, revelation alone remains as a hypothesis, it must be given due and respectful consideration. Thinkers are not wanting who have gone this far.

Dr. D. G. Brinton, the noted anthropologist, wrote in 1872: "When I say all religions depend for their origin and

\* *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Paul," Vol. 9, p. 682, on Conversion, Part 4; also Glover, *Paul of Tarsus*, pp. 42, pp. 151-155.

continuance upon inspiration, I state a historic fact. . . . All are but expressions of a belief that knowledge arises, words are uttered, or actions performed, not through conscious ideation or reflective purpose, but through promptings of a power above or beyond the individual mind."<sup>9</sup> Sir Henry Jones, writing in 1922, universalizes revelation in the following: "I am loath to admit that God reveals what is vital to some and not to others," and asserts of scientific intuition that "we cannot explain it"; for "to try to explain the new is absurd," for "explanation runs back to a previous state."<sup>10</sup> Milton claimed to be a mouthpiece of the eternal spirits, and F. Granger<sup>11</sup> affirms that the poet Black often composed "20 or 30 lines of poetry without premeditation" and even against his will, and adds Savonarola's statement, "all these scenes were formed in my mind by angelic intervention." J. R. Howard<sup>12</sup> cites Henry Ward Beecher's words, "There are times when it is not I that is talking." Henri Poincaré,<sup>13</sup> the great French mathematician, gives instances of insights, sudden, direct, involuntary, illuminating and true—into problems which before had defied the gigantic genius of his conscious reasoning. Both mathematical problems and practical inventions—Whitney's cotton gin—have been solved in sleep. So common indeed are revelations that some thinkers attribute all new knowledge to this source.

If, then, a revelation to St. Paul is our last resort after all other means have proven themselves inapplicable to this case, we must ask from whom it came? Not from matter, for matter never speaks a meaningful message to matter, causes do not communicate ideas to their effects. Not from any other human being; for no other person on earth

<sup>9</sup> *Religion of Primitive Peoples.*

<sup>10</sup> *A Faith that Enquires*, pp. 32, 73.

<sup>11</sup> *Soul of a Christian*, pp. 215-218.

<sup>12</sup> Beecher's *Patriotic Addresses*, p. 348.

<sup>13</sup> *Science and Method*, pp. 35f., quoted by B. H. Streeter, *Reality*, 1922, pp. 333-334.

knew the idea communicated. Not from Saul himself; for the idea was never before in his mind. The only tenable theory seems to be the Apostle's own assertion that it came from above, from some divine agent or agents.

Do the facts justify the assumption of many agents, perhaps demons? They do not demand the assumption of more than one agent; and "Occam's razor," or the law of parsimony, prohibits the assumption of more agencies than those required to explain the event observed. Therefore, one and only one Being, properly endowed, is required to account for this revelation.

With what attributes must that agent be endowed? Here, again, the law of parsimony demands that only powers just sufficient for the explanation of the actions observed shall be assumed. Furthermore, such attributes must have been observed to belong to beings similar to the Agent assumed. Do beings exist who can transfer ideas from one to the other? Manifestly human beings can do that. For explaining St. Paul's revelation, therefore, nothing beyond a mind like our own, different in degree but not in kind, is required. One Superhuman Mind is then necessary, and also sufficient, to explain it.

Since the existence and nature of God are known on many other grounds, the assumption of his participation in Saul's conversion seems to be the most reasonable, and at the same time, except to materialistic mechanism, thoroughly acceptable to science. It may, indeed, transcend inductive and descriptive science, but it does not deny any of their directly observed facts, their laws, or their postulates legitimately made. Moreover, since the strange event is explained by the existence and operation of a Being like ourselves with whom we are familiar, and by an operation of his will, which resembles our own, with which we are most familiar, the explanation fulfills the definition of explanation. In addition, such an explanation by the familiar offers us more guidance in our work of converting

than any other, and so possesses the greatest value, worth or truth of any. Being the simplest and most familiar, it is the best.

That God gave St. Paul his transcendent vision seems to be the conclusion to which all the facts faithfully considered lead us. But to state the matter in such general terms may give scant satisfaction to those who would know how God could do it. The answer must, of course, be based upon analogy with other known modes of giving new ideas to ready minds. If we can find suggestions in everyday communications of new knowledge that will aid us in forming in imagination some conception of the way in which God lodged his purpose in Saul's mind, we will render the assumption that he did it more credible. For the logic of immediately perceived resemblance is what creates faith in willing minds.

Now nothing is so common as the transference of ideas from mind to mind by means of signs, spoken, written and otherwise given. There are signs of many varieties. Their nature is altogether secondary to their message. Telephones, telegraphs, radios, heliographs—all these impartially convey messages of import to minds capable of receiving them. The receiver must be inspired, that is, must have devoted himself to preparation of some kind for receiving the message. The means employed to transfer the message is of secondary importance.

Besides material means for sending messages, our modern inventions of wireless telegraphy and radio emanations have made us familiar with the possibility of transmitting knowledge without the use of visible, and perhaps without the use of any material, connections whatever. Many cases are recorded which makes it possible, at the very least, to believe that mind may communicate directly with mind. The process is called by many names, thought transference being a common one; and it includes the transmission of ideas, emotions and impulses to act. The Society for



Psychical Research has accumulated many well-sifted examples of such transferences, some of them performed under laboratory conditions.<sup>14</sup>

With telepathy, or thought transference, we pass from the focal point of clear science out into a concentric circle of twilight known as psychic phenomena. This realm receives no attention from inductive, descriptive science. This neglect follows directly from its method and purpose. Science obtains its facts by observation, which telepathy transcends; science describes only the motions of material particles, while telepathy allows one mind to affect another immediately without the intervention of anything material; science, further, deals, not with unusual or exceptional events which have always been the wonder and field of religion, but with those that are uniform and universal.

The ignoring of psychic phenomena by descriptive science ought not, however, to cast any doubt on the reality of such events. Inductive science, asserting that all its knowledge must come through the senses, is naturally restricted to a comparatively small field of the world's total activities. Behaviorism, the latest development of psychology, ignores ideas, emotions and volitions; but this does not therefore annihilate or destroy them, nor discredit their value to individuals. Sense knowledge is like the machine invented to extract iron ore from sand by means of electro-magnets. The machine drew out the iron and let everything else pass through with the sand. Later on another inventor, with a gold-washing device composed essentially of velvet strips, ran the same sand through his machine and found gold but no iron. Each machine found what it was made to find. So inductive science, based on observation, finds in the world objects of sense and nothing else.

But religion, the science of the absolute or whole, moved

<sup>14</sup> *Journal of Society for Psychical Research*; *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Telepathy," by F. C. S. Schiller; James H. Leuba, *Psychical Research*.

by its urge to completeness, must consider the universe and everything in it. If thought transference aids its progress and understanding, then that aid is entirely legitimate for it to consider. No one asserts that thought transference is necessarily universal. Perhaps it does not work in every case, even between two people usually sensitive to each other's minds, nor need it succeed every time it is tried. Such deficiencies, making a theory untenable for science dealing with uniformities, may be acceptable to religion dealing with exceptions.

The explanation of St. Paul's revelation just offered may be called mystical. That obscure word applies both to (1) immediate union of the soul with God, the climax of which is ecstasy; and (2) immediate revelation of truth to man from God. The special mystical states which the Apostle enjoyed, while they involved his whole personality, were predominatingly emotional and apparently ineffable (II. Cor. xii. 1-6). So little is known of their exact nature that a psychological discussion of them seems impossible. Whenever visions came to the Evangelist, they gave him immediate revelations of God's will, accompanied at times with words of comfort which brought peace to his mind and power to his will (Acts ix, xvi. 6-10, xviii. 9-10, xxii. 17-21, xxvii. 23-24; Gal. i. 12).

Whenever these emotions did appear in his consciousness, and are later mentioned by the Apostle, he states either that they were unspeakable (II Cor. xii. 4), or else they aroused in him the usual emotions that result from his faith and experience (Acts ii. 7). How they were originated—being immediate, or without means—is of course as mysterious as telepathic communications between men (Phil. iv. 7). They consisted of both ideas and feelings, and were given to reveal God's wish for him, to stabilize his faith, to sustain him in his work and the endurance of hardships with fortitude, and they resulted for St. Paul in a sense of his perfect and unbroken union with God. If this is the essence of mysticism, then he was a mystic.

But it seems necessary to distinguish between two phases of his mysticism: the natural, which was the usual and ordinary direct and immediate revelation from God and constant union of soul with him; and the supernatural, consisting of those unusual and extraordinary experiences which St. Paul enjoyed only occasionally. The first type seems to result from conditions open to fulfillment by all Christians; the second comes only by the will of God (I Cor. xii. 1-11). Therefore, St. Paul's religion may be called both mystical and natural—mystical in the sense of immediate, natural in the sense of regular, usual, immediate relations with God. If the message given him on the Damascus Way was mediated by signs existing in their own right, then it was not mystical in the sense of being immediate; if it was immediate, it was unscientific; for scientific means mediate.

Is the explanation of Saul's vision by telepathy a supernatural one? By no means. It does not conform to the canons of inductive science; but that does not render it supernatural. It is a travesty on God's power to suggest that he must make the world to fit natural laws made by man, or that the canons of man's science can be imposed upon him. The fact is that two very far-removed definitions of "natural" are extant. One meaning given it by untechnical thinkers makes a natural event one that is usual, ordinary, "natural under the circumstances," expected from the nature of the agent. The other, coming from science, identifies nature with the external, physical world in which all events without exception come about through material causes. In this second sense, revelation from God to man is not "natural," not done through physical causes. But knowing man's nature and given God's nature, the process is quite "natural." As it does not break any physical law—the only kind known to science—it is not a miracle; but as it does not depend upon physical causation, it is a miracle.

Common usage, under the influence of modern science,

identifies "natural" and "scientific," and opposes "natural" and "supernatural." Nature is supposed to be the external material world. Man is often omitted from it,<sup>15</sup> or else reduced to a bundle of material particles; or, at most, made a spectator of passing events which impress themselves upon his mind. The picture thus imprinted upon his mind is supposed to be science. Nature is the "reality"; science is its reflection thrown on man's mind. Their correspondence is "Truth."

Such a conception of science is now rapidly disappearing. Man is now recognized as an active creator of nature defined as the whole ordered world, the cosmos, made up of man's perceptions arranged, unified and conformed to the laws of man's own mind. Man makes nature not as he builds castles in Spain, magically or capriciously, but according to his purposes under the laws imposed upon his mental constitution by his Maker. How far he can go toward "mending this sorry scheme of things entire" no one knows; Omar's wish may never be fulfilled, not because matter is stubborn, but because God has his own purposes which, to some extent, he imposes upon his coworker, man.

The new conception of nature decisively contradicts the older science in several important points. First, it denies that all knowledge comes through the senses and asserts that we can know some things beyond the reach of sense; secondly, it denies that every event is caused by physical necessity and affirms that both freedom and purpose appear in the world. A real discussion of these two opposing views would lead us too far astray from our theme. But it seems manifest that the new view of freedom and purpose in the world is consonant with common sense and simple observation, and against it science has no observed facts to urge. It takes refuge only in suppositions that *if* all the facts were known, mechanism would be revealed.

<sup>15</sup> George J. Romanes' return to orthodoxy turned on this point. See his *Candid Examination of Theism*, 1878; *Thoughts on Religion*, 1895.

The admission of purpose to nature,<sup>16</sup> excluded by science since the time of Descartes and Bacon, bears directly upon our problem, since it allows the assumption that God does work in nature and that purposefully, as the modern creative evolutionary theories have shown.<sup>17</sup> In all the organic world of life God's purposes appear.<sup>18</sup> The lowest plants known select from their environment what they need for their maintenance. Animals select more freely; and man not only selects, but imagines new aids and creates them for himself. Thus has our world again become habitable to God, a rational, loving Father who works even until now. The revolution, silent and secure, wrought in scientific thinking is enormous. Once it is shown that purpose appears in nature equally fundamental and equally observable with physical causation, special communications from God to men become not only perfectly feasible but do not disturb anything except the older scientist's imaginary world of perfect mechanism. In the real world in which we live, communications from God to man are as natural as those between men.

The new view that purpose is observable in nature touches upon the old problem of the subjectivity and objectivity of St. Paul's vision. For the new view does not make purpose solely and merely an intent in the mind, but also a result discernible in consequences of actions. Purpose so conceived is defined as the average, common result of a cyclic series. The purpose of the apple tree, for example, is seed-bearing. If the immature tree receives a mortal wound, it puts forth premature blossoms, fruit and seeds;

<sup>16</sup> The literature on this new conception of nature is voluminous. *Encyc. Brit.*, "Metaphysics"; Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, "Nature"; James, *Pragmatism*, 1907; F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism*, 1907; E. A. Singer, *Mind as Behavior*, 1924; Chap. IV.

<sup>17</sup> Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 1911; C. L. Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, 1923; L. M. Sweet, *To Christ Through Evolution*, 1925; *Encyc. Brit.*, 11th ed., "Evolution."

<sup>18</sup> N. Paul Cossmann, *Empirische Teleologie*, 1899; F. J. E. Woodbridge, *Natural Teleology*, 1911; in *Essays in Modern Theology*.

if it is wounded in maturity, it doubles the number of seeds in each apple. From seed to seed its course is run, its cycle of purpose completed. Its processes, unlike a causal series, do not march on in single file forever, pushed forward blindly by forces in the rear. It seems to strive for a goal, and in striving selects means to that end, or that average result. Purpose in this sense can be discerned throughout the vegetable and animal kingdoms. In this sense, purpose is objective.

Does Christianity yield an average common result? In all Christians, among the innumerable consequences of accepting Christ revealed in the behavior of men, is there one that is common to all and appears in average amount in each? If so, then this may be called the purpose of God in establishing Christianity in the world, and this purpose is objective. One purpose does thus appear. Wherever people accept Christianity in the Pauline sense, and Christ becomes operative in their lives, they become one with God through him, one with their fellow men and one with themselves. Unity is the common, average result appearing wherever Christianity appears as a working power in men. This, then, is the purpose of God in giving Christ to the world.

Having such a purpose, did he choose means to accomplish his end? He chose an agent, Saul of Tarsus, and offered him the commission. This man possessed within himself the common desire of mankind for unification and unity. His sentiment of rationality was probably very highly developed. In Jesus Christ he saw the means for that unity. His desire and his judgment being knit together into a rational whole, he accepted the Christ and found the oneness, the wholeness, that he longed for. Other millions of men like him found the same satisfaction of their inmost longing. The vision of Jesus Christ given to one man near Damascus thus became objectified in its results. In them the wish of God's heart, that all men should be saved, becomes visible to man.

An average result, unlike a caused effect, does not always occur when the circumstances are the same. Physical necessity produces the same result under the same circumstances one hundred percent of the time; purpose produces a common result only on the average. Cause and effect contains only two factors; purpose involves three—the agent, his means and the result. But, since the result is obtained only on the average, between the agent and his result there exists some slippage, some uncertainty, some freedom from necessity. If God were not a Person, but a mechanical Force, then all persons would inevitably be saved. As he is an Agent, asking the coöperation of subagents who use means, all people are not saved. For freedom appears between the links of the series, between agent, means and end.

What is this freedom? It is called free-will. It expresses itself, first, in man's choice of an end, or a common, average result which he aims at in all his acts; and secondly, in his choice of means and invention of new means to that end. Human freedom is demonstrated by the different life choices different men make, and by the different means they choose to attain the same end under varying circumstances.

But is there any freedom? Can men choose independently of physical antecedents? <sup>19</sup> Of physical surroundings? Of desires implanted in them? Inductive science replies in the absolute negative to all these questions. To maintain its claim to prophetic power it must insist upon necessity, and to hold by its method of sense observation it must insist upon physical necessity by material causes. But until science has furnished the world with one, single example of its ability to predict coming events of any kind *exactly* and not merely approximately, its claim to prophetic powers need to be taken only approximately. That discrepancy leaves open a chance for freedom from physical necessity.

Next, the scientific assertion that the facts, as far as

<sup>19</sup> One of the latest studies in freedom is F. C. S. Schiller's *Studies in Humanism*, 1907, Chap. XVIII.

observed, always point toward physical causation, and give ground for believing that if all the facts in every case could be observed, perfect mechanical necessity would be found everywhere, is denied by the two sets of facts observed. One set is illustrated by the pendulum. The nearer its length approaches thirty-nine inches in certain latitudes, the nearer its beat swings to seconds. This relation may be called "cause-and-effect relation." Needless to say, no pendulum ever is exactly thirty-nine inches long, or beats seconds exactly. The other set of facts is illustrated in improving the morals of people by improving their neighborhood. Up to a certain point change in one brings change in the other. But beyond a certain point, further improvement in controllable conditions does not bring the same amount of improvement in the morals of each person affected. Here the facts observed do not all move progressively toward greater and greater control; and they are facts as final as the other set which do move parallelistically toward a goal, though they never reach it. Such considerations as these have compelled some thinkers to divide sciences into teleological and ateleological<sup>20</sup> groups, and to place in the first all the biological, and in the latter all the physical sciences, though it does not necessarily mean an absolute break in the actual world. It means only that man does not possess the technique and method of discovering how the two realms of phenomena—living and dead matter—are connected. He can no more build an intellectual causeway between the two divided regions than he can bridge the Atlantic Ocean though he may know that its shores are connected under its waters. In the personal unity of self-consciousness he sees tastes and colors, utterly unlike to the last detail, combined by the alchemy of the Self into single objects. How it is done is inexplicable and indescribable. That it is done is indisputable.

<sup>20</sup> E. A. Singer, *Mind as Behavior*; Joseph Needham, "Mechanistic Biology and the Religious Consciousness," in *Science, Religion and Reality*, 1925, pp. 219ff.



## CHAPTER XI

### ST. PAUL'S FAITH

As St. Paul's religious experience unfolded throughout his life, two aspects of his post-conversion development exhibited themselves as an increase in the certainty of his faith and in a growth of character. From his first trembling belief on the Damascus road to his final triumph expressed in "I know him whom I have believed," he passed through many stages of faith. Parallel with this mental progress went his transformation in character. On the way, stretching between the persecutor and St. Paul the aged, mellowed and sweetened with Love for men, were set many milestones of privations and sufferings that marked the Apostle's steady advance toward his Ideal Man revealed in Jesus Christ. These two lines are merged into one by the nature of that faith which the Evangelist experienced himself and preached also to others.

In the Apostle's vocabulary, the greatest word is Christ; the next, Love; the next, faith. Faith is a word of large significance in many languages. In the form of "Amen" it abides in three great religions of the world—Judaism, Mohammedanism and Christianity. In the last it has flitted back and forward between the lips of the masses and the pens of the experts until it has acquired many and diverse meanings. In common with all purveyors of living ideas, it passes like the chambered nautilus from one out-grown habitation of meaning to others more spacious, as the enlightenment and the experience of mankind increases the content of Christian life.

Beyond the word itself, with its most interesting philological history, and even beyond the ideas the word symbolizes, rise the actual human experiences signalized by

the word's synonyms and cognates—ignorance, disbelief, doubt, probability, belief, trust, reliance, dependence, faith, knowledge, conviction, certitude, certainty, assurance and others—all rungs on the ladder by which man endeavors to lift himself from the sloughs of doubt to the firm, abiding, sunlit heights of knowledge, capable of guiding his mind and his actions along paths satisfying to his heart.

In whatever way faith may be symbolized, or however it may be defined as an abstract idea, to the psychologist analyzing human character faith is a state of consciousness, an attitude of the man, assumed toward a proposition or judgment which has aroused his emotion in the form of interest, and at least excites his will to the point of poising in a posture of attention, or of proceeding cautiously, alert, tense, ready to change. This total attitude engages the whole man; it presupposes the work of the perception, memory, imagination and reason in forming a judgment and in discerning the self-consistency of that judgment and its agreement with other truths already accepted. All this mental activity induces and is accompanied by emotion, dominated either by desire or aversion for the judgment and its anticipated results in practice. These emotions influence the will to a greater or less extent. If the emotion is friendly to the judgment, then the will is inclined to accept it, adopt it, trust it, and to act upon it. This decision of the will is, then, in the final analysis, the essence of faith. In a man like St. Paul—ardent, aspiring, passionate, doing with all his might what he believes, and believing with all his might what he does—the emotional accompaniment of faith is like the heat of a blast furnace that melts the ore, the will is the power which lifts the release-gate and allows the molten metal to flow into the molds fixed for it by the ideas in the judgments believed.

All religions of any venerableness exhibit at least three varieties of faith. Christianity has its miraculous faith, given directly from God (II Cor. xii. 4, 9, 11); its historic faith, or body of truth once for all delivered to the saints

and amplified by time, appearing in creeds and systems of theology; and finally, its saving, personal faith, which St. Paul so abundantly possessed, besides, possibly, enjoying also to a certain extent faith miraculously given him. It is the personal faith in which psychology is interested—in its nature, its structure, its generation, its function. How such faith was originated and developed in St. Paul's consciousness, and what part miracles played in that generation, are our immediate problem.

A miracle is any unusual event, or wonder, good or bad, occurring in nature or among men, attributed to some agent, producing certain consequences, physical and mental. A miracle strikes the eye, arouses the instincts of curiosity and fear and self-submission which, combined, form awe, and then, in human beings, arouses the imagination to give a reason for the wonder, or sign, the most plausible explanation being accepted or believed (Jno. iii. 2, xx. 31, xii. 37, xi. 46, vi. 26; Mt. xxiv. 24; Mk. xiv. 22, iii. 22). To what agency the wonder will be assigned depends upon the faith observers already hold, which is never predictable with certainty.<sup>1</sup>

The dubious effects of miracle-working are well illustrated by St. Paul's restoration of the lame Lystrian (Acts xiv. 8-19), who was probably a Jewish proselyte<sup>2</sup> and would therefore attribute his cure to God. But the Lystrians, deterred by no such faith, attributed the wonder to their gods, made ready to sacrifice to Paul and Barnabas, who preached to them. The instability of the faith thus generated, if any, was evidenced by the same Lystrians, incited by Jews, stoning St. Paul and leaving him for dead.

<sup>1</sup> Spirits must be tested; I Jno. iv. 1, 2; Deut. xviii. 22; xiii. 1-3.

<sup>2</sup> Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 116, thinks he was a proselyte. Paul's recorded wonders are found in Acts xiii. 11, Elymas; xiv. 8-19, Lystra; xvi. 18, Philippi, girl cured; xix. 6, Holy Spirit conferred; xix. 11, 12, cures; xx. 10-12, Eutychus (if it is a wonder); xxviii. 3, 6, viper; xxviii. 8, 9, Publius' father cured; I Cor. xiv. 18, tongues.

A miracle, to be effective, must grow out of the proper psychological soil. Public opinion and popular expectation do much to call forth wonders. Perhaps it was the difference in public attitude toward signs which apparently moved St. Paul to make use of them chiefly in Asia. The Book of Acts is singularly silent about special miracles after the time the Apostle sets foot on European soil at Philippi, until he returns again to Ephesus (Acts xvi. 19-xix. 11), a period amounting to nearly two years. Silence alone, of course, does not prove that he performed no miracles, but other evidence points to partial, if not entire, reliance upon natural means of reaching his hearers with the Gospel. The earthquake at Philippi may have been accepted by the jailor as a sign; and the cure of the demon-possessed girl aroused a riot, but made no converts, and put the missionaries in prison (Acts xvi). At Corinth St. Paul received a vision for his own personal encouragement (Acts xviii. 9), but he does not seem to use miracles to arouse faith, and freely deprecates speaking with tongues (I Cor. xiv. 27-39; xii. 31).

St. Paul's employment of miracles in converting others is a sign of their importance in his own faith. A birds'-eye view of the conversions attributed to his missionary zeal on his several trips in Asia and Europe is given in the following synopsis, with special reference to his use of miracles as signs and wonders.

## ST. PAUL'S CONVERSIONS IN EUROPE

<i>No. Acts</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>People</i>	<i>Method Used to Convert Them</i>
1 16	Philippi	Jews, Lydia	Spoke, Lord opened Lydia's heart, v. 4
2 16	Philippi	Gentile Jailor	Spoke
3 17	Thessalonica	Jews and Gentiles, v. 4	Reasoned with them
4 17	Beroea	Jews and Gentiles, v. 10	Spoke in synagogue
5 17	Athens	Gentiles	Spoke in set address
6 18	Corinth	Jews and Gentiles	Reasoned, v. 4

## ST. PAUL'S CONVERSIONS IN ASIA

<i>No.</i>	<i>Acts</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>People</i>	<i>Method Used to Convert Them</i>
1	13	Cyprus, 4	Gentile, Sergius Paulus	Elymas struck blind
2	13	Antioch, Pisidia	Jews and Gentiles, v. 43, 46	Preached set speech in synagogue
3	14	Iconium	Jews and Gentiles, v. 2	Speaking, signs and wonders
4	14	Lystra	Gentiles	Cripple healed, address
5	18	Ephesus	Jews	Reasoned, v. 19, in synagogue
6	19	Ephesus	Jews and Gentiles	Reasoning, cures, v. 6, 11, 12 Sceva

1. From the time Paul leaves Troas, Acts xvi, till his return to Asia, no mention is made in Acts of any certain miracles. Lydia's heart was opened by the Lord and the earthquake happened in Philippi, a demoniac girl was freed, and the Holy Spirit was given (xix. 6).
2. In Asia miracles are plentiful; special signs and wonders are mentioned.
3. In all cases the word of God was spoken to an understanding audience.

## PRINCIPLES OF PAUL'S EVANGELISTIC METHODS

I. *The supernatural factors in conversions*

- A. The Holy Spirit is not mentioned as playing any part in converting people.
- B. God opened the "heart" \* of Lydia, Acts xvi. 14.
- C. Signs and wonders were wrought at times with varying effects.

1. Acts xiii, Cyprus, Elymas was smitten blind and Paulus converted.
2. Acts xiv, Iconium, signs and wonders granted by the Lord, the city was divided, the missionaries were attacked, and fled.
3. Acts xiv, a cripple was healed at Lystra; the people attempted to worship Paul and Barnabas, and the same

\* "Heart" is used in the New Testament in a very general sense as "seat of the soul," and also as a name for the whole mentality of a person.

people, a little later, when incited by the Judaisers, stoned Paul and left him for dead.

4. Acts xix, at Ephesus special signs and wonders were wrought through Paul, which led the sons of Sceva to imitate him, and for which they were fitly punished, bringing such fear upon Jews and Gentiles that many brought their magic books and burned them.
5. Acts xvi, the exorcising of an evil spirit and the earthquake probably did not impress the Philippians as miracles, both being fairly common occurrences in that region, and both arousing excitement because of the effect they had upon the business of certain people.

D. On the whole, St. Paul appeared to hold miracles in doubtful valuation beyond merely calling attention to the Gospel, and that chiefly among the Jews, or people influenced by their teachings.

I. *Natural factors operating in conversions wrought through St. Paul, recorded in Acts*

A. In general, the human side of conversion consisted in (1) re-making old sentiments into new sentiments; (2) or, transferring old sentiments to Jesus Christ, both procedures occurring in the minds of the converts.

1. The intellectual processes thus involved were the following:
  - (1) The perception of certain signs, in the form of words, acts, persons, etc.
  - (2) Understanding thereby that Jesus Christ is God-Man.
  - (3) Judging him to be able to save them from what they were to what they wished to be, from sinful souls to righteous people.
  - (4) Imagination, aided by the historic person of Christ, supplying the ideal.
2. The emotional processes were many and varied, the chief being the following:
  - (1) Certain primary emotions belonging to instincts.
  - (2) Other emotions, compounded of these, belonging to sentiments.

- (3) Derived emotions, like peace and joy, coming from trust in Christ.
  - (4) Agreeable or disagreeable feelings in attitudes were secondary.
3. The volitional processes were chiefly the following:
- (1) Attention to the preaching of the Gospel.
  - (2) Choice of Jesus Christ as Lord, Son of God, and Savior.
  - (3) Confessing this faith; receiving baptism; partaking of the Eucharist; forsaking other gods and forms of worship; living according to the principle of Love, or Good-will, interpreted by established morality, by personal judgment, and by appeals to the Apostle himself.

ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN SIDE OF SEVEN CONVERSIONS MADE BY  
ST. PAUL AND RECORDED IN THE BOOK OF ACTS

<i>Place</i>	<i>Acts</i>	<i>Intellectual</i>	<i>Emotional</i>	<i>Volitional</i>
Paphos	xiii	Heard, 7 Saw, 12 Believed, 12	Astonished, 12	Called, 7 Sought, 7
Antioch	xiii	Hearken, 16 Spoken [Heard], 42 Hear, 44  Spoken, 45 Spake, 46 Believed, 48	Fear, 16   Jealousy, 45 Glad, 48	Besought, 42 Followed, 43 Gathered, 44 Contradicted, 45 Blasphemed, 45 Glorified, 48 Stirred, 50 Urged, 50 Cast, 50 Shook dust, 51 Came to, 51
Iconium	xiv	Spoke, 1 Believed, 1 Speaking, 3	Souls stirred, 2 Affected, 2  [Wonder, 3]	Disobedient, 2 Stirred, 2 Signs done, 3 Wonders, 3 Divided, 3 Held, 3 To stone, 5 Onset, 5 Fled, 6

<i>Place</i>	<i>Acts</i>	<i>Intellectual</i>	<i>Emotional</i>	<i>Volitional</i>
Lystra	xiv	Saw, 11	[Awe inferred]	
		Heard, 9		Lifted voices, 11
		Faith, 9		Said, 11
		Said, 9, 11		Called, 12
		Saw, 11		Brought, 13
		Called, 12		Stoned, 19
		Persuaded, 19		Dragged, 19
Derbe	xiv	Preached, 21		
		Disciples, 21		Disciples, 21
Philippi (Lydia)	xvi	Heart opened, 14		Baptized, 15
		Spake, 13		Invited, 15
		Heard, 14		Restrained, 15
Philippi (Jailor)	xvi	Saw, 27	Fear, 29	Drew sword, 27
		Believe, 30		Sprang, 29
		Spake, 31	[Fear, 29]	Trembled, 29
				Do, 30
				Washed, 33
				Baptized, 33

NOTE.—Some perceptions, memories, imaginations and reasonings are clearly implied, e.g. spake and saw imply perception, memory and some understanding. Some acts of the evangelists also imply natural responsive acts on the part of their hearers, e.g. signs done probably caused wonder and attention at least.

The Apostle to the Gentiles, whose divine authority was so often challenged, was never weary of asserting that his revelation of truth had come directly from God. But the apprehension of a revelation by the understanding does not also carry with it faith in its validity. Rebellious spirits might understand and not believe. This fact shows that faith is not a mere intellectual process, nor the understanding of a meaningful proposition enough to compel belief in it. So that the Apostle's reiterated assertions that he received his Gospel directly from heaven do not necessarily prove that he received his faith from the same source.

Faith is an attitude a man assumes toward a proposition. First, of course, he must be aware of it. It must come to his mind. Whence it comes or how, as we have shown in



a preceding chapter, neither confers upon it validity nor tricks it out in the vesture of truth. The proposition thus revealed may indeed possess certain attributes which impress it upon the beholder's mind as irresistibly true, and hence immediately acceptable or creditable; but nevertheless, faith in the last resort is a state of mind resting upon the will of the believer.

St. Paul's faith contained no mystical element which forced the belief upon him regardless of his own volition. In spreading the Gospel he was no mechanical instrument of God's will, no mere mouthpiece, or phonograph, or loud-speaker broadcasting the Good News he received from heaven. He spoke what he believed and spoke it because he believed it with all his heart, might and mind. That faith he acquired by modes not beyond the power of the most humble saint. For if Christianity is a universal religion, as the Apostle taught, its faith must be possible to all normal minds.

Regardless of the part miracles may have played in attracting attention and in furnishing revelations, abundant evidence is forthcoming to show that this leader in experimental religion used the normal, ordinary mental powers of himself and his hearers to build saving faith within them. The mode of delivering the Gospel message, the conversions analyzed above in this volume, the context and circumstances of preaching, all these go to prove that the evangelist called upon the perception, memory, imagination and reason of his hearers as well as his own.

He is probably drawing upon his own experience when, with boldness and profundity, he lays the foundations of faith in perception. "Belief comes by hearing" (Rom. xiv. 17). Sometimes it comes by seeing (Acts xiii. 12). But its basis is fact perceived by the senses; fact that gives solidity and foundation for superstructures that eventually pass beyond the visible heavens.

St. Paul's first facts were not the vision and the voice he perceived near Damascus. Before those came he had

witnessed the splendid fortitude of men and women of the Way under suffering, and had beheld the peace with which they met their fate. Later he added similar facts of his own, revelations of his power to endure which must have startled as well as lifted him above mortal happiness. Later still he marked the changed lives of unnumbered saints, rich and poor, ignorant and learned, good and bad, who endured to the end even under torture and death. These are facts upon which Christian faith is built, and which, instead of being dissipated altogether, or waning in power and frequency, have multiplied with the centuries ten thousand times ten thousand times. These facts are unsailable. Likewise they are priceless. No normal human being places a low value on them. To all they give some bit of potential faith.

Of the higher, or representative intellectual processes, memory enters alike into all faith-making and can be omitted from this consideration. Imagination, rightly understood, plays a superior rôle in all religious faith, as it does in all science. On the spiritual side, it had pictured all that celestial-terrestrial tragedy which eventually gave the greatest theologian of the apostolic college his real and lasting foundation of faith. Out of the old Jewish teachings and the new material he received by revelation he fashioned this wonder and delight of many minds, the comfort of many a sin-sick soul like himself. Infinitely more difficult is the operation of imagination engaged in such a task than in material invention or in the elaboration of a philosophy.

Secondly, his imagination was also employed in building up that spiritual image of Jesus, into whose likeness he aimed to grow. Its vividness seems to count (II. Cor. iii. 18; I Cor. xiii. 12; cf. I Jno. iii. 2). Further, imagination employed itself in devising means and methods of forwarding this growth. Paul had not discarded the rites of Judaism, but he had discounted their worth for himself and reduced it to zero for his disciples. In their place he

was compelled to secure other means for Christian development. Baptism and holy communion were at hand. The church organization, however, was still fluid, and the cares and worries, adaptations and inventions, remodeling of the old and seeking heavenly guidance for the new, as the Corinthian letters show, must have occupied the leader's constructive imagination to the limit of its great capacity.

As for his reason, the frequent repetition of the word in connection with his persuading others proves what a great place it held in his own growth in faith. As we have seen, it identified Jesus and the Messiah, an intuitive and immediate step of vital significance. Then it busied itself with the logic involved in that whole system of theology which the Apostle worked out. At first probably nothing but the discrepancies between Judaism and Christianity thrust themselves upon the groper's mind. Then gradually he discerned deeper meanings and glimpsed resemblances, and finally saw how they both grew out of the same trunk (Rom. xi. 17), a figure of speech very significant for reason.

If we assume that St. Paul used the same means and methods to persuade others that he himself followed in building his faith, we can discern how his reason was employed first, and later with the Jews, in proving that Jesus was the Son of God from the Scriptures (Act. ix. 20), a method the Jews indignantly rejected, conclusive evidence that the proofs were not decisive and compelling. Among the Gentiles Old Testament texts had not the axiomatic value of premises.<sup>4</sup> At Athens he did endeavor to use well-accepted philosophic doctrines, with little success (Acts xvii. 28). Therefore, with them, St. Paul abandoned his logical proofs and contented himself with persuading both Jews and Greeks (Acts xiii. 43, *epeithon*; xviii. 4, Corinth; xix. 8, 26, Ephesus; xxvi. 28, Agrippa; xxviii. 23, Rome). His persuasion seemed to consist of an impassioned pleading in which emotion acted a strong part.

Persuasion falls short of logical proof. Its conclusions

<sup>4</sup> T. R. Glover, *Conflict of Religions*, 1927, pp. 183-193.

are probable, in the sense of such probability as Bishop Butler said ruled our lives. It amounts to suggestion defined as securing belief for propositions on insufficient logical grounds.<sup>5</sup> That is the kind of faith most men have for embarking upon life's adventures, no matter how dangerous.

Christian faith as an attitude is saturated with feeling. Religion itself has been frequently called a sentiment. Many writers have defined it in terms of emotion entirely. Bain said it is an "affair of the feelings"; J. S. Mill, the direction of emotions; Tyndall, its sphere is emotion; Schleiermacher, a feeling of dependence; Hume says it arises from hopes and fears; John Hobbes, its seed is fear of spirits; and Petronius, "Fear first made the gods."

The Christian religion from the beginning emphasized the tender emotions and self-abnegating feelings. Its Founder set the example of the most perfect tenderness ever exhibited in Love. St. John says God is Love. St. Paul was not one whit behind him in making the command, "Love your neighbor as yourself," the single commandment of Christian ethics. The New Testament writers all made the sentiment of Love, with its many emotions organized together, the very center and core of their religion. St. Paul emphasizes the inwardness of Christian service in the thirteenth chapter of first Corinthians. He insists that outward acts without Love are of no avail. With him faith and Love are much alike, and in Galatians v. 6, as in Corinthians, he makes Love essential to faith, saying, "In Christ Jesus circumcision availeth nothing, nor uncircumcision; but faith wrought through love." The energizing power of Christian faith is an emotion. Without it faith is dead belief, a cold, intellectual apprehension of abstract identity in which the believer has no further interest beyond a nod and a tremor of fear.

<sup>5</sup> *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Suggestion," and McDougall, *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*; J. M. Bramwell, *Hypnotism*, 1906; A. Moll, *Hypnotism*, 1901, 5th ed.

How, then, shall this germ of belief be transformed into a living, saving faith, suitable for satisfying the religiously hungry soul of man, and powerful for directing his conduct in the way that it should go? A faith which, in realms like metaphysics, drives a man to die at the stake like Giordano Bruno, or, in the realm of religion, begets its martyrs by the thousands? The germ of belief must be touched with a quickening power; a vitalizing element must be added to its constitution. That element is some kind of feeling. Belief touched by emotion begins to live, to move, to burn with warmth and power.

In contrast with both scientific belief and historic religious faith, saving faith is personal. It arises in persons and is directed toward a person. A man believes in Jesus Christ. The process is permeated with emotions, primary and secondary and derived. Besides the feelings of simple instincts, the settled, profound and fixed passions of immense and all-absorbing sentiments are aroused too, and perform their strenuous parts in faith-making both religious and secular.

In the scientific method, it is true, emotion is traditionally abhorrent, a disturber of the tranquil processes of reason engaged in its "passionless pursuit of passionless knowledge." For the scientific ideal insists that scientific truth should be secured through weighing known and measured facts, by the intellect alone, and by inclining the belief the way the probability leads. *Probability is the sole measure of credibility.* Whoso admits either desire or wish into the process is a traitor to the high standards of pure reason. So say Huxley, Clifford, Coleridge and Pearson.\*

But manifestly, such a lofty and aloof ideal is far from the practice of men in their daily faith-making. They take chances, risk fortune and life for forlorn hopes, traverse wildernesses in search of gold, cross oceans in the air,

\* See James, *Will to Believe*, 1896, on Huxley and Clifford; Pearson, *Grammar of Science*; Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, 1825, Introductory Aphorisms.

explore remote corners of the world and pioneer in the face of danger, all with small chances of winning what they strive to obtain. This they do, not because probability favors them, but because in them operate dynamically huge, driving forces, wants, wishes, desires, urges, passions, greed for gold, hunger for fame, longing for adventure. Sentiment moves men mightily in deciding their trusts, or practical faiths, in everyday affairs of life, trivial and momentous.

In this, religion resembles natural faith-making. It too appeals to vast and powerful sentiments. The early Christians left home, friends and property to follow the Christ. St. Paul himself sacrificed all earthly goods and family connections with valiant disregard, for the sake of the new religion. His disciples likewise gave up much, sometimes facing persecution and sometimes risking death for the Christ. This faith, unlike the acceptance of historic tenets of established creeds, and the long-established laws of science, resembles the faith that scientific researchers themselves exhibit when, with little probability of success, they give their lives to investigations which often leave them poverty-stricken, and sometimes take their health and their very lives. It is in such living, driving, dynamic, parental faiths that close likenesses can be sought and found, and not in their widely separated offspring—traditional scientific truth and creedal or historic religious faiths, both accepted on authority and not found by experiment and experience. The early faith of the apostolic days was shot through with emotion, generated by desire, hot with passion, powerful with feeling.

The same psychic attributes appear whenever new faiths are proposed for acceptance. New beliefs exhibit passion and vehemence, zest and enthusiasm. Long-established beliefs tend to lose their power because they grow old and cold. All religions exhibit these characteristics. Likewise, scientific theories show the same tendencies, many of which arrive in perfect storms of enthusiastic support on the one

side and storms of opposition from the other. How eagerly the biologists accepted Darwin's evolution, and how recklessly the religionists opposed it. In the fifteenth century, the earth's sphericity caused men like Columbus to stake their all on its truth, and the immensity of the Copernican universe drove Giordano Bruno to the stake; yet both of these once revolutionary doctrines, now established beyond doubt, no longer fire people to passionate espousal or robust battle on their behalf. Old faiths, like everything else that grows old, lose their early power to excite emotion.

The truth is that all new faith is influenced by emotion. Into the making of belief enter both legitimate and illegitimate desires. All small, personal prejudices, all hunger for fame, all vanities, stubborn ambitions—these are illegitimate and should not influence one toward any belief. But besides the personal desires, there are great, universal, objective wants imbedded in human nature and developed into well-nigh universal and practically life-long, enduring sentiments. This truth has been freely admitted by authorities who have studied the nature and the genesis of faith in human minds. "*Ein jeder sieht was er im Herzen trägt,*" is Goethe's way of saying that where a man's treasure is there his mind will be. Feeling leads; reason follows.

Alexander Bain<sup>7</sup> long ago wrote that "The influence of feelings upon belief is of a mixed character. . . . We are not easily persuaded of the ill-effects of anything we like. . . . When we are under strong emotion all things discordant with it keep out of sight. . . . intense feeling so lords it over the intellectual trains that opposing considerations are not even allowed to be present. . . . In a state of strong excitement no thoughts are allowed to present themselves except such as concur in the present moods; . . . it depends upon this stoppage of the intellectual trains that we come into . . . disbelieving for the moment, what we have formerly felt and acted upon. . . . It depends upon many circumstances what intensity of emo-

<sup>7</sup> *The Emotions and the Will*, 1888, pp. 20-21.

tion shall be required to produce this higher effect of keeping utterly back the faintest recollection of whatever discords with the reigning fury." Psychology quite agrees with common-sense experience that powerful emotion both paralyzes any arguments against a desired belief and compels the intellect to think up arguments in favor of it.

James shows that besides these intense emotions, more moderate and less uproarious feelings operate always in producing all scientific and philosophic beliefs. "The passion for parsimony," he says, "for economy of means in thought, is the philosophic passion par excellence; and any . . . aspect of the world's phenomena which gathers up their diversity into monotony will gratify that passion, and in the philosopher's mind, stand for that essence of things compared with which all other determinations may by him be overlooked. . . . Who does not feel the charm of thinking that the moon and apple are, as far as their relation to the earth goes, identical?"<sup>8</sup> "Pleasure at finding that a chaos of facts is the expression of a single underlying fact," he adds, is like the esthetic delight a musician feels in hearing a series of separate notes run together into a harmony. Such a cool-headed philosopher as Hume remarked that an idea consented to "feels" different from one rejected from belief.<sup>9</sup> Despite the strenuous pronouncements of a few scientists against emotion, it is the factor which finally determines what men in general will and do believe.

Of this trait in human nature, St. Paul, the psychological evangelist, took full and free advantage. Knowing very well that cold logic and factual induction were powerless to win belief for his vital doctrines, he made his appeal to the deep-seated and ever-passionate emotions in men, both to

<sup>8</sup> "The Sentiment of Rationality," 1882, in *The Will to Believe*, 1896. Cf. also *Reflex Action and Theism*, 1881, which quotes Chr. von Sigwart, *Logik*, 1873, 2d ed., trans. by H. Denby, 1895, p. 382; Chap. V treats induction, Vol. II.

<sup>9</sup> *Treatise on Human Nature*, Part III, sec. vii.



their general, common emotional nature and to their specific and more superficial desires. How he did this the rest of this chapter will endeavor to show in outline. The problem here opened is so vast and so inextricably complex that we cannot do more than touch its salient features.

This view of evangelization accounts for both St. Paul's successes and his failures; the Jews as a whole did not accept his Gospel. Even among his most susceptible listeners not everyone accepted his doctrines. At Athens the rejection was decisive. In such disappointments coming to the greatest of Evangelists, modern preachers of the Word may find both consolation and enlightenment.

The truth that it is not logic nor fact that determines the attitude of men toward religion, but their feelings lodged in settled sentiments, is amply illustrated by the vicissitudes of fortune which befell St. Paul at Ephesus (Acts xix. 8:20). There he preached the Gospel unmolested for about two years, opposed only by the Jews, whose sentiments naturally were antagonistic to the new religion. The Gentiles at first probably shrugged their shoulders and went their various ways, worshiping their goddess Diana <sup>10</sup> and pursuing their "favorite phantoms" as before.

But two years sufficed for the new religion to reveal some of its fruits. It had condemned idolatry; but in the abstract and as a religious dogma, the condemnation did not seem to attract much popular attention. When, however, the converts to the growing religion increased to a point where their opposition to idols began to eat into the profits of the silversmiths who made images of the goddess Diana, then public sentiment was stirred to its depths. Feelings were aroused; a meeting was arranged; and Demetrius, the orator of the day, made a direct and bald appeal to business sentiment. "There is danger that this our trade come into disrepute!" he cried. Then, having revealed the true motive of the movement, he overlaid this sordid sentiment with pious references to religion. It was not the first nor the

<sup>10</sup> Or Artemis, Acts xix. 24, R. V., Marg.

last time that special pleaders have covered their greed for gain with the mantle of religious sentiment. Here, as many times elsewhere, the plea succeeded, the tradesmen drove Paul and his immediate disciples out of the city—and that without anyone's producing a single fact or reason in support of the goddess' claim to reality, divinity or worthiness of worship! Sentiment and sentiment alone operated here to reject the Gospel, just as it did with Paul's own nation.

We can accept as a simple truth, then, the proposition that since all science and all religion are possessions of human personalities, they exist only as components of consciousness all organically connected, and each bit itself an organic whole consisting of intellectual, emotional and volitional phases of the one dynamic act, each pictured, as we have suggested above, as vortices, or smoke rings in a moving current. In this totality, emotion plays an essential part; although after it has performed its service it may be ignored, and only an intellectual abstract consisting of ideas welded together in philosophy or theology may be the object of consideration and attention.

Faith being an attitude of the person, it has organically connected with it both legitimate and illegitimate emotions in the form of desires. The illegitimate emotions must be condemned, or at least, as far as possible, ignored, though they may not always be wrong. That brings us to the query: Is there any legitimate emotion that always may enter into a man's manufacture of his faith?

The question may be approached by asking another: Why does man form wholes out of fragments of knowledge? Why and how does he, unlike the brutes, weld his separate sensations into objects, or ideas of objects? And then unite these ideas into great systems of thought? And go on and on in this direction until he has united into one vast system of ideas all the truths mind can ever comprehend?

The "mental mechanisms" by which he does this are plain enough. Intellect plays the supreme rôle. But what

power lies back of and actuates the mind of even a child, in this procedure? It makes man's science, philosophy, theology; preserves the unities in art; treats all men as one in morality; organizes men in ever more comprehensive societies or nations; makes inventions, material and mental, to save man's energy in thinking and acting.

Working as it does in obscurity, this power is hard to define. Obtaining its results by gentle though constant pressure, it escapes detection except by closest scrutiny. Appearing in many guises, it bears many names. It has been called intellect, reason, category of unity, desire for maximum unity, sentiment of rationality, urge to completeness, longing for the Absolute, etc.

This sentiment of rationality, as we will continue to call it, revealed itself, as we saw in Chapters IV and V above, in unifying St. Paul's world of ideas, and also his own personality. Here we meet it again working as the chief emotional factor in making his faith. The assertion that an emotional factor, and not a mere intellectual factor, or only a volitional factor, is necessary to faith-making seems to suggest that men believe what they desire to believe. Taken universally, this is true; distributively, it is an all too common fact. That is, if we mean that man believes what all men desire to believe, the doctrine is not dangerous. For it grounds itself upon the source of infallibility, a universal, human sentiment. But further, we must ask: What do all men desire to believe?

Here enters that factor in faith which the intellectualists love to magnify. For the summum bonum of the thinker is identity of ideas. "A is A"—the principle of identity, he says, is absolute truth. Anybody can see it is. And, though the mind of man never reaches such identity except in the realm of pure ideas, still his mind strives and strains to approximate it everywhere. This principle lies at the root of the attempts to make Jesus "very" God by asserting that he is of the same substance as the Father.

Such indeed is the mechanics of the truth-finding process.

But it does seem legitimate to ask: What power urges on the intellect to seek unity amidst diversity? Why is man's mind not perfectly satisfied with diversity? Why, even when his conclusions cannot by their nature ever be tested by applying them to actualities, does he still build fabulous structures of abstract ideas—philosophies, theologies, pure sciences—all of which strive and strain for more and more unity on the whole and in each part? Because he loves "truth."

Despite the pretense that science has no heart, and despite religion's self-contradictory beliefs, sentiment rules the progress of both. Man loves truth; truth is unity. That religion is true which most completely satisfies man's longing for unity. When unity is presented to him, not in the dried husks of identity of abstract ideas, nor in identity of a hypothetical "substance," or "ether," but in the person of the God-man, the 'way and the truth and the life' (Jno. xiv. 6), one with the Father, through whom the world is made one, and self and all other men are made one, to the urging within the man for unity in truth are added all the surges toward that unity embodied, incarnated, made alive in a concrete Person.

## CHAPTER XII

### FAITH AND CHARACTER

THE relation of faith and conduct in St. Paul's teaching has been the subject of long and sometimes baffling study. The confusion thus resulting has been due very often to the method of studying his faith. The investigation has started with the assumption that the phases of human consciousness may be separated from one another and so studied and defined without reference to their organic relationship. The intellect, for example, is sometimes identified with the "mind" and contrasted with the "heart," and the "will" set off from both. That piece of spiritual surgery having been performed—and the surgeon's not recognizing that the patient has died under the vivisection of the "soul"—belief has been defined as an "intellectual assent." Then the further assumption is made that, since belief is so defined, it is possible for a man to believe and not to feel or to act.

Passing over the psychic impossibility of the intellect's inability to usurp the powers of the will and give "assent," the primary mischief of such a proceeding begins with breaking up the human being into "faculties," or "powers," which themselves are immediately treated as little personages, or daemons. Such a trisecting of the "soul," or the personality, leaves the parts dead, fragmentary abstractions, bereft of their essential qualities. To endow such ghosts with a being and habitation leads to hopeless misunderstanding of the Gentile Apostle's fundamental concept, faith.

For him, persons, not intellects, believe. That means an idea-emotion-action compound. But sometimes one idea

(Christ)—emotion (Love)—action (service) is estopped from more than lip service by another compound: idea (money)—emotion (greed)—action (work). The decision between these two is made by the will acting as the "I." It turns the floodgate of energy one way or the other. The turning is definitely "trust," and the whole result is "faith." St. Paul's faith was never directed toward an abstract idea of God, but was faith in Christ, a busy and hard-working man (Jno. v. 17, ix. 4). Faith in him meant for Paul to be like him as far as man could be. That meant more than lip service (Mt. vii. 21; Phil. ii. 12; I Thess. iv. 11; I Tim. iv. 7, 8). But "works" inspired by such a purpose, motivated by such Love, were not, for the Apostle of freedom, "works of the law" done merely because they were ordered done. A cripple suffering total muscular paralysis might do the first, never the second.

The mental process, therefore, which stops with the mere recognition that God is the answer to the world riddle, places itself in the position of the demons who "believe and tremble." That state, according to St. James, is "dead faith" (Ja. ii. 17, 19). "So little is faith in its biblical conception," says Dr. B. B. Warfield, "merely a conviction of the understanding, that, when that is called faith, the true idea of faith needs to be built up above the word."<sup>1</sup> To understand is not to believe. It is a step on the way to faith, but if a man stops there he stands only on the threshold. Simon, the sorcerer, suffered from this kind of paralysis in his abortively born faith. He heard, he saw, he believed, was amazed, and baptized, but until the scathing words of St. Peter, "Thy heart is not right with God!" fell upon his frightened ears, it never once occurred to him that this new faith demanded for its satisfaction such a grip upon his affections and his will that his whole life, inner and outer, would be completely reformed (Acts viii. 21). An intellectual nod, a hollow "Amen!" to a creed logically flawless, the apprehension of God as a postulate

<sup>1</sup> Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, "Faith," by Warfield.

of reason, may together perfect a system of philosophy, but they cannot save a soul.

A growing, vital faith can. But if it merely weighs and ponders probabilities, it is stillborn. If it expends itself in mere effervescing and paroxysmal emotion it may be merely maniacal, or futilely sentimental. A real and robust faith marches on past intellectual apprehension, on past emotional irruption to trust, to final fruition in action congruent with the idea of Christ believed in. It is neither a "mere intellectual assent," nor a state of mind expressed in creeds which when uttered with proper intonation and in correct order will, like "Sesame," open the door of Paradise with swift and effortless magic.

Faith is an adventure of the will; and as Dean Inge says, "conscience progressively verifies itself as we progress on the upward path. That which began as an experiment ends as an experience." This view of faith, he affirms, was shared by Clement of Alexandria, who traces the steps of faith from "saving change" through knowledge into love; and by Origen, by the Cappadocian Fathers, St. Augustine, the medieval mystics and those of the Renaissance, the Cambridge group of the seventeenth century, and by William Law in the eighteenth century;<sup>2</sup> and it remains to-day both the conception and the state of many devout and earnest believers, and is recognized as the faith of modern science, the essence of which is found in proving things not seen.

In the last analysis St. Paul's faith depends for its inception and development upon his will. If, as Professor James said,<sup>3</sup> the will is most acutely exercised in paying attention, then, of course, will accompanied every step of the Apostle's advance in faith from the first vision to the last finishing touches he put upon his system of theology, and every choice and use of means he ever exercised for the trans-

<sup>2</sup> *Forum*, Jan., 1926, pp. 1-8; also his *Faith and Its Psychology*, 1909.

<sup>3</sup> *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, Vol. II, pp. 561, 562.

formation of his character. His volition operated in both the so-called theoretical and practical realms of faith-making. Let us examine first the way it applied itself to strengthening his faith.

All manner of faith presents itself piecemeal to the human mind in the form of intuitions, named hypotheses in science and revelations in religion. Their mode of origin has rightfully nothing to do with their truth or validity, or the amount of credence to be granted them. They come from nowhere into somewhere, naked and helpless, making their appeals first to the hearts of men, and then enlisting men's wills in the adoption and nourishment of these foundlings into robust and sturdy truths of science or the more powerful tenets of religion.

Faith is thus born in the form of statements of three kinds: (1) existential judgments affirming that certain things exist and making up the laws of descriptive science; (2) value judgments, asserting that existing things are good or bad, ugly or beautiful, satisfying or not, in many degrees and qualities—judgments, manifestly, that make up most of our conversation; (3) potential judgments, asserting the creative power of anyone, judgments plainly not concerned with the past or present primarily, but with the future, and with things not yet in existence. "I can do all things in him that strengtheneth me," is St. Paul's example. For those who fear overemphasis upon emotion in St. Paul's faith may remember that he stated his beliefs in the form of the above judgments, every one of which is open to some kind of objective test. Caird's fear of "subjective caprice and waywardness" in "religion that must be a thing of the heart" <sup>4</sup> is effectually cared for by the Apostle's organic conception of faith that necessarily includes intellect, emotion and will.

Existential judgments apply to the existence of both material and spiritual things. "Come and see" (I Jno. i. 39)

<sup>4</sup> John Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*, quoted in *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 434.



is the test of the truth of the first type. "Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails. . . I will not believe" (Jno. xx. 25) is the demand of the scientifically minded Thomas, all forgetful of the fact that such evidence will never reveal the existence of a spirit, or even the identity of a person. Such confirmations can be obtained only through a study of functions. If striving for some aim, some goal, some ideal is present in any set of activities, then the operation of mind, or spirit, may be safely inferred. The recently revived doctrine of purpose in nature, and the latest methods of the psychic researchers who have discarded spirit materializations for cross-correspondence to prove the existence of persons after death, both indicate the manner in which faith in God as Spirit may be attained. To affirm that God is Spirit and then to look for him among material creations is a contradiction in method. No man hath seen God at any time (I Jno. i. 18, iv. 12). The Son manifests him by the sanity of his acts, the purposiveness of his words, the quality of his deeds.

Value judgments concern both ends and means; and these may be material or spiritual. Statements about qualities like sweet, red, loud, rough, etc., and right and wrong, ugly and beautiful, are final judgments in the sense that they represent states of a person's consciousness, safe from contradiction because immune from proof. They stand in their own right beyond impeachment. "What will a man give for his own soul?" concerns final, spiritual values. What is the summum bonum? was the Greeks' eternal question.

Once the end is determined, then we face the problem of judging the best means to that end. Means include both theories and materials. Certain theories are accepted, not because they can ever be substantiated by the observation of facts, nor because they are ends in themselves, but because they forward the end of all organized knowledge—the increase of unity and simplicity of description by which

more theories may be elaborated. Science contains many such principles and theology confesses to a number of such tenets. The classical example is Copernicus' heliocentric theory, which no fact can establish but which has been enormously fertile in breeding new theories, some as impossible to substantiate by any practical test as the mother theory.

Besides the factual quantitative judgments which make up descriptive science, and which can be proven by the simple act of observing, normative science and religion contain practical judgments of values or qualities. Their certitude depends upon the individual's own taste or estimate. Olives may be bitter to some, salty to others, sour to others. The Eskimo might call a temperature "hot" which a native of the tropics would shiveringly designate "cold." Judgments of beauty differ notoriously. Men do not agree universally upon what is good and what is bad morally.

When the Master likens the Kingdom of Heaven to a pearl of great price, wheat and tares, good and bad fish, a treasure hid, a lost coin, lost sheep, etc. (Mt. xiii; Lu. xv), he invites primarily the test of value. "O, taste and see that Jehovah is good," is the challenge of the Psalmist (xxxiv. 8). St. Paul counted the priceless things of this world but refuse in comparison to Christ (Phil. iii. 8). The Kingdom of Heaven on earth stands as the social goal, and the fullness of the stature of Christ as the individual goal, inviting men to try them and see whether or not they will satisfy the social and personal needs of mankind. The experiment is a cosmic one. The whole world is its laboratory. Millenniums and perhaps eons of time will be demanded to determine the outcome. It has already gone so far that many people prefer Christian to non-Christian lands, more Christian to less Christian nations, and the most faithful followers of Christ to those who follow afar off. As far as Christianity has been tried in the world, it confirms its claims.

Those saints of God who have given it the most rigid tests in the most searching trials of life have come to the profoundest certitude about Christ Jesus.

Still one more type of judgment appears in religion which receives little, if any, notice elsewhere. We may call them judgments of potentiality, or power. They are expressed by, "I can do all things in him that strengtheneth me" (Phil. iv. 13). They express not belief in the already existing, not the worth of anything, but the confidence that what is not may be made to be. Paul's call to found the church among the Gentiles; each Christian's trust that Jesus Christ will transform him; the founding of nations, building of cities, organization of societies, art, inventions, sciences, philosophies, all are carried to fruition by belief in the power of something or somebody to realize them.

Inductive, descriptive science has no tests for such beliefs, and consequently no room for them in its sifted knowledge about what already exists. The science of botany, for example, is utterly baffled by Luther Burbank's belief, based upon the odor of a strawberry, that it was on its way to produce at some future time a new berry with a taste which Burbank alone of all men held in his imagination. Such faith depends to some extent upon past experience; but it also depends upon a genius capable of creating the idea of something which never has existed, or else receiving the idea by revelation from God. The heroes of the world possessed such creative faith. Alexander's vision at Troy, St. Paul's call in the same place, Constantine's "*In hoc vince!*" Mohammed's cave dreams, Napoleon's undeluded, self-made ambitions of empire, were all alike in that they were brought to pass by personal effort after being brought into being in imagination.

To summarize the matter, we may say that men recognize faith in the seen and faith in the unseen. They begin with belief in the seen and pass by well-marked stages to a complete assurance in the unseen. The method of developing to such a state of certitude is always

the repeated act of trusting. Whenever a belief arises about the existence of some material thing, the simple test of verifying the statement by observation is at hand. But when the thing is immaterial or, being material, cannot be located, recourse must be had to trust. St. Paul saw a vision of Jesus. He was told to go to Damascus and it would be told him there what he must do (Acts ix. 6). Then, pursuant with the promise, Ananias, also prepared by a vision, came to him. It was this fitting together of two halves of a vision, joining them like a broken talisman, that gave him the assurance that his wayside message came from God. St. Peter (Acts x) was also convinced that the unseen God was no respecter of persons when his first vision was completed by the coming of messengers and the descent of the Holy Spirit upon Cornelius and his household. It is this hanging together, this coherence in a unity, of the things seen with things discovered by intuition and reason, which eventually gives all men their profoundest security, their utmost certainty. Adams and Leverrier calculated the position of the undiscovered planet Neptune, and Berlin astronomers saw it. Since then men have calculated the existence of dark stars, and though nobody can see them, astronomers believe implicitly in their existence, just as the physicists are assured of the atoms and electrons they can never behold.

But the moment the choice was made, Christianity demanded of the penitent in heart an open and overt confession of his faith in Christ. "With the heart<sup>\*</sup> man believeth unto righteousness; and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation" (Rom. x 10), reveals the inner and the outer phases of this faith. St. Paul's religion was not an esoteric one which could be held in secret; not a philosophy which concerned nothing but a man's thoughts; not a pure science which was not applied to anything. His conception of faith, which saw that complex process as an

<sup>\*</sup> Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, "Heart." In the New Testament the heart stands for the intellect, emotions and will.

organic whole, essentially and necessarily included choice, action, behavior. Belief, faith, trust opened the floodgates of the emotional energy contained within the sentiment of Love for Christ and let loose its tides to flow out into intense, devoted and congruent activities. Pure religion, unlike pure science, is always applied religion (Jas. i. 27). Once it is understood that Christian faith and Christian Love are and must be organically and functionally bound together in normal consciousness, the difference developed by theologians between St. Paul and St. James disappears.

Both agree that the momentous and decisive step in Christian faith is the overt act expressing the inward condition. Faith, says Hebrews (xi. 1), is the testing, trying or proving things not fully certain. The "testing of faith," however, does not mean merely trying its strength for the satisfaction of God. St. Paul, like Hebrews, was concerned with the increase of faith in beginners. He fully recognized that newborn babes in Christ might be very weak in faith, that is, be very uncertain in their minds about the new religion they had adopted. Such he would receive into the church, but not into discussions of all phases of Christianity (Rom. xiv. 1). In short, he did not insist that Christian faith is certainty, or even certitude of mind. A beginner's faith might be largely doubt. If the seed of faith is there, even though it be but a mustard seed, it will, if properly attended, grow into power ready to remove mountains (Mt. xvii. 20). "Increase our faith" (Lu. xvii. 5) is a prayer that the New Testament conception of faith answers with hope.

The way to increase faith is to exercise it. "By works was faith made perfect" (Jas. ii. 22) is a specific case of, "If ye know these things, blessed are ye if ye do them" (Jno. xiii. 17); and the obverse of, "If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know" (Jno. vii. 17). The passage from initial belief, uncertain and tentative, to sound, tried and enduring conviction, to certitude of the heart, to steadfast and peace-giving assurance, is made by the bridge of

trust. "Prove all things; hold fast to that which is good" (I Thess. v. 21) expresses all the daring and all the revelation of St. Paul's adventurous soul. "I know him-whom I have believed" (II Tim. i. 12) has in it the ring of conviction which comes from such adventure upon the uncharted seas of spiritual experience. The faith of St. Paul saw the world as a foundering ship, Jesus Christ the lifeboat, faith—not the absolute conviction that the lifeboat would infallibly reach land, but the trust that lowered the man into it, followed by fear and trembling perhaps during the passage through the fierce breakers, but transmuted into the peace and joy of certitude when it landed safe on shore.

By what means, methods and tests does faith grow? Here St. Paul's Gospel was ready with an answer. The tests by which a convert's first tentative belief grew and waxed strong were of two kinds: works of worship and works of goodness. The first met him at the very door of the church. They were simple acts which anyone had the power to perform. The first was open, verbal confession; the second was baptism. Like all religious worship, their purpose, or end, is not visible. Theology may debate their purposes. But psychology sees in them the satisfaction of its fundamental principle, that all impression seeks expression. They offer the convert his opportunity to complete in a natural circle the belief of his head, the emotion of his heart, in some act of his body. Thus they complete his first stage of saving faith on its negative side, repentance or turning from the old life purpose; on its positive side, turning to Christ. It is interesting to note that the word "repentance" is not used in connection with St. Paul's conversion.\*

\* Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*; *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Faith," by B. B. Warfield, W. Morgan; "Repentance," by W. Morgan, Samuel McComb. Faith, being included in the sentiment of Love, naturally includes repentance, or the surrender of every life purpose except the one to be Christlike.

St. Paul's highest certitude of the unseen God, his sure reliance on Jesus' words, his firm hope of an eternal life, were all achieved by a steady advance from his first belief through many stages of alternating vision and accomplishment. Over and over again, either by ordinary circumstances or by special revelation, God spoke to him; and each time the Apostle put the matter to the test. As success after success crowned his efforts, even in the face of the most obstinate opposition from enemies and stubborn resistance from circumstances, his faith increased step by step until he could cry, "He is able!" (I Tim. i. 12) and, "I can!" (Phil iv. 13).

How vision and test of vision followed one another is revealed by a casual inspection of his progress from Damascus (Acts ix), through disappointed desire to preach in Jerusalem (Acts xxii. 17-20), through his illness-guided Galatian campaign (Acts xiii. 13; Gal. iv. 13); then thwarted by the Holy Spirit in Asia (Acts xvi. 16) he is drawn to Troas and perhaps driven by illness to Dr. Luke, who may have suggested the man of Macedonia<sup>7</sup> who called him through the gateway of Europe into endless opportunity (Acts xvi. 9, 10, 11; cf. "we"). At Athens, "his spirit being provoked," God showed him the fallacy of trusting philosophic premises; and at Corinth, "constrained by the word," he tested God's promise (Acts. xviii. 9) and built a great, though troublesome church. Then the vision unfolded itself anew, and by way of Ephesus, Jerusalem, Caesarea, and perils of land and perils of the sea, he arrived at his goal, the Eternal City.<sup>8</sup> So many times has he tried the promise of God that on the deep, in the midst of a hopeless storm, his encouragement to the crew breathes his serene confidence in the message from that God, "Whose I am and whom I serve."

<sup>7</sup> Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller*, pp. 202ff.

<sup>8</sup> His gregarious instinct, or sociability, which led him to cities, warns us not to think of him as a desert hermit for three years (Gal. i. 17, 18).

Instead of relying upon written promises, he was himself making those experiments in God's Love out of which holy books have come. Bravely, through incalculable chances of danger, this daring spiritual pioneer felt his way out into the unknown and unexplored regions of God's providence, and we to-day sit safe and sure within the walls of that spirit city which he hewed out of the wilderness full of principalities and powers potential with evil—moral, material and spiritual. To such lone, exploring souls the Kingdom of God owes its constantly expanding domains, even as devoted scientific investigators push back the encircling unknown.

As St. Paul's faith grew in assurance and certitude by trusting upon trusting, by the same process his character grew along parallel lines, always approaching nearer and nearer the spiritual image of the Christ in whom his faith was deepening day by day. The two went together for a reason revealed in St. Paul's doctrine of faith energized by Love, which adopted the Christ as the Ideal Man and discarded the law as a means of attaining that real righteousness which his heart craved. Out of this view came his minor doctrine of edification or building up in Christ, a doctrine recovered from his own experience and his observation of the experience of other disciples.

It is not perfection in the sense of completeness, but the perfection of a healthy, normal child growing toward manhood. Such a person may be morally perfect\* in that he is always at every opportunity using each and every available means to edify himself and others in Christ (Phil. iii. 12, 13; cf. 16; I Thess. iii. 13, v. 23). Moral perfection, in Paul's view, was not a static perfection, but a continual, deliberate, self-chosen conformity of means to end. For such perfection, imagination framing the ideal of Christ, judgment evaluating the means to attain the ideal, and will selecting and using every means available, all

\* Sir Henry Jones, *A Faith that Enquires*.



play their appropriate and natural rôles in the process of edification in sanctification.

The leader of the Gentiles presents such a picture of himself. He is not yet exactly like Christ, but he presses on toward the goal (Phil. iii. 12-16). Congruently with his own experience, he exhorts the Philippians (ii. 12) to work out their own salvation; the Romans (xii. 1, 2) to present their bodies as sacrifices and to be renewed in mind; the Colossians (iii. 2) to set their minds on things above. In II Cor. iii. 18 he indicates that there are stages in the process noted in Rom. viii. 13; Col. iii. 2, and in other places. The development is sure if the convert keeps his eye single to Christ by doing everything, in word and deed, to his glory (Col. iii. 17).

As the development has its purgative and positive sides, its sloughing off of habit and creation of virtues, so it also has its divine and human sides. For, though man must act positively and not merely passively, he is still assured of God's certain copartnership in his enterprise (Phil. ii. 13; Rom. xii. 1-3; II Cor. iii. 18; so also Eph. vi. 10-18). He works through the ordinary channels of perception, memory, imagination, reason and will, so that the Christian's duty may be summed up in keeping his eye single to the glory of Christ.

Other more visible means are also open to the seeker of Christlikeness, in both worship and morality. The latter we will treat later. The means and modes of worship occupy a comparatively unemphatic and nonprominent place in St. Paul's teaching and practice. He says very little about public worship, and some of that only when he is asked about it by anxious disciples (I Cor. vii. 1, xi. 2-6, xii. 1, 31, xiv. 20). Of the ordinances, baptism and communion, he likewise says little (I Cor. xi. 17-30, i. 13-17). Concerning prayer, however, he is emphatic, insisting that it ought to be the practice of every Christian, followed not because it is enjoined, but as the simple, constant out-pouring—sometimes inarticulate—expression of a child's

love for its Father.<sup>10</sup> All such "works," in the church or out,<sup>11</sup> were to be quite natural expressions of the motives of the heart, aimed at the achievement of definite ends, and none of them done for the sake of mere legality or conformity to mechanical practices (I Cor. xiii. 1, 2). What mystical powers they possess, as well as their doctrinal significance, lies beyond the province of a descriptive science to discuss.

Prayer stands in a relation to character-making which other forms of worship cannot claim. Psychologists freely admit that its practice exercises a direct, immediate reflex upon the petitioner. As "the heart's sincere desire, uttered or unexpressed," founded on belief and trust in a Personal God, it gives a sense of rest, a freedom from worry (Phil. iv. 5-7) and, ultimately, a serene and tranquil character, confident of good (Rom. viii. 28).

St. Paul, however, considered that prayer was efficacious to affect other people and to change the course of history, if not of natural events. Though we may not know how to pray as we ought (Rom. viii. 26), the Apostle frequently prays for others and admonishes his followers to do the same (II Cor. xiii. 7; Phil. i. 9; Col. i. 9; I Thess. v. 23, 25; II iii. 1). Such petitions have naturally been frowned upon by a deterministic science, but a faith in a Personal God and loving Father, together with the recent revolution in philosophic thought regarding man-made science and nature, support the practice of the Apostle.

The devotion to a single purpose of becoming like Christ, or Godlike, operates to inspire the Christian with a perpetual ideal, to infuse each and every act he performs with a vitality that keeps it always interesting, to give a constant measure of the worth of his acts, to increase his faith in Jesus' way of life as the right one, and to confer upon

<sup>10</sup> McDougall, *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 163.

<sup>11</sup> It must not be forgotten that St. Paul's conversion brought him a profession, somewhat incidental to his religion, but highly important to his personality.

him the constant peace of progress and the frequent joy of reaching set goals in his onward way. At the same time, this ideal saves him from the goal of many religions—absorption in the god, Nirvana, annihilation of selfhood, impersonal immortality. For this procedure enhances, ennobles and intensifies human personality.

It does this by engaging in all its acts the conscious will of man. As long as a man's will is active, he is an independent person, not yet absorbed nor annihilated. St. Paul's ethics, or morality, by defining good works as those which made the doer and others affected more Christlike, demands, first, a definite choice of Jesus as the Example, the Ideal Man. That alone preserves the will, and hence the personality of the Christian. God himself does not impose the image of Christ upon a waxlike creature and so mold him into Christlikeness. The man is not wax to be molded, stone to be sculptured, iron to be beaten into shape, but a living, choosing person.

But, though such a first choice of an eternal ideal may be made, it does not follow inevitably that personality may not be swallowed up in a machine-like performance of religious duties, or works. The operators of stamping machines, devotees to the Jesuitic ideal of blind obedience and formal worshipers, all alike tend to lose their human identity and to sink their personalities in mere partially conscious automata. From this dire calamity St. Paul's theory of good works, or his morality, saved his followers.

For, first, growth into Christlikeness remains, when carried out in the Christian manner, always a lively conscious process. It never sinks to the level of pure habit, because it never depends wholly upon settled observance to fixed rules. For it "All things are lawful" (I Cor. vi. 12, x. 23). No detailed regulations, no matter how vast in number nor how specific in detail, could ever be formulated for prescribing conduct suitable under all the infinitely varying conditions and personal idiosyncrasies for making men Christlike. Each man's heredity, his environment,

his education, his present circumstances and surroundings, his besetting sins, peculiar weaknesses, conscious and unconscious, all conspire to make him unique in some degree at least. This obvious fact renders it impossible to lay down rules for all men.<sup>12</sup>

The attempt to treat all men alike, to make detailed rules for each one and for each activity of life, was one of the chief causes of the failure of the Law. Its commandments, enlarged though they were by detailed interpretations by the Rabbis, failed completely to diagnose and cure Saul's case of restless unrighteousness. Any imitation of them is also bound to fail in a like manner.

In place of detailed instructions on how to act toward his fellow men, St. Paul, following his Master, summed up all duties to God, himself and his fellows in one sentiment, Good-will, or Love. "A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another," Jesus said (John xiii. 34, 35), and made that the sole mark of discipleship open to the eyes of men. The Johannine epistles repeat it several times (I Jno. ii. 7, iii. 11, 23; iv. 21; II Jno. iv. 6). St. Paul sums up the principle of conduct toward men in the same sentiment, Love (Rom. xiii. 8, 9; Gal. v. 14). James does the same (Jas. ii. 8). This essential and beautiful unity of St. Paul's religion and ethics, joined together in Love, or Good-will, by setting up Christ as the Ideal Man, has been much obscured by the unfortunate emphasis which makes Christianity a set of rules derived from a fundamental dualism of two "great commandments" (Mt. xxii. 36; Mk. xii. 28), which mark the Jews' unfinished effort to reduce their many rules to one principle, an attempt which was splendidly completed in Christianity's one supreme Sentiment, Good-will, or Love, containing One Ideal, God concretely revealed in the God-man, through

<sup>12</sup> Henry Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, is devoted to proving that no scientific method of telling what is right or wrong exists. *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, "Ethics," by D. MacKenzie; Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*; Fr. Paulsen, *Introduction to Ethics*.

whom all men are made one with God, and hence, one with one another. For moral purposes—or, insofar as Christ-likeness is the goal—all men are one person. St. Paul presents an “ethical solidarity.” A good work done to self is done to everybody. A cup of cold water given the least of these, in the Christian view of morality, is done unto Christ, unto God and unto all men (Mt. x. 42; Mk. ix. 41).

Who gives himself with his alms feeds three,  
Himself, his hungry neighbor and me.

To St. Paul this ideal union was real.

No wonder that St. Paul became a mighty man. How could it be otherwise when he dared to weigh and measure vast moral, social and political issues in the scales of their ability to make men Christlike? That daring trust which God reposes in men implies that they have the (1) passion to become Christlike; (2) the judgment to use the correct means to become Christlike; and (3) the freedom of will both to choose Christ and then daily and hourly to choose from among myriads the best means to become more Christlike. Before such democracy in religion and morals, the most daring Stoics, the priests of all religions, and the prophets of new orders might well stand hesitant, if not appalled. The eternal glory of St. Paul is his faith in mankind as well as his faith in God. He believed the Almighty had endowed man with enough freedom to become a willing coworker with the Creator in finishing an unfinished world made up of saved souls on their way to perfection. God was a potter, men were clay; but even clay possesses a nature of its own which the artist must respect (Rom. ix. 14-18, xix. 23).

By such striving is a man's character made. Through it his personality is organized, not diminished nor swallowed up.<sup>13</sup> For, first, he strives. That is born in him. He can-

<sup>13</sup> How oneness with God and morality may be preserved together, see Jones, *A Faith that Enquires*. St. Paul freely uses his own human judgment (I Cor. vi. 11, vii. 25-27, xi. 5-16).

not kill that inner urge except by the most sustained, most determined effort at soul-suicide. Even then, at the end of a misdirected lifetime, as long as breath is in him, some remnant of the divine gift in him, which raises him above the satisfied beasts of the field, still strives. Next, this divine power to strive for self-betterment given to men is epitomized, converged, focused and made powerfully effective by being fixed on Christ. It takes upon itself the form of a sentiment and a consuming passion. The image of him is the intellectual component in it; the affection for him is the urge in it; the choice of him, and the never-ceasing choice of means to become like him, are the will in it. Thus does the man, Christ Jesus, not only a person, but a personality matchless in his perfection of integration, of organized, regnant selfhood, mastery over passion, rationality of poise and purpose, and supremacy of all-inclusiveness, become the ideal toward which Pauline Christians strive, and every step they take makes them more definitely persons.

St. Paul's system of morality avoids many pitfalls of man-made systems of ethics, but it does not eliminate one of the great problems involved in all morality and religion. That is the problem of freedom, the power of man to choose anything whatsoever. Such a liberty has been denied by predestinarian theologians and mechanistic scientists. Both contend that man's seeming freedom is illusory. Neither theory is based upon observed facts, but deduced from previous theories—the first, from the absolute sovereignty of an omnipotent God, the second from the assumed power of inductive science to predict the occurrence of future events.<sup>14</sup>

On the other hand, the common sense of mankind, bent upon preserving the moral responsibility of men, has always favored at least a freedom to choose between good and bad

<sup>14</sup> F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism*, 1907; McDougall, *Mind and Body*, for studies in determinism and free-will. Also Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, Ex. Vol., p. 293; Vol. IV, p. 143; and "Will," by V. H. Stanton.

on man's part. St. Paul went this far and no farther. He never changed from his position in this matter from the doctrine of the Pharisees (Rom. ix. 14-18, xix. 23). He seems clearly enough to insist upon the sovereignty of God and his perfect freedom to mold men as he will. Yet, at the same time, men appear free to choose both ends and means, and the Evangelist exhorts men and women to do so without a single hint that they are unable to make such choices. In all probability he would have indignantly denied the modern doctrine of determinism, or physical necessity.

Most recent movements in philosophy have tended more and more toward Paul's position. Mechanism to-day is being recognized, not as a master of man, but his tool to be used by him for his purposes. When the issue is condensed into the query, Can a man use his brains? the overwhelming conclusion is that he can. His brains do not use him. An analogous reconciliation can be made between man's ability to choose and God's purpose, if we grant that St. Paul's discussion concerns not the ultimate destiny of man (see his examples, Rom. ix), but his temporary use of certain men in certain phases of their activities for divine purposes not yet revealed here. St. Paul's view of the situation perhaps gave him only a limited, though still a very extensive, view of it. God's plans are eternal; his realm infinite in extent. It may be that a man must be free to elect himself to eternal damnation. Paul's statement, "I was not disobedient to the heavenly vision," seems to place the final arbitrament of his life in his own hands.

We close this study of St. Paul, the chosen vessel of the Lord, with the thought of his supreme choice. God did indeed select him for signal honors and signal sufferings. He chose him because he was natively endowed with marvelous gifts of mind and body, enhanced by training and culture. To one whose career, judged by that small segment of the curve we know, would have led him to a high position in a small nation, came the call to an eternal

work, and by his acceptance of that message from heaven he was lifted out of the company of mortal men, and set high above principalities and powers, above the wrecks of nations and the engulfing infiltrations of time. He has been set high by the church he organized; he has been sainted, given authority beyond his personal dreams, called even the Founder of that Christianity which to-day rules the Western world; but no apotheosis can hide from sympathetic students his essential humanity nor stay the involuntary sympathy that wells up in the hearts of those who follow this hero of the cross in his elations and sorrows, his anxieties and his triumphs. While we stand in awe at the towering genius of the man, and bow involuntarily before the utter devotion of his whole being, we never lose the sense of the common humanity of this gigantic personality, which he shares with us. So, in the end, the analyst of St. Paul's character feels that though he has come nigh unto the heart of this gracious soul—curious, burning, fiery, quick, unstable, elastic, steel-like, undivertable, inexorable as a river for its end, plastic as its current in its means—the arc of his life reaches out into the firmament of God beyond the tracing of human pen. While his hard-driven body was on earth, his soul was partly in heaven. We have tried to trace some of the workings of the earthly part of him as he stands:

Like some tall cliff that lifts its awful form,  
Swell from the plain and midway leaves the storm,  
Though rolling clouds around its breast are shed,  
Eternal sunshine settles on its head.





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